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Erick Virgil Hall. Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

3/1/2005

NEWC

CCBLACJE

New Case Filed

Thomas F. Neville

CCBLACJE

Post Conviction Relief Filing

Thomas F. Neville

3/2/2005

CERT

CCBLACJE

Certificate Of Mailing

Thomas F. Neville

3/25/2005

RSPS

CCMONGKJ

St Rsps To Post Conv Relf,st Motn To Dismiss

Thomas F. Neville

4/13/2005

RSPS

CCRIVEDA

Response To States Response To Post Conv
Relf

Thomas F. Neville

9/7/2005

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion For Petnr Access Grand Jury Transcrpts

Thomas F. Neville

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled - Motn Accss Trns
(10103/2005) Thomas Neville

Thomas F. Neville

1013/2005

HRHD

DCELLlSJ

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
10/03/200501:30 PM: Hearing Held Motn
Accss Trns

Thomas F. Neville

10/31/2005

STIP

CCGROSPS

Stip For Release Of Jury Quest. & Add To The

Thomas F. Neville

MISC

CCGROSPS

Reporters Transcript

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order Allowing Petitioner Access To & Poss

Thomas F. Neville

CONT

DCELLlSJ

Of G/j Transcripts SUb. To Conditions

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order For Preparation Add'l Transcripts

Thomas F. Neville

MEMO

CCTHIEBJ

Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Motion

Thomas F. Neville

MOTN

CCTHIEBJ

Motion For Discovery

Thomas F. Neville

1/19/2006

OBJT

CCCHILER

State's Objection to the Motion for Discovery

Thomas F. Neville

1/20/2006

MOTN

DCELLlSJ

Motion To Reconsider oral orders re: ex parte
procedures for expert access and strictions on
juror contact

Thomas F. Neville

MEMO

DCELLlSJ

Memorandum In support of Motion to Reconsider Thomas F. Neville

1/24/2006

MOTN

DCELLlSJ

Motion For the Court to adopt petitioner's
proposed scheduling order

Thomas F. Neville

2/8/2006

HRSC

DCELlISJ

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/15/2006 02:00
PM)

Thomas F. Neville

NOTC

DCELLlSJ

Notice of hearing on Motion to Reconsider

Thomas F. Neville

2/15/2006

HRHD

DCELLlSJ

Hearing result for Motion held on 02/15/2006
02:00 PM: Hearing Held

Thomas F. Neville

3/1/2006

LODG

CCMARTLG

Lodged State's Memo in Support of the State's
Objection to the Motn for Discovery

Thomas F. Neville

3/16/2006

MOTN

CCTHIEBJ

Ex Parte Motion For Expert Access To Petitioner Thomas F. Neville

3/28/2006

MOTN

CCMARTLG

State's Motion in Limine to Preclude Depositions
Without Court Order

Thomas F. Neville

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing Motn in Limine to Preclude
Depositions Without Court Order (6-23-06 @ 9
am)

Thomas F. Neville

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/23/2006 09:00
AM) State's Motn in Limine to Preclude
Depositions Without Court Order

Thomas F. Neville

11/15/2005

1/5/2006
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Case: CV-PC-2005-21649 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

3/31/2006

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas for Depositions Thomas F. Neville
and Subpoenas Duces Tecum for Production of
Documents

4/17/2006

AMEN

CCMARTLG

Amended Petn for Post-Conviction Relief

Thomas F. Neville

DCELLlSJ

Notice Of Amended Hearing for all motions
currently set for June 23, 2006

Thomas F. Neville

5/15/2006

Judge

5/24/2006

AMEN

DCELLlSJ

Addendum to Amended Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief

Thomas F. Neville

5/31/2006

RSPS

CCMARTLG

State's Response to the Amended Petn for Post
Conviction Relief and State's Motn to Dismiss

Thomas F. Neville

6/2/2006

MOTN

DCELLlSJ

Motion To suspend post-conviction proceedings

Thomas F. Neville

MISC

DCELLlSJ

Second Addendum to Amended Petition for
post-conviction relief

Thomas F. Neville

MOTN

DCELLlSJ

Renewed motion for access to completed
questionnaires

Thomas F. Neville

NOTC

DCELLlSJ

Notice Of Hearing, June 20, 2006 @ 1:30 p.m.

Thomas F. Neville

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion for Order to Conduct Medical Testing and Thomas F. Neville
Order for Transport

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing Motn Order to Conduct Medical Thomas F. Neville
Testing and Order for Transport (6-20-06 @ 1:30
pm)

6/12/2006

NOTC

CCMARTLG

Notice of Filing of Correction to Affd of Dr James
Merikangas MD

Thomas F. Neville

6/14/2006

MOTN

CCMARTLG

State's Motion for the Production of Documents
and for Ordr Waiving the Atty-Client Privilege

Thomas F. Neville

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing State's Motn to Dismiss and
Motn for Production of Documents (6-20-06 @
1:30 pm)

Thomas F. Neville

MOTN

DCELLlSJ

Motion To Disqualify

Thomas F. Neville

AFFD

DCELLlSJ

Affidavit Of Mark J. Ackley In support of Motion
to Disqualify

Thomas F. Neville

MEMO

DCELLlSJ

Memorandum In support of Motion to Disqaulify

Thomas F. Neville

NOTC

DCELLlSJ

Notice Of Hearing June 20, 2006 @ 1:30 p.m.

Thomas F. Neville

6/20/2006

HRHD

DCELLlSJ

Hearing result for Motion held on 06/20/2006
Thomas F. Neville
01:30 PM: Hearing Held State's Motn in Limine
to Preclude Depositions Without Court Order
State's Motn to Dismiss and Motn for Production
of Documents

6/2212006

OBJT

CCSHAPML

State's Objection to the Petitioner's Motion to
Disqualify the Court

Thomas F. Neville

NOTC

CCSHAPML

Notice of Hearing (7/5/06 @ 9:00AM)

Thomas F. Neville

HRSC

CCSHAPML

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
07105/200609:00 AM)

Thomas F. Neville

AMEN

CCWOODCL

Amended State's Motion For The Production Of
Documents and For Order Waiving Attorney
Client Privilege

Thomas F. Neville

6/7/2006

5/2712006

OO()()!l
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Case: CV-PC-200S-21649 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

6/27/2006

NOTH

CCWOODCL

Notice Of Hearing (07/0S/06 @ 9 am)

Thomas F. Neville

6/30/2006

MISC

DCANDEML

3rd Addendum to Amended Petition

Thomas F. Neville

NOTC

DCANDEML

Notice of Hearing (7/S @9 a.m.)

Thomas F. Neville

HRHD

DCELLlSJ

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
07/0S/2006 09:00 AM: Hearing Held

Thomas F. Neville

HRSC

DCELLlSJ

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
09/27/200609:00 AM)

Thomas F. Neville

7/6/2006

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order Granting Access to Completed jury
questionnaires

Thomas F. Neville

7/11/2006

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order Denying Motion to Disqualify NUNC PRO
TUNC

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order Denying the Motion to Suspend post
conviction proceedings

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order Denying Petitioner's Motion to Transport for Thomas F. Neville
Medical Testing

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order Waiving Attorney-Client Privilege And
Granting State's Access To Documents

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order Granting In Part, And Denying in Part,
Petitioner's Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas
For Depositions and Subpoenas Duces Tecum
For Production of Documents

Thomas F. Neville

MOTN

DCELLlSJ

Motion For Permission To Appeal The Denial of
Petitioner's Motion to Disqualify

Thomas F. Neville

AFOS

CCMAXWSL

Affidavit Of Service 8-24-2006

Thomas F. Neville

AFOS

CCMAXWSL

Affidavit Of Service 8-24-2006

Thomas F. Neville

9/11/2006

MISC

DCANDEML

Partial Agreement on Discovery

Thomas F. Neville

9/26/2006

HRVC

DCELLlSJ

Hearing result for Motion to Compel held on
09/27/200609:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Thomas F. Neville

12/6/2006

MOTN

DCELLlSJ

Ex Parte Motion for Expert Access to Petitioner

Thomas F. Neville

AFFD

DCELLlSJ

Affidavit Of Paula M. Swensen in Support of Ex
Parte Motion For Expert Access to Petitioner

Thomas F. Neville

12/21/2006

HRSC

DCELLlSJ

Hearing Scheduled (Post Conviction Relief
01/04/200709:00 AM)

Thomas F. Neville

12/29/2006

MISC

CCHEATJL

Supplemental Memorandum In Support Of Motion Thomas F. Neville
For Discovery

1/8/2007

MISC

DCELLlSJ

Fourth Addendum to Amended Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief

Thomas F. Neville

NOTC

DCELLlSJ

Notice Of Filing of Index of Exhibits to Amended
Petition For Post Conviction Relief

Thomas F. Neville

NOTC

DCELLlSJ

Notice Of Filing of Table of Contents to Amended Thomas F. Neville
Petition for Post Conviction Relief

1/10/2007

CONT

DCELLlSJ

Hearing result for Post Conviction Relief held on
01/10/200701 :30 PM: Continued

Thomas F. Neville

1/11/2007

CONT

DCELLlSJ

Post conviction hearing, cont'd to 01/12/2007 @
9:30 a.m.

Thomas F. Neville

7/S/2006

7/19/2006

8/24/2006

f\()OOt:::
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Case: CV-PC-2005-21649 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

1/11/2007

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order To Vacate NUNC PRO TUNC hearing
November 9, 2006 hearing

Thomas F. Neville

1/12/2007

CONT

DCELLlSJ

Post Conviction hearing

Thomas F. Neville

2/2/2007

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Renewed Motion for Order to Conduct Medical
Testing and Order for Transport

Thomas F. Neville

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion for Juror Contact

Thomas F. Neville

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing (2-16-07 @ 9 am)

Thomas F. Neville

HRSC

CCMARTLG

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/16/2007 09:00
AM) Renewed Motn for Order to Conduct
Medical Testing and Order for Transport and
Motn for Juror Contact

Thomas F. Neville

MOTN

CCMARTLG

State's Motion to Clarify Discovery Order And/Or
to Modify Discovery Order

Thomas F. Neville

NOTH

CCMARTLG

Notice Of Hearing Motn to Clarify Discovery
(2-16-07 @ 9 am)

Thomas F. Neville

2/12/2007

MEMO

MCBIEHKJ

Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion

Thomas F. Neville

2/13/2007

NOTC

DCELLlSJ

Withdrawal of Notice of Hearing on Motion for
Juror Contact

Thomas F. Neville

2/16/2007

MISC

DCELLlSJ

Response to State's Motion To Clarify Discovery
Order andlOr To Modify Discovery Order

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order Regarding Discovery

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order To transport petitioner no later than Feb.
Thomas F. Neville
26, 2007 For Radiological and serological Testing

HRHD

DCELLlSJ

Hearing result for Motion held on 02/16/2007
09:00AM: Hearing Held Renewed Motn for
Order to Conduct Medical Testing and Order for
Transport and Motn for Juror Contact; Motn to
Clarify Discovery and/or Modify Discovery Order

2/2012007

NOTC

DCELLlSJ

Notice Of Filing of Curriculum Vitae For James R. Thomas F. Neville
Merikangas, M.D.

3/16/2007

RSPS

CCMARTLG

Discovery Response to Court

Thomas F. Neville

5/14/2007

NOTC

DCANDEML

Notice of Hearing (6/15 @ 2:30)

Thomas F. Neville

HRSC

DCANDEML

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
06/15/2007 02:30 PM)

Thomas F. Neville

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Motion For Juror Contact

Thomas F. Neville

MEMO

CCMARTLG

Memorandum In Support Of Motn For Juror
Contact

Thomas F. Neville

MOTN

CCMARTLG

Sealed Supplemental Motion For Discovery

Thomas F. Neville

5/5/2007

NOFG

CCTHIEBJ

3/11/2007

MISC

DCELLlSJ

2/9/2007

6/1/2007

Document sealed
Notice Of Filing of Attachments To Sealed
Supplemental Motion For Discovery
Document sealed
Sealed Notice of Filing of Audio Citations to
Interview of Norma Jean Oliver
Document sealed

Thomas F. Neville

Thomas F. Neville

Thomas F. Neville
nn~~re
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Case: CV-PC-2005-21649 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

6/15/2007

CONH

DCELLfSJ

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on
06/15/200702:30 PM: Conference Held

Thomas F. Neville

7/9/2007

OBJT

CCDWONCP

State's Objection to Petitioner's Motion for
Unrestricted Access to Jurors

Thomas F. Neville

8/8/2007

ORDR

DCELLfSJ

Agreed Protective Order

Thomas F. Neville

8/23/2007

MOTN

CCTHIEBJ

Motion For Permission To Appeal

Thomas F. Neville

NOHG

CCTHIEBJ

Notice Of Hearing

Thomas F. Neville

8/27/2007

RSPS

CCBLACJE

State's Response to Request for Admissions

Thomas F. Neville

9/6/2007

MOTN

DCELLfSJ

Motion For Expert Access To Petiti<;mer

Thomas F. Neville

9/12/2007

ORDR

DCANDEML

Order to Provide Transcript of Hearing Held in
Ada County Case No. HCR18591

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCANDEML

Order To Conduct Medical Testing

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCANDEML

Court's Order Denying Petitioner's Motion For
juror Contact

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCANDEML

Order to Release Records of Norma Jean Oliver

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCANDEML

(6) Order to Release Medical &
PhysicallPsychiatric Records of Norma Jean
Oliver

Thomas F. Neville

9/17/2007

ORDR

DCANDEML

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Petitioner's Supplemental Motion for Discovery

Thomas F. Neville

9/28/2007

TRAN

CCTHIEBJ

Transcript Filed

Thomas F. Neville

10/1/2007

MOTN

CCTEELAL

Motion for Fragile X Blood Test

Thomas F. Neville

10/3/2007

ORDR

CCTHIEBJ

Order To Conduct Fragile-X Blood Test

Thomas F. Neville

10/5/2007

PETN

DCELLfSJ

Final Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief Thomas F. Neville

10/1212007

NOTC

DCANDEML

Notice of Filing of Table of Contents

Thomas F. Neville

NOTC

DCANDEML

Notice of Filing of Index of Exhibits

Thomas F. Neville

NOTC

DCANDEML

Notice of Filing of Verifictation Page

Thomas F. Neville

10/19/2007

NOTC

DCELLfSJ

Notice of Filing of Exhibit 97 to the final amended Thomas F. Neville
petition for post-conviction relief

10/29/2007

MOTN

CCSTROMJ

Motion for Additional Time to Make State's
Response to Final Amended Petition for Post
Conviction Relief

Thomas F. Neville

11/16/2007

NOTC

CCTHIEBJ

Notice Of Filing Of Exhibit 17 To The Final
Amended Petition For Post-Conviction Relief

Thomas F. Neville

12121/2007

MOTN

CCTHIEBJ

State's Motion To Dismiss

Thomas F. Neville

RSPN

CCTHIEBJ

State's Response To Final Amended Petition For Thomas F. Neville
Post Conviction Relief

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Permissive Thomas F. Neville
Appeal

HRSC

DCELLfSJ

Hearing Scheduled (Status 02/08/2008 03:00
PM)

9/13/2007

1/18/2008

Judge

Thomas F. Neville

(\{)(){\~
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Case: CV-PC-2005-21649 Current Judge: Thomas F. Neville
Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Erick Virgil Hall, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

1/18/2008

HRSC

DCELLlSJ

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
05/01/200809:00 AM) 1 1/2 days on State's
Motion for Summary Dismissal

Thomas F. Neville

RSPN

CCTHIEBJ

Addendum To State's Response To Final
Amended Petition For Post Conviction Relief:
State's Response To Petitioner's Claim C

Thomas F. Neville

MOTN

DCELLlSJ

Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum

Thomas F. Neville

HRSC

DCELLlSJ

Notice of Hearing Feb, 8, 2008 @ 3:00 p.m.

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCELLlSJ

Order on Discovery Disclosed January 18, 2008 Thomas F. Neville
regarding Norma Jean Oliver and April Sebastian

HRHD

DCELLlSJ

Hearing result for Status held on 02/08/2008
03:00 PM: Hearing Held

Thomas F. Neville

OBJC

CCTHIEBJ

State's Objection To The Petitioner's Motion For
Issuance Of Subpoena Duces Tecum

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Restricting Contact with Norma Jean
Oliver

Thomas F. Neville

ORDR

DCTYLENI

Order Denying Petition's Moiton for Issuance of
Subpoena Duces Tecum

Thomas F. Neville

3/3/2008

RESP

DCELLlSJ

3/5/2008

APDC

DCELLlSJ

Response to The State's Motion to Dismiss (Filed Thomas F. Neville
under Seal)
Document sealed
Appeal Filed In District Court
Thomas F. Neville

CAAP
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CASE NO. H0300518
PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
(Capital Case)

ORIGINAL

. -,.

.

COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at
the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD), and petitions this Honorable Court for postconviction relief from the conviction and sentences imposed by this Court in the Fourth Judicial
District, in State v. Hall, Ada County Case No. H0300518, on January 18,2005. This Court has
jurisdiction over the action pursuant to

I.e.

§19-2719; §§19-4901 et seq.; I.C.R., Rules 35 and

57; and Article I, Sections 1 and 5 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. Petitioner relies on
Article I, §§ 1,5,6, 7, 8, 13, 17 ~d 18 of the Constitution of the State ofIdaho, and'~he Fourth,
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Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as
International Human Rights Law in support of this Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (herein
"Petition").

I.

BACKGROUND (I.C.R. 57(a)(1) through (a)(6»

1. Petitioner is in the custody of the State of Idaho Department of Correction, detained at the
Idaho Maximum Security Institution (IMSI) near Boise, Idaho.
2. Judgment and sentence were pronounced by Honorable Thomas F. Neville, District Judge
of the Fourth Judicial District ofthe State ofldaho, in Ada County, Boise, Idaho.
3. Petitioner stands convicted in Ada County Case No. H0300518 of the crimes of:
Count I, Murder in the First Degree
Count II, Rape
Count III, Kidnapping in the First Degree
4. The Court imposed sentences as follows on the 18 th day of January, 2005:
Count I, for Murder:

Death

Count II, for Rape:

Life in Prison without possibility of parole

Count III, for Kidnapping:

Life in Prison without possibility of parole

The sentences for Counts II and III are to run consecutively.
5. Petitioner pled NOT GUILTY and a jury returned verdicts of guilty to the cnmes
charged.
6. Other than post-trial motions and any prematurely filed NOTICE OF APPEAL, which
cannot be litigated under Idaho law until these post-conviction matters are concluded, this
is Petitioner's first attempt in any court to obtain relief from the convictions and sentences
herein challenged.
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II.

ILLEGAL RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY
Petitioner is a person restrained of his liberty in that he is a prisoner of the State ofIdaho,

under the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, held on death row at the Idaho
Maximum Security Institution in Boise, Idaho. This restraint is pursuant to the following
conviction and sentence imposed on January 18, 2005 by this Court presiding in the Fourth
Judicial District, in State v. Hall, Ada County Case No. H0300518: Murder in the First Degree,
Kidnapping in the First Degree, and Rape. This restraint is illegal in that the convictions and
sentences were obtained in violation of the constitutions of the United States and of the State of
Idaho and in violation of court rules, statutes and other law as set forth below.

III.

LACK OF SPECIFICITY - NEED TO AMEND
This Petition is filed according to the time constraints ofI.C. § 19-2719, giving Petitioner

only forty-two (42) days within which to file an initial petition for post-conviction relief. Due to
these time constraints, it is impossible for Petitioner to file a petition which complies with I.C. §§

19-4901, et seq., § 19-2719 and ICR 57, because of the following factors, among others:
1.

As required by ICR 44.2 and I.C. 19-870(l)(c), the Court appointed Petitioner's
present counsel to represent him in post-conviction proceedings on February 17,

2.

Present counsel for Petitioner have limited knowledge of and had no participation in
the criminal case leading to the conviction and sentences herein challenged; and

3.

Present counsels have not yet received a copy of the reporter's transcript or the
clerk's record from the criminal proceedings and have not had a meaningful

I Present counsel was previously appointed to represent Petitioner in his direct"appeal on January
25,2005.
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opportunity to conduct an independent investigation and to engage in discovery as of
this time.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires review of the trial transcript and the
entire record to determine the nature, frequency and effect of counsel's errors, Hoffman v. Arave,
236 F.3d 523, 535 (9 th Cir. 2001), in addition to a thorough investigation for claims outside the
record. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (recognizing that even a thorough
investigation of the record may not reveal all claims since often "the record is unclear or the
errors are hidden" and noting that reliance solely on the record would likely render postconviction proceedings "a meaningless ritual.") This investigation must be both diligent and
exhaustive, aimed at including all possible grounds for relief since the failure to raise all possible
claims may result in a procedural bar. See I.C. § 19-2719 (3), (5); Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho
469; 903 P.2d 58 (1995); State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). Further, the
investigation can neither rely solely on the assistance and investigation of trial counsel, see

Hoffman, supra (recognizing the inability or difficulty of trial counsel's objective examination of
their own performance); I.C.R. 44.2 (requiring the appointment of at least one attorney other than
trial counsel to represent the defendant in post-conviction), nor upon the discovery provided by
the prosecutor or law enforcement during the underlying criminal proceedings. See McCleskey

v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 498 (1991).
Petitioner has not had sufficient time to conduct this independent investigation, yet alone
adequate time to review the volumes of material that trial counsel had in their possession during
their prior representation. In fact, at this time Petitioner has not even received all documents
from trial counsel due to their recent refusal to supply Petitioner with all their files absent a court
order. Nevertheless, Petitioner has acted with diligence in preparing this petition. Petitioner has
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already taken the following steps: attempted several times to obtain all of trial counsels' files,
obtained the files of the mitigation specialist, requested the files of the defense investigator, and
conducted cursory interviews with Petitioner, the mitigation specialist, and trial counsel. Among
the steps remaining to be taken include the following: obtain and review trial counsels' files,
obtain and review the defense investigator's files, obtain and review the reporter's transcript and
clerk's record, identify and request relevant records, conduct comprehensive interviews with all
members of the defense team and potential witnesses, determine which experts would be
appropriate for case development, and otherwise re-investigate the crime and surrounding events.
See 2003 American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of

Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (herein "ABA Guidelines"), Guideline 10.15.1 ("Duties
Of Post-Conviction Counsel,,). 2
Accordingly, Petitioner will seek this Court's leave to amend his Petition pursuant to

I.e.

§ 19-4906(a) and ICR 15 from time to time as development of his case in post-conviction

progresses. Nevertheless, in support of his petition for post-conviction relief from the conviction
and sentence entered against him, Petitioner is able to show the Court as follows:

IV.

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
The convictions and sentences entered against Petitioner were obtained in violation of

laws of the United States and ofIdaho, including the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, §§ 1, 5, 6, 7, 8 13, 17, and 18, of the
2 The Commentary to this Guideline provides in part: "Two parallel tracks of post-conviction
investigation are required. One involves reinvestigating the capital case; the other focuses on the
client. Reinvestigating the case means examining the facts underlying the conviction and
sentence, as well as such items as trial counsel's performance, judicial bias or prosecutorial
misconduct. Reinvestigating the client means assembling a more-thorough biography of the
client than was known at the time of trial, not only to discover mitigation that was not presented
previously, but also to identify mental-health claims which potentially reach beyond sentencing
issues to fundamental questions of competency and mental-state defenses."
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Constitution of the State ofIdaho, provisions of the Idaho Code and the Idaho Criminal Rules as
well as international law.
Petitioner alleges that all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel herein satisfy both
prongs of the Strickland analysis, specifically, that the claims show 1) a deficiency in trial
counsel's performance, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In addition, Petitioner alleges that he has
demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct and the necessary level of prejUdice for this Court to
grant him relief. Finally, Petitioner alleges that even if the claims do not meet the governing
level of prejudice on their own, that when cumulatively considered, the accumulation of error
creates prejudice entitling Petitioner to relief Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9 th Cir. 1992).
A. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AT PRETRIAL, TRIAL AND SENTENCING
PROCEEDINGS.
1. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Failing To Timely Disclose

Favorable Evidence.

Suppression of evidence favorable to an accused by the prosecution violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Favorable evidence
includes not only that evidence tending to exculpate the accused, but also any evidence adversely
affecting the credibility of the government's witnesses, e.g., evidence that could be used for
impeachment. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). The prosecution must actively
search out material in its files and in the files of related agencies reasonably expected to have
possession of evidence favorable to an accused. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
Even this early in his investigation, Petitioner is aware of at least one item of evidence
withheld from him that would have been favorable during the guilt and punishment phases of his
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trial.

Specifically, Petitioner claims that the prosecution and/or its agents withheld medical

records of the prior statutory rape victim, Norma Jean Oliver. These records were withheld until
conclusion of the case. If the records had been disclosed in a timely manner as requested, then
Petitioner could have rebutted the testimony of the victim that Petitioner had committed a prior
forcible rape. The records would have shown that the victim did not have any injuries associated
with rape, and as such, the amended charge of statutory non-forcible rape was more consistent
with the facts of the prior incident.
2. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making An Improper Closing
Argument Regarding The Definition Of Mitigation.
Several times during closing argument, the State argued that Petitioner's mitigation
evidence was not mitigating evidence because it did not excuse his conduct.

However, by

definition, mitigation is not so narrowly confined; indeed, mitigation cannot constitute an excuse
or justification for criminal conduct, if so, then the defendant would not be guilty of the crime.
As such, the prosecution's argument precluded the jury from considering mitigation presented at
odds with the definition of mitigation. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated,
We generally note that the concept of mitigation is broad. Mitigating
circumstances have been defined as: "Such as do not constitute a justification or
excuse of the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be
considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability." Black's
Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979) at 903.

State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 415, 631 P.2d 187, 197 (1981). Indeed, mitigation is anything
that could justify a sentence less than death, State v. Creech, 105 Idaho at 369, 670 P.2d at 470
(1983) or any circumstances that "may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of
moral culpability." Osborn, 102 Idaho at 415, 631 P.2d at 197. Thus, mitigation not only refers
to circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime but also circumstances of the
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defendant himself including "his background, his age, upbringing and environment or any other
matter appropriate to a determination of the degree of culpability." !d.
An individual juror must be free to consider a mitigating factor, regardless of whether

other members of the jury agree as to its existence. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988);

McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 US. 433 (1990) ("each juror [must] be permitted to consider and
give effect to mitigating evidence"). It is not enough "simply to allow the defendant to present
mitigating evidence to the sentencer," rather there must not be any impediment, through
evidentiary rules, jury instructions, Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 US. 393 (1987), or prosecutorial

argument. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 US. 302, 326 (1989). In this case, the prosecutor's closing
argument created an impediment to the jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances by
limiting the jury's consideration of mitigation to evidence that would excuse criminal conduct
and thus impeding consideration of evidence that would have called for a lesser sentence. 3 This
misconduct requires this Court to vacate Petitioner's death sentence.
3. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making An Improper Closing
Argument Regarding The Manner In Which Mitigation Is Weighed Against The
Aggravation.
While arguing their view of mitigation, the State presented a slide that depicted the
weighing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances. The illustration was
that of a scale, likened to the scales of justice, with the term "mitigation" on one side weighed
against all four aggravating circumstances the State sought to prove to the jury: "HAC,"
"Propensity," "Utter disregard," and "In perpetration." The illustration resembled the following:

Not only did these improper arguments affect the jury and its verdict, but the Court as well.
Specifically, in its post-verdict findings, the Court noted that Petitioner's mitigation evidence did
not excuse his crimes, indicating the Court's agreement with the jury regarding their finding that
the four aggravating circumstances were not outweighed by the mitigation.
3
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As shown above, the prosecution drew a scale leaning heavily in favor of the four aggravating
circumstances weighed aggregately against the mitigation. Drawing upon the scale in its
argument, the prosecution asserted that Petitioner deserved the death penalty.
The State's argument and illustration is a grossly simplified and misleading
characterization of the weighing process required under

I.e.

§ 19-2S1S(8)(a)(ii). The statute

requires that all of the mitigation presented by the defense be weighed against each of the
statutory aggravators it has found as proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Charboneau,
116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989).

The scale depicted by the prosecution misstates the

requirements under the law and constitutes gross misconduct. This misconduct requires this
Court to vacate Petitioner's death sentence.
4. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Arguing That The Defense Experts
Were Hired Guns.
During their closing argument, the prosecution referred to Petitioner's experts as hired
guns, asserting that "they're in the business of supplying defendants with excuses." The
prosecution further referred to their testimony as a "show" that cost $100,000, and rhetorically
inquired whether they were "hired to convince [the jury] to spare the defendant?" This argument
is constitutionally improper and highly prejudicial.
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A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense which includes the right to
expert assistance. In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
"the Constitution requires that an indigent defendant have access to the psychiatric examination
and assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense based on his mental condition." Id. at
70. A defendant cannot be penalized for exercising his constitutional rights.
A defendant's right to counsel can be violated by a prosecutor's improper examination of
a witness or argument which seeks to penalize the defendant for exercising his constitutional
right.

State v. Masters, No. M2003-00305-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1208872, at *10 (Tenn.

Crim. App. Jun. 2, 2004). In Masters, the court held that the defendant's rights were not violated
during cross-examination of his experts when the prosecutor sought to attack "the reliability and
impartiality of the witnesses because of their attitudes toward capital punishment and the bias of
the information on which their opinions were, at least in some part, based." Id. However, when
the prosecution goes beyond attacking the reliability and impartiality of a witness, the risk of
depriving the defendant of a fair trial increases significantly. One such instance is where the
state suggests that because the defense experts were paid hefty fees, their testimony would weigh
heavily in favor of the defense. State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 185, 770 A.2d 255, 272 (N.J.

2001); see also State v. Schneider, 402 N.W.2d 779, 788 (Minn. 1987) ("Experts are not the paid
harlots of either side in a criminal case and should not be portrayed in such a light.").
Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor's argument in his case went beyond attacking the
reliability and impartiality of his experts, and thus deprived him of his right to a fair trial and his
right to present a defense in mitigation of punishment. This misconduct requires this Court to
vacate Petitioner's death sentence.
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5. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Making An Argument Inconsistent
with Evidence Outside The Record.
The prosecution had the opportunity to rebut the testimony of Petitioner's defense experts
during the penalty phase of the trial, yet they chose not to do so. Indeed, the prosecution had
their own professional witness, Dr. Estess, who they no doubt had to compensate to review
Petitioner's experts' opinions as well as their testimony, yet the prosecution did not call him as a
witness, presumably because he could not rebut their testimony.
Petitioner asserts that it is improper for a prosecutor to seek to undermine Petitioner's
experts when aware that their own expert concurs in their opinions.

After review of the

transcripts and record in this case, as well as a full opportunity to conduct discovery, Petitioner
anticipates presenting additional evidence in support of this claim.
6. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct In Arguing For Imposition Of The
Death Penalty To Deter Future Crimes.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor suggested that the death penalty should be
imposed to deter future crimes. This argument is improper because it called for the jury to base
its penalty verdict on matters wholly irrelevant to their consideration of the crime and the
defendant's character and record. Deterrence is a matter solely for legislative consideration; it is
improper for a jury in a capital case to consider alleged deterrent or non-deterrent effects of the
death penalty in deciding whether it should be imposed. See People v. Love, 56 Ca1.2d 720, 366
P.2d 33 (Cal. 1961) (holding that it was improper for the prosecution during closing argument to
argue that the death penalty was a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment). Thus, courts
uniformly condemn such prosecution appeals to the jury to render their verdicts for the greater
social good. The clear purpose of these arguments is an attempt to dissuade the jury from
granting mercy to the defendant. See Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d 621, 624 (11 th ' Cir. 1985).
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However, the requirement that the jury consider mitigating circumstances demonstrates that
mercy certainly plays a part in capital sentencing. !d. Thus, the prosecutor's argument regarding
deterrent effects and society's greater good swayed the focus of the jury away from the
consideration of mitigating evidence in favor of evidence irrelevant to its consideration. This
misconduct requires this Court to vacate Petitioner's death sentence.
7. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Presenting Evidence Regarding
Potential Conditions Of A Life Sentence And By Arguing That A Life Sentence
Would Be Too Lenient And Otherwise Speculating As To What Might Happen
To Petitioner If A Death Sentence Were Withheld.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim.
B. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
FAILURE TO CONDUCT ADEQUATE INVESTIGATION.
1. Trial Counsel Failed To Retain Necessary Defense Experts.

i.

Forensic Pathologist.

Trial counsel failed to hire a forensic pathologist or other expert to review the autopsy
results and make an independent determination of cause of death or injuries inflicted upon the
victim prior to her death. Trial counsel should have obtained independent consultation in each of
these areas to truly subject the prosecution's case to the level of adversarial testing demanded in
capital cases at both the guilt and penalty phases at trial.
Without sufficient time for an adequate investigation by Petitioner's counsel, it is
impossible to determine the actual discrepancies and if others existed that should have been
investigated, however, Petitioner asserts he was prejudiced by the mere fact that trial counsel
failed to fulfill its duty and effectively allowed the State to present an untested case to the jury at
trial and sentencing.
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ii. Crime Scene Expert.

Petitioner makes this claim without having reviewed the trial transcript, record or defense
files in this case. Petitioner anticipates conducting extensive investigation into this area and
reserves the right to withdraw this claim if the evidence does not lend support.
iii. Medical Expert.

Petitioner makes this claim without having reviewed the trial transcript, record or defense
files in this case. Petitioner anticipates conducting extensive investigation into this area and
reserves the right to withdraw this claim ifthe evidence does not lend support.

iv. Violence In Penal Institutions Expert.
Petitioner makes this claim without having reviewed the trial transcript, record or defense
files in this case. Petitioner anticipates conducting extensive investigation into this area and
reserves the right to withdraw this claim if the evidence does not lend support.

v. Penal Institution Management Expert.
Petitioner makes this claim without having reviewed the trial transcript, record or defense
files in this case. Petitioner anticipates conducting extensive investigation into this area and
reserves the right to withdraw this claim ifthe evidence does not lend support.

2. Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate Circumstances Surrounding
Petitioner's Prior Conviction For Statutory Rape.
Petitioner was previously convicted of statutory rape. At the murder trial, the prosecution
presented the testimony of the victim, Norma Jean Oliver, as well as the testimony of the prior
prosecuting attorney on the case, to show that the rape was violent and to show that amendment
of the forcible rape charge to statutory rape did not indicate the level of force involved.
Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain all the records of statutory rape case
including the medical records which Petitioner believes would have demonstrated at most that
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the rape was a non-forcible statutory rape.

Trial counsel's failure to conduct an adequate

investigation falls below objectively reasonable standard for effectiveness.

But for trial

counsel's ineffectiveness, Petitioner asserts that there is a reasonable probability that outcome of
the trial and the sentencing would have been different.
3. Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate Petitioner's Development
During Adolescence And Adulthood.
During sentencing proceedings, the defense offered testimony from family members and
two experts that described Petitioner's horrific childhood.

However, trial counsel failed to

adequately investigate Petitioner's life in adolescence and adulthood. In their closing argument,
the prosecution argued this very fact to the jury. Thus, it was difficult for the jury to draw a
connection between Petitioner's childhood and adult behavior and the jury was left with the
impression that there were no mitigating circumstances in Petitioner's adult life.
Had trial counsel adequately investigated and presented mitigating circumstances of
Petitioner's adolescence and adulthood including mitigating evidence near the time of the crime,
it is reasonably probable that the jury would have found that the mitigation outweighed the
aggravation and sentenced Petitioner to a life sentence.
C. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR THEIR

FAILURE TO EXPLAIN MITIGATION TO THE JURY DURING CLOSING
ARGUMENTS.
Not only must trial counsel investigate and present mitigation, see e.g., Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), but counsel must also
explain the meaning and purpose of mitigating evidence. Pizzuto v. Arave, 385 P.3d 1247, 1252
(2004) (citing Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) ("To perform effectively
in the penalty phase of a capital case, counsel must conduct sufficient investigation and engage
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in sufficient preparation to be able to present and explain the significance of all the available
[mitigating] evidence."); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 399.
During the penalty phase, defense counsel offered the testimony of several mitigation
witnesses including family members who testified as to the childhood and character of Petitioner.
Dr. Mark Cunningham and Dr. Roderick Pettis testified regarding mitigation, including facts of
Petitioner's upbringing such as incest, drug abuse, physical and verbal abuse, and neglect. Trial
counsel however failed to explain the purpose of mitigation and their testimony to the jury, and
instead allowed the prosecution to mislead the jury regarding the definition ,md purpose of
mitigation by failing to object to the prosecution's closing argument mischaracterizing the
definition of mitigation. See supra, Claim IV. A. b.
Petitioner asserts that but for trial counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable
probability that the jury would have considered the mitigation, appropriately weighed it against
the aggravating circumstances, and imposed a life sentence.
1. Failure To Rehabilitate The Credibility Of Its Own Expert Witnesses During

Closing Argument.
During closing arguments, the State attempted to discredit the defense's expert witnesses,
Dr.'s Cunningham and Pettis, by stating that "they are in the business of supplying defendants
with excuses." The State questioned whether the witnesses were neutral or hired to convince the
jury to spare the defendant. Not only did trial counsel fail to object, but counsel failed to address
these comments in their closing argument. Trial counsel's duty to explain mitigation to the jury
must encompass a duty to bolster the source of the mitigating evidence when it is attacked. Trial
counsel allowed the jury to conclude that the defense experts' testimony was bought, leaving
little, if any, room for reliability. Petitioner was deprived of his right to present mitigation and
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have it considered by the jury because of trial counsels' ineffective assistance. Petitioner's
sentence should thus be vacated.
D. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING THE
JURY SELECTION PROCESS.
Petitioner has not been afforded the opportunity to review the jury selection proceedings
in this case due to a lack of access to the trial transcripts which have not yet been prepared.
After further investigation, Petitioner shall expound upon this claim, or reserve the right to
withdraw the claim if supporting evidence is not discovered upon further investigation.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failure To Strike For Cause

Or Utilize A Preemptory Strike Individual Jurors.
Petitioner has knowledge that at least one juror should have been stricken from the jury,
the wife of Timothy McNeese, Deputy Attorney General for the Idaho Department of
Corrections.

Ms. McNeese ultimately served as the foreperson.

It is hardly reasonable to

assume that the wife of an advocate for the State in carrying out death sentences would not be
affected by her husband's employment when determining whether to impose the death sentence.
Further, Petitioner served a IO-year term in the IDOC during the period that Mr. McNeese served
as the Deputy Attorney General. It is likely that Mr. McNeese was familiar with Erick Hall and
there is a reasonable probability that he shared discussions about inmates, possibly including
Mr. Hall, as well as information about conditions of confinement and other matters that a juror

might consider, appropriately or not, during the sentencing process with his wife. As stated,
Petitioner does not have trial transcripts, the record or files in this case and thus has not had the
opportunity to review them.
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E. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN FAILING TO
ADEQUATELY RAISE LEGAL CHALLENGES.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Object To The

Prosecutor's Closing Argument.
As discussed supra in Claim IV. A, subsections b through g, hereby incorporated by
reference, in closing argument the prosecution mischaracterized the definition of mitigation
evidence and the manner in which it is weighed against evidence in aggravation.

The

prosecution also improperly 1) commented on the role of Petitioner's experts, 2) argued
deterrence as a justification for the death penalty, 3) argued inconsistently with the opinion of
their own expert, and 4) speculated on what might happen if a death sentence were not imposed.
Trial counsel were ineffective for allowing each these arguments to be presented to the jury
without objection.

But for trial counsels' failure to object and request a mistrial, and in the

alternative, request an admonishment and corrective instruction by the Court, there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different.
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Adequately
Challenge The Introduction Of Statements Made By Petitioner To Law
Enforcement.
Petitioner has not had the opportunity to review the interrogations, reports, pleadings, and
transcripts relevant to this claim and reserves the right to either expound or withdraw this claim
after further investigation.
3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Move For A
Change Of Venue.
Trial Counsel failed to move for a change of venue and/or renew a motion for change in
venue during voir dire despite the extensive media coverage and pretrial pUblicity regarding this
case and a separate rape/murder case yet to proceed to trial. The sheer volume of pUblicity in
this case rendered it impossible in which to find an impartial jury composed of Mr. Hall's peers.
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From the media's and the public's perspective, this was a high-profile case involving a young
woman from out-of-town, abducted along the Boise Greenbelt, a highly traveled recreational
area in Boise.
Trial counsel should have thoroughly litigated this issue. It is the defendant's burden to
show "a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news coverage prevented a fair trial in violation of
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77
P.3d 956, 967 (2003). Thus, it was up to trial counsel to establish that in the totality of the
circumstances, juror exposure to pretrial publicity would result in a trial that was fundamentally
unfair to the Defendant. Id. Trial counsel should have presented the Court information in support
of a motion for change of venue including, but not limited to, the nature and content of pretrial
publicity, affidavits indicating the level of community prejUdice, and testimony by prospective
jurors. Id.
Because no motion for a change of venue was filed, this Court was never given the
opportunity to review the significant amount of damaging media coverage in the Boise
community regarding this case that spanned several years. After a review of the transcripts and
record, Petitioner anticipates expanding this claim to include other evidence of the
ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to move for a change of venue.
4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Request A Special
Jury Instruction That Would Require The Jury To Provide Written Findings
Delineating The Mitigating Circumstances That Were Found.
Prior to the amendment to

I.e.

§ 19-2515, a judge, not a jury, was required to make

written findings setting forth any statutory aggravating circumstance found and set forth in
writing any mitigating factors considered.

I.e. § 19-2515(f) (Michie 2000).

The failure to make

such written findings constituted reversible error. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 415-16, 631
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P.2d 187, 197-98 (1981); Creech v. Arave, 928 F.2d 1481, 1489-90 (9 th Cir. 1991), reversed in
part on other grounds by Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993).
The written findings requirement serves two purposes: 1) it helps to ensure that the
imposition of the sentence of death is reasoned and objective as constitutionally required, and 2)
it protects a capital defendant's right to meaningful appellate review. See Osborn, at 414-15;
631 P.2d at 196-97. Without the findings, the reviewing court cannot determine whether the
fact-finder overlooked or ignored any mitigation that was presented, whether the evidence
supports the aggravating factors found, and whether the fact-finder properly weighed all factors.
ld. at 415,631 P.2d at 197; State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993).
Pursuant to the current version of the statute, if a defendant waives the right to a jury at
his sentencing proceeding, the district court shall
(i) [m]ake written findings setting forth any statutory aggravating circumstance
found beyond a reasonable doubt;
(ii) [s]et forth in writing any mitigating circumstances considered; and
(iii) [u]pon weighing all mitigating circumstances against each statutory
aggravating circumstance separately, determine whether mitigating circumstances
are found to be sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust and
detail in writing its reasons for so finding."
I.C. § 19-2515(8)(b). In contrast, when a jury is not waived, the jury is only required to indicate
on special verdict forms whether a statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, and "whether all mitigating circumstances, when weighed against the
aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust."
I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a).
Because the jury is not required to specify the mitigating circumstances it found, a
defendant who chooses to have a jury make the findings of fact at his sentencing proceeding
relinquishes his constitutional right to have his sentence meaningfully
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court and by the Idaho Supreme Court on direct appeal and as a part of its mandatory sentencing
review under I.C. § 19-2827.

Without a complete record, the district court and the Idaho

Supreme Court are precluded from conducting a meaningful review which includes a
determination whether imposition of the death sentence was reasoned and objective or the result
of arbitrariness and passion. See e.g., Osborn, at 415,631 P.2d at 197 ("If the findings of the
lower court are not set forth with reasonable exactitude, this court would be forced to make its
review on an inadequate record, and could not fulfill the function of 'meaningful appellate
review' demanded by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court."); see also State v.
Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214 (1989) (recognizing the increased potential of
arbitrary and inconsistent imposition of the death penalty by juries).
Trial counsel should have requested a special verdict form requiring the jury to delineate
the mitigating circumstances it found and the weighing of such mitigation against the individual
aggravating circumstances when rendering its sentencing decision. Petitioner has been deprived
of the right to have this Court and an appellate court determine whether his sentence was the
result ofa reasoned and objective analysis. Because of trial counsel's ineffectiveness, Petitioner
has lost the necessary predicate for his right to a meaningful review. Petitioner's sentence should
thus be vacated and be afforded a new sentencing proceeding where the sentencer is required to
provide adequate written findings.
5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Challenge Idaho's
"Heinous, Atrocious Or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance, And The Respective
Instruction To The Jury, As Unconstitutionally Vague And As Not Having Been
Meaningfully Narrowed By The Idaho Supreme Court To Comport With The
Eighth Amendment.
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim. Petitioner does not however assert that especially in
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light of the advent of jury sentencing in Idaho, trial counsel has an obligation to reassess prior
case law upholding this and other aggravating circumstances, see also infra, Claim IV. E,
subsections f through g. For instance, in previously upholding the "heinous, atrocious or cruel"
aggravating circumstance, the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
Lankford asserts that the aggravating factor that "their murder was
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity," is
unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100
L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). In Maynard, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
aggravating circumstance of an Oklahoma death penalty statute which referred to
especially heinous, atrocious or cruel murders was unconstitutionally vague
pursuant to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court
reasoned that these aggravating factors failed to adequately inform the sentencer
of what must be found in order to impose the death penalty and thereby left the
sentencer with the ability to impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and
capnclOUS manner.
There is, however, an important distinction between the Oklahoma
and Idaho aggravating circumstance statutes. The distinction is that
Oklahoma has jury sentencing while Idaho adheres to judicial sentencing in
capital murder cases. These aggravating circumstances are terms of art that
are commonly understood among the members of the judiciary. As a result,
the potential for inconsistent application that exists as a result of jury
sentencing is eliminated where the judge sentences.
State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 877, 781 P.2d 197,214 (1989) (emphasis added). Thus, trial counsel

were ineffective in failing to challenge the constitutionality of this aggravating circumstance, not
necessarily solely because of the change to jury sentencing, but especially because of such change. See
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline, 10.8 ("As described in the commentary to Guideline
1.1, counsel also has a duty, pursuant to Subsection (A)(3)(a)-(c) of this Guideline, to preserve issues
calling for a change in existing precedent; the client's life may well depend on how zealously counsel
discharges this duty.")

i.

Idaho Has Failed To Establish A Valid Limiting Construction.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim.
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i.

The Unconstitutional Aggravating Circumstance Requires Re-Sentencing.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support ofthis claim.
ii. Even If The Aggravating Circumstance Is Valid, The Jury Erred In Finding
It In This Case.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim.
6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In Failing to
Challenge The Aggravating Circumstance, I.e. § 19-2515(9)(1), And The
Respective Instruction To The Jury, That The Defendant Exhibited Utter
Disregard For Human Life, As Unconstitutional.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim. See also supra, Claim IV. E, subsection e, hereby
incorporated by reference.
i.

Idaho Has Failed To Establish A Valid Limiting Construction.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim.
ii. The Unconstitutional Aggravating Circumstance Requires Re-Sentencing.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim.
iii. Even If The Aggravating Circumstance Is Valid, The Jury Erred In Finding
It In This Case.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim.
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7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Challenge
The Aggravating Circumstance I.e. § 19-2515(h)(8), And The Respective
Instruction To The Jury, As Unconstitutionally Broad And Indefinite Until The
Idaho Supreme Court Supplies More Direction For Its Application.
After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim. See also supra, Claim IV. E, subsection e, hereby
incorporated by reference.
i.

Idaho Has Failed To Establish The Appropriate Context For Determining
The Existence Of The Aggravating Circumstance.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim.
ii. The Unconstitutional Aggravating Circumstance Requires Re-Sentencing.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim.
iii. Even If The Aggravating Circumstance Is Valid, The Jury Erred In Finding
It In This Case.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim.
8. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To Raise International Law
Violations.
The convictions and sentences entered against Petitioner were obtained in violation of
intemationallaw.
V.

PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, respectfully prays this Honorable

Court:
1.

To allow civil discovery pursuant to the IRCP and ICR 57(b);
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2.

For leave to amend the Petition as more information becomes available during the
course of these proceedings;

3.

For an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition;

4.

For an order vacating the convictions and sentences imposed against Petitioner;

5.

For such other, further relief as, to the Court, seems just and equitable.

DATED this 2 nd day March of2005.

MARK A.CKLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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VERIFICATION

STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)

Erick Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That I am the Petitioner in the above entitled action; that I have read the foregoing
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, and I know the contents thereof, and that the
facts contained therein are true and correct as I verily believe. based upon his review of the
record, conversations with Petitioner.
DATED this 2.,5 day of February, 2005.

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
Petitioner

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~S day of February, 2005.

No ary Public for Idaho
Residing at Ob~, \ \:')
My commission expiresd' B' ~O\ \
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

':J

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this _\_ day of March, 2005, served a true and
correct copy of the forgoing PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF as indicated
below:

ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
POBOX51
BOISE ID 83707

r~

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
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Filed March 3, 2005

3:34 PM

J. DAVID NAVARRO
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
Erick Virgil Hall
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

State of Idaho
Defendant.
======~--------------

Case No. SP OT 0500155
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, J. David Navarro, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy ofthe Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as
notice pursuant to Rule 77 (d) LC.R. in envelopes addressed as follows:
Prosecuting Attorney; Inter-Departmental
Mail

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

,2005

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

By:

if 6iMk

Deputy Clerk
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 2127
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. SPOT0500155D
STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST
CONVICTION RELIEF,
STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS,
AND STATE'S OBJECTION TO
CIVIL DISCOVERY

----------------------------)
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of
Ada, State of Idaho, and makes the State's Response to the defendant, Erick Virgil Hall's
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, as follows.
The State admits that the petitioner is in the custody of the Idaho State Department of
Corrections, pursuant to a judgment and sentenced pronounced by the Honorable Thomas F.
Neville, District Judge, in Ada County Case No. H0300518.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST CONVICTION RELIEF, STATE'S MOTION TO
DISMISS, AND STATE'S OBJECTION TO CIVIL DISCOVERY (HALL), Pa d036
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The State admits that the defendant has been convicted of the crime of First Degree
Murder, Rape, and Kidnapping in the First Degree. The State further admits that the defendant
has been sentenced to death for the murder and to consecutive fixed life sentences for the rape
and kidnapping. The State admits that the petitioner pled not guilty and that a jury returned
verdicts of guilty to the crimes charged.
To the knowledge of the undersigned, this is the defendant's first petition for post
conviction relief filed in Case No. H0300518.
The State denies every other allegation upon which the petitioner relies in support of this
petition for post conviction relief. The State denies that the petitioner is illegally restrained of
his liberty and denies that the defendant's convictions and sentences were obtained in violation
of the Constitutions of the United States or the State of Idaho, or in violation of any statute, rule
or international treaty.
Hereafter, the State will respond to the allegations in the petition using the numbering
system in the original petition.
A.

PROSECUTORIAL

MISCONDUCT

AT

PRETRIAL,

TRIAL

AND

SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS.
1. • •• by Failing to Timely Disclose Favorable Evidence.

The State denies that it suppressed any evidence favorable to the defendant. The State
specifically denies that any medical records of Norma Jean Oliver were favorable to the
defendant and denies that the medical records were suppressed or withheld from the defendant.
The State denies that the records show anything inconsistent with Ms. Oliver's testimony.
2. . .. Misconduct by Making an Improper Closing Argument Regarding the
Definition of Mitigation.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST CONVICTION RELIEF, STATE'S MOTION TO
DISMISS, AND STATE'S OBJECTION TO CIVIL DISCOVERY (HALL), Page 2
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The State denies that there was anything improper about the State's closing argument
regarding mitigation or any other topic.
3.... by Making an Improper Closing Argument Regarding the Manner in
Which Mitigation is Weighed Against the Aggravation.

The State denies that there was anything improper about the State's closing argument on
the topic of weighing mitigation versus aggravation. The jury was properly instructed.
4. . .. by Arguing that the Defense Experts Were Hired Guns.

The State denies that any prosecution reference to the defendant's experts was improper
or unfairly prejudicial.
5. ... by .Making an Argument Inconsistent with Evidence Outside the
Record.

To the extent that the Prosecution understands this claim, the Prosecution denies it as
being without a legal or factual basis. Counsel for the petitioner has no knowledge concerning
information provided by Dr. Estess to the prosecution.

His claim is nothing more than

speculation without a factual basis. He cites no legal basis for his claim. His claim should be
denied.
6. . .. in Arguing for Imposition of the Death Penalty to Deter Future
Crimes.

The State denies that there was anything improper about the Prosecution's closing
argument relative to deterrence.
7. . .. by Arguing that a Life Sentence Would be too Lenient ...

The State denies this allegation and moves to dismiss since there is no factual basis set
out to support the claim.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST CONVICTION RELIEF, STATE'S MOTION TO
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B.

DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
FAILURE TO CONDUCT ADEQUATE INVESTIGATION.
1. Trial Counsel Failed to Retain Necessary Defense Experts.

i. - v. Named Experts.
For each of the experts named under this claim, defense counsel admits that he has not
reviewed the trial transcript, or record or defense files in this case. In other words, the petitioner
has no idea whether trial counsel hired any of the named experts or not and as such has no
evidence to support the claim. At this point, no relief can be granted based upon this claim.

2. Trial

Counsel

Failed

to

Adequately

Investigate

Circumstances

Surrounding Petitioner's Prior Conviction for Statutory Rape.
The petitioner claims that trial counsel should have reviewed Norma Jean Oliver's
medical records which would have demonstrated that the rape was non-forcible. The petitioner
does not point to any part of the medical records to support this conclusion and is apparently
unaware that trial counsel represented the defendant in that earlier rape charge. There is no legal
basis shown and as such, no relief can be granted based on this claim.

3. Trial Counsel Failed to Adequately Investigate Petitioner's Development
During Adolescence and Adulthood.
Despite the defense presentation of testimony from family members and a hundred
thousand dollars worth of psychologists and psychiatrists' testimony, the petitioner incredibly
argues that there were additional mitigating circumstances from the defendant's adolescence and
adulthood, which were not presented. The petitioner gives no hint of what those additional facts
might be. The allegation should be dismissed.
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C.

DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR
THEIR FAILURE TO EXPLAIN MITIGATION TO THE JURY DURING
CLOSING ARGUMENTS.

This is a bald assertion without any claimed factual basis. The State moves to dismiss it.
1. Failing to Rehabilitate the Credibility of its own Expert Witnesses During
Closing Argument.

This claim is a bald assertion without legal or factual basis and should be dismissed.

D.

DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DURING
THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS.

There is no factual basis to support this claim and it should be dismissed.
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance by Failure to Strike for
Cause or Utilize a Preemptory Strike Against Individual Jurors.

In a bald assertion of astonishing proportions, the petitioner claims that because the
husband of one of the jurors was a deputy attorney general assigned to the Department of
Corrections at the same time that Erick Hall was serving a sentence in an Idaho prison, the juror
would have been familiar with Erick Hall. This is a glaring example of a violation of counsel's
obligation of Candor to the Tribunal as required by Rule 3.3 of the Idaho Rules of Professional
Conduct. There is no asserted factual basis for this claim and it should be dismissed.

E.

DEPRIVATION

OF EFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE

OF

COUNSEL

IN

FAILING TO ADEQUATELY RAISE LEGAL CHALLENGES.
1. ... By Failing to Object to the Prosecutor's Closing Argument.

There is no legal or factual basis for the claim and it should be dismissed.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST CONVICTION RELIEF, STATE'S MOTION TO
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2. . .. By Failing to Adequately Challenge the Introduction of Statements
Made by Petitioner to Law Enforcement.

Current counsel is apparently unaware of the extensive suppression hearing that was
conducted in the case. There is no factual basis for the claim and it should be dismissed.
3. . .. By Failing to Move for a Change of Venue.

Current counsel is apparently unaware of the extensive questioning of jurors concerning
their knowledge of the case based on pre-trial publicity. There is no factual basis for the claim
and it should be dismissed.
4. . .. By Failing to Request a Special Jury Instruction That Would Require
the Jury to Provide Written Findings Delineating the Mitigating
Circumstances That Were Found.

The petitioner does not show that he has a constitutional or due process right to written
findings by the jury. He has not claimed that any other state or the federal system requires that
findings be made by a jury in a death penalty case. He only asserts that there cannot be
meaningful appellate review without written findings. Obviously, the jury's guilt verdict can be
reviewed without written findings. There is no showing that trial counsel was ineffective as
claimed.
5. . .. Failing

to

Challenge

Idaho's

"Heinous,

Atrocious

Or

Cruel"

Aggravating Circumstance, and the Respective Jury Instructions.

The petitioner has not claimed a constitutional deficiency with this aggravator or with the
jury instruction. This allegation should be dismissed.
i., ii., iii.

STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST CONVICTION RELIEF, STATE'S MOTION TO
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The State moves to dismiss these claims for lack of legal or factual basis to support the
claim. The instructions are available to the petitioner, but no specific discovery is claimed. The
fact that the jury found this aggravator cannot be a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel.
6. . .. Failing to Challenge the Utter Disregard for Human Life Aggravator.
i. ii., iii.

The State moves to dismiss, no legal or factual basis is shown in the petition. The jury
instructions were immediately available to the petitioner before the filing of the petition. The
petitioner does not point to any defect in the instructions. The claimed "jury error" in finding
this aggravator cannot be ineffective assistance of counsel.
7. ••. In Failing to Challenge the "Propensity" Aggravator as Found in Idaho
Code § 19-2515(h)(S).
The State presumes that the petitioner is referring to the "Propensity" aggravator as set
out in Idaho Code § 19-2515(9)(h). The code section cited by the petitioner does not refer to an
aggravator. The jury instruction describing that aggravating circumstance is currently available
to the petitioner and as such is available for briefing and argument. The petitioner has given no
legal or factual basis for this claim and so it should be dismissed. The State also notes that in the
petitioner's claim number iii ... that the "jury erred in finding it," referring to the aggravator,
cannot be claimed as ineffective assistance of counsel. It is an appellate issue. This claim
should be dismissed for that additional reason.
S. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Failing to Raise International Law
Violations.
The State knows of no international law applicable to this case.

The Petitioner

apparently doesn't either since none are cited. This claim should be dismissed.
STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST CONVICTION RELIEF, STATE'S MOTION TO
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CONCLUSION
The State moves for the dismissal of this petition for the reasons stated. There is no
genuine issue of material fact that would justify a hearing as required by Idaho Code § 194906( c). The Court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's conclusions oflaw. Roman v. State, 125
ID 736 (Ct.App. 1987); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 ID 156 (Ct. App. 1986).
No showing has been made to support the petitioner's request for civil discovery. A
request for civil discovery must be specific as to the items sought and the reasons demonstrating
the need to protect his substantial rights. Raudebaugh v. State, 135 ID 602 (S.Ct. 200 I). The
State moves the Court to deny the request for civil discovery. The State further moves the Court
to deny all of the grounds for relief requested for the reasons set out above.

tlJiJ
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this "?/daY of March 2005.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

•
Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
delivered to Mark Ackley, Kimberly Simmons, Erik Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender's
Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703, through the United States Mail,

this'~v{

day of March 2005.
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State ofIdaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
KlMBERL Y J. SIMMONS, I.S.B. # 6909
ERIK R. LEHTINEN, I.S.B. # 6247
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT0500155
RESPONSE TO STATE'S
RESPONSE TO POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF, STATE'S MOTION TO
DISMISS, AND STATE'S OBJECTION
TO CIVIL DISCOVERY

(Capital Case)

r ' ...
!

t.

COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his counsel at the

State Appellate Public Defender, and responds to the State's answer to, and motion to dismiss,
Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief.
I.
THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS PREMATURE

The State's motion to dismiss Petitioner's Petition For Post-conviction Relief (hereinafter
"petition") is premature since at this stage in the proceeding Petitioner has not yet received the
Reporter's Transcript or had sufficient opportunity to conduct a thorough investigation of the
underlying criminal case. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires review of the trial
transcript to determine the nature, frequency and effect of counsel's errors, Hoffman v. Arave,
RESPONSE TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, STATE'S
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236 F.3d 523, 535 (9 th Cir. 2001). Further, a copy of the transcript is necessary to provide to any
independent experts retained by Petitioner. To request an expert to formulate an opinion prior to
receipt of all relevant information such as the testimony of the State's expelis, falls below
professional standards of practice. Finally, Petitioner has not had sufficient time to conduct a
thorough investigation for claims outside the record. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,
358 (1963) (recognizing that even a thorough investigation of the record may not reveal all
claims since often "the record is unclear or the errors are hidden" and noting that reliance solely
on the record would likely render post-conviction proceedings "a meaningless ritual.")
II.

THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS NOT ONLY PREMATURE, BUT
INCOMPLETE AND MISLEADING

As noted above, it is impossible for Petitioner to file a final a complete list of claims
before receipt of, and an opportunity to review, the Reporter's Transcript. Nevertheless, there
are a few aspects of the State's Response which require response.
The first aspect of the State's Response which requires response is the fact that the State
does not move to dismiss every claim. Petitioner's understanding is based on the fact that the
State moves to dismiss only a limited number of claims, such as those it asserts to be purely
legal.

To this extent, the State recognizes the need to amend Petitioner's petition after a

sufficient time for review of the transcripts and to conduct an independent investigation.
The second aspect of the State's Response which requires response is the fact that the
State has misstated Petitioner's claims in an apparent attempt to prejudice the Court against
Petitioner and his counsel.

For example, in responding to Petitioner's Claim, B.1 ("Trial

Counsel Failed To Retain Necessary Defense Experts"), subsections i-v, the State claims that
"petitioner has no idea whether trial counsel hired any of the named experts or not and as such
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has no evidence to support the claim." (Response, p. 4.) This is an incorrect assertion. As
Petitioner noted, his counsel met with trial counsel for the purpose of identifying, at least in part,
potential claims for post-conviction relief. As a result of that meeting, Petitioner stated the
following: "Trial counsel failed to hire a forensic pathologist or other expert to review the
autopsy results and make an independent determination of cause of death or injuries inflicted
upon the victim prior to her death." (Petition, p. 12.) The State suggests that Petitioner and his
counsel are lying to the Court. It is one thing to claim that there is no evidence to support the
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to utilized a pathologist, it is quite another to
suggest that trial counsel did consult with one, contrary to a sworn statement made by Petitioner.
If there is insufficient evidence to support the claim, then that is because Petitioner has not yet
received the trial transcripts which would, at a minimum, include the testimony of the State's
pathologist, an essential matter to be reviewed by a pathologist retained in post-conviction
proceedings.
A second example of the State's attempt to prejudice this Court is contained in its
response to Petitioner's Claim, B.2 ("Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate
Circumstances Surrounding Petitioner's Prior Conviction For Statutory Rape"). The State claims
that "petitioner does not point to any part of the medical records to support his conclusion and is
apparently unaware that trial counsel represented the defendant in the earlier rape charge.
(Response, p. 4.) Actually, Petitioner is aware that Amil Myshin represented him in the earlier
rape charge; that does not change the fact that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate and
prepare for Ms. Oliver's testimony in the murder case. Mr. Myshin's records from his prior
investigation did not contain Ms. Oliver's medical records, so he could not rely on those for her
cross-examination at trial.

Petitioner has not yet obtained the medical records because trial
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counsel has not cooperated in his requests to disclose their files. Petitioner has not located the
records in the Clerk's Record; indeed, Petitioner believes they were not made part ofthe record.
A third example of the State's attempt to prejudice this Court against Petitioner and his
counsel is in its response to Petitioner's Claim D.I ("Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective
Assistance By Failure To Strike For Cause Or Utilize A Preemptory Strike Individual Jurors.")
The State claims that Petitioner's counsel has violated their obligation of Candor to the Tribunal
required by Rule 3.3 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. (Response, p. 5.) Petitioner
submits that a careful review of his claim compared to the manner in which the State restates it,
or misstates it, reveals that if any counsel has violated professional rules governing candor to the
Court, it is the State. Petitioner has confirmed that the spouse of a deputy attorney general for
the Idaho Department of Corrections did indeed sit on the jury. Petitioner believes this juror was
the foreperson. Petitioner is investigating whether this juror was privy to prejudicial information
both specific to Petitioner as well as general to inmates housed by the Department of
Corrections.
The third aspect of the State's Response that deserves a response is the State's assertion
that Petitioner has failed to assert any defects in the jury instructions. Petitioner limits this
response to Claim E.5 and Claim E.6, set forth in their entirety below.
E. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN FAILING TO
ADEQUATELY RAISE LEGAL CHALLENGES.

***
5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By Failing To Challenge Idaho's
"Heinous, Atrocious Or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance, And The Respective
Instruction To The Jury, As Unconstitutionally Vague And As Not Having Been
Meaningfully Narrowed By The Idaho Supreme Court To Comport With The
Eighth Amendment.
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Respondent alleges that Petitioner "has not claimed a constitutional deficiency with this
aggravator or jury instruction" and therefore asserts that the claim should be dismissed.
(Response, p. 6.) Respondent is mistaken; the constitutional deficiency clearly alleged is that the
aggravating circumstance contained in LC. § 19-2515(9)(e), commonly known as the "heinous,
atrocious or cruel" aggravator, is unconstitutionally vague. (Petition, p. 20.)
Dismissal is also improper because Petitioner has not yet had the opportunity to review
the Reporter's Transcript to determine whether the Court provided any additional instructions to
the jury beyond the written instructions, and to determine the manner in which the prosecutor
argued the instruction. Until Petitioner receives and reviews the Reporter's Transcript, it is
impossible to determine the full scope of this claim.
Petitioner provides the following additional legal analysis based solely on his review of
the written jury instructions attached as an exhibit to the Clerk's Record. The instructions at
issue provided:
The terms especially "heinous," "atrocious," or "cruel," are considered separately;
but in combination with "manifesting exceptional depravity." The terms heinous,
atrocious or cruel are intended to refer to those first-degree murders where the
actual commission of the first-degree murder was accompanied by such additional
acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of first-degree murders.
A murder is especially heinous if it is extremely wicked or shockingly eviL
Atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile.
Cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter indifference to, or
even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.
The statutory aggravating factor does not exist unless the murder was especially
heinous, especially atrocious, or especially cruel, and such heinousness,
atrociousness or cruelty manifested exceptional depravity. It might be thought
that every murder involves depravity. However, exceptional depravity exists only
where depravity is apparent to such an extent as to obviously offend all standards.
of morality and intelligence. The terms "especially heinous manifesting
exceptional depravity," "especially atrocious manifesting exceptional depravity,"
RESPONSE TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, STATE'S
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or "especially cruel manifesting exceptional depravity" focus upon a defendant's
state of mind at the time ofthe offense, as reflected by his words and acts.
Instruction No. 44.
The purpose of this instruction is to limit the scope of the aggravating circumstance to a
narrow class of first-degree murders as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment.
However, the aggravating circumstance and the limiting instruction were unconstitutionally
vague andlor otherwise insufficient to channel the jury's discretion in a manner necessary to
restrict the aggravator to a narrow class of first degree murders. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486

u.s. 356 (1988).

Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to

this instruction on these grounds and by failing to submit the following argument.
In State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981), the Idaho Supreme Court

attempted to narrow the application of the aggravator to only those cases where the murder is
both "heinous, atrocious or cruel" and "manifest[s] exceptional depravity." Osborn, 102 Idaho at
418, 631 P.2d at 200 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973) and State v. Simants,
250 N.W.2d 881, 891 (Neb. 1977». In addressing the meaning of "heinous, atrocious or cruel,"
the Idaho Supreme Court stated:
The Florida Supreme Court interpreted this language as follows: "(W)e feel that
the meaning of such terms is a matter of common knowledge, so that an ordinary
man would not have to guess at what was intended. It is our interpretation that
heinous means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means
outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high
degree of pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of
others. What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the actual
commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to
set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies the conscienceless or pitiless
crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim." Id. at 9. (Emphasis
added)
Osborn, 102 Idaho at 418,631 P.2d at 200 (emphasis added).
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The Osborn Court adopted only a portion of the Dixon definition, specifically, that
"heinous, atrocious or cruel" means: "extremely wicked or shockingly evil; that atrocious means
outrageously wicked and vile; and, that cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others." The Osborn Court did not
limit the aggravator to crimes which are "unnecessarily torturous to the victim." Instead, the
Court relied on the fact that the Dixon definition had been upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in

Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
In Proffitt, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the manner in which the Florida Supreme
Court constructed the aggravator, stating:
That court has recognized that while it is arguable "that all killings are atrocious, .
. . (s)till, we believe that the Legislature intended something 'especially' heinous,
atrocious or cruel when it authorized the death penalty for first degree murder."
Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d, at 910. As a consequence, the court has indicated that
the eighth statutory provision is directed only at "the conscienceless or pitiless
crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim." State v. Dixon, 283
So.2d, at 9.

Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added). Thus, the Dixon definition was upheld, but only
because a narrowing construction was applied limiting the aggravator to crimes which are
"unnecessarily tortuous to the victim." This aspect of the Proffitt holding was overlooked by the
Idaho Supreme Court which assumed the entirety of the instruction to be sufficient. Petitioner
submits that the without the portion limiting the aggravator to crimes which are "unnecessarily
tortuous to the victim," the Dixon definition is constitutionally deficient. This interpretation of
the holding in Proffitt is confirmed by four subsequent U.S. Supreme Court cases: Maynard v.

Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988); Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990); Sochor v. Florida, 504
U.S. 527 (1992); and Bell v. Cone, _

U.S. _ , 125 S.Ct. 847 (2005), all of which were

decided after Osborn.
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In Shell v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court rejected the portion of the Dixon limiting

instruction utilized in Mississippi as constitutionally insufficient to save the vague aggravator.
Shell, 498 U.S. at 1. The instruction at issue in Mississippi provided: "[T]he word heinous

means extremely wicked or shockingly evil; atrocious means outrageously wicked and vile; and
cruel means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with indifference to, or even enjoyment
ofL] the suffering of others." Shell, 498 U.S. at 2.W This is in essence the portion of the Dixon
instruction adopted by Idaho, and, as noted in Justice Marshall's concurrence, also determined to
be insufficient in Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 361-364. Shell, 498 U.S. at 2.
In Sochor v. Florida, the Supreme Court clarified its holding in Proffitt. Specifically, the

Court stated:
Understanding the factor, as defined in Dixon, to apply only to a "conscienceless
or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim," we held in
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), that the
sentencer had adequate guidance. See id., at 255-256, 96 S.Ct., at 2968 (opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.).
Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. at 536.

Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell v. Cone,

U.S. _ , 125 S. Ct. 847

(2005), addressed the question of whether the narrowing construction presumed to have been
applied by the Tennessee Supreme Court was constitutionally sufficient. The Court upheld the
construction, noting that the Tennessee Supreme Court had consistently required a finding of
torture to the victim before death or acts evincing a depraved state of mind. Id. _

U.S. _ ,

125 S. Ct. at 854-855. The Supreme Court cited past Tennessee opinions where "torture"
involved a sufficient period of time for the victim to realize what was occurring and where
"depraved state of mind" involved repetitive acts of violence unnecessary to accomplish murder.
Id, at 855.
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Just as the portion of the Dixon limiting instruction relied upon in Osborn and
incorporated into Petitioner's jury instruction, is insufficient, so is the portion of the Simants
instruction defining the phrase "manifesting exceptional depravity." In Moore v. Clarke, 904
F.2d 1226 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 930 (1992), the Eighth Circuit explained that
the use of "exceptional" is as vague and subjective as "especially," a standard rejected by the
Supreme Court in Maynard, supra.
Thus, Instruction No. 44, which follows the definition in Osborn, is unconstitutionally
vague, or otherwise insufficient to have guided the jury's discretion. Trial counsel should have
objected to the aggravator itself, and the limiting instruction on the grounds that they are vague,
overbroad and unhelpful to the jury. But for trial counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable
likelihood that Petitioner would not have been sentenced to death based upon this factor.

i.

The Unconstitntional Aggravating Circumstance Requires Re-Sentencing.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support of this claim. Nevertheless, Petitioner submits that because the jury
weighed the unconstitutional aggravator in sentencing him to death, his death sentence must be
vacated and he must either receive a new sentencing hearing or have his case reviewed anew by
the state court. In a "weighing" state, if an aggravating circumstance is invalidated, but other
valid aggravating circumstances remain, the sentencing calculus must be redone. See, e.g.,

Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). Idaho is a "weighing" state. See Williams v.
Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1478 n.l3 (9th Cir. 1995). Under Clemons, the invalidation of the
aggravator requires resentencing, appellate reweighing, or appellate harmless error analysis.
Because appellate reweighing and the error cannot be deemed harmless in light of Ring v.

Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), resentencing is necessary. But see State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho
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496, 509-510 988 P.2d 1170, 1183-1184 (1999) (holding that the invalidation of one aggravating
circumstance does not invalidate a death sentence so long as the sentencer complied with Idaho's
death penalty statute)
ii. Even If The Aggravating Circumstance Is Valid, The Jury Erred In Finding
It In This Case.

After review of the transcripts and record in this case, Petitioner anticipates presenting
evidence and law in support ofthis claim.
6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In Failing to
Challenge The Aggravating Circumstance, I.C. § 19-2515(9)(1), And The
Respective Instruction To The Jury, That The Defendant Exhibited Utter
Disregard For Human Life, As Unconstitutional.
The Court provided the jury with instructions regarding the aggravating circumstance
contained in

I.e.

§ 19-2515(9)(f), commonly known as the "utter disregard" aggravator.

Specifically, Instruction No. 45:
"Exhibited utter disregard for human life," with regard to the murder or the
circumstances surrounding its commission, refers to acts or circumstances
surrounding the crime that exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for
human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer. "Cold-blooded" means marked
by absence of warm feeling: without consideration, compunction, or clemency,
matter of fact, or emotionless. "Pitiless" means devoid of or unmoved by mercy
or compassion. A "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" refers to a slayer who kills
without feeling or sympathy. The utter disregard aggravating factor refers to the
defendant's lack of conscience regarding killing another human being.
Instruction No. 45A provided that
The alleged aggravating circumstance of having acted with "reckless indifference
to human life", (sic) with regard to the murder or the circumstances surrounding
its commission, refers to conduct so wanton or reckless with respect to the
unjustified infliction of harm as to be tantamount to a knowing willingness that it
occur.
The purpose of these instructions was to define the "utter disregard" aggravator. Trial
counsel should have objected to these instructions on the grounds that they are vague, overbroad
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and unhelpful to the jury. The utter disregard factor is unconstitutionally vague, even with the
definitions outlined in this instruction. The jury found the aggravating circumstance that the
defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life. But for trial counsel's ineffectiveness, the
Petitioner may not have been sentenced to death based upon this factor.
It was ineffective assistance not to challenge the constitutionality of the "utter disregard"

aggravator. The Idaho Supreme Court ruled in State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho at 405,631 P.2d 187
(1981), that the utter disregard aggravator "is meant to be reflective of acts or circumstances
surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life,
i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer." Osborn, 102 Idaho at 419, 631 P.2d at 200. The Court
added in State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 774 P.2d 252 (1989), that this aggravator refers to the
defendant's lack of conscientious scruples against killing another human being. Id. at 99.
Petitioner recognizes that the Idaho Supreme Court upheld this factor by limiting its application.
Osborn, 102 Idaho at 419, 631 P.2d at 200; State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463
(1983). Petitioner acknowledges that Idaho's utter disregard factor has also been upheld by the
United States Supreme Court. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993). Even though both the
Idaho Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have upheld this aggTavator against
constitutional challenge effective counsel will specifically challenge it in every pending capital
case. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405; Creech, 507 U.S. 463.
Petitioner submits that the utter disregard aggravator is sufficiently devoid of meaningful
content; is sufficiently vague and capable of application to any first degree murder, that it fails to
fulfill its role of narrowing the class of murders to which it may be applied. It violates the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, and presumably Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution ofthe State
of Idaho. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 364
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(1988). The manner in which the United States Supreme Court upheld Idaho's utter disregard
factor actually demonstrates its invalidity.
Petitioner, before addressing the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Arave v.
Creech, wishes to put that decision in context by reviewing the opinion of the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals that preceded it. As Mr. Creech's case wound its way through the federal
court, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the utter disregard factor to be unconstitutional.
Given this standard, we find that the narrowing construction of section 19-2515(g)(6), as applied
to Creech, was unconstitutionally vague. Having concluded that the statutory language "the
defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life" was too vague, the Idaho Supreme Court
limited it by stating "the phrase is meant to be reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the
crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the coldblooded, pitiless slayer." Osborn, 631 P.2d at 201.
This limiting construction gives no more guidance than the statute. Rather than defining
"utter disregard," the court in Osborn merely emphasized it. But the problem with the "utter
disregard" standard is not that it is too Iowa threshold, it is that it is unclear. Idaho's limiting
construction does not resolve this infirmity. Just as it is difficult to determine what constitutes
"utter disregard for human life," it is unclear what constitutes "the highest, the utmost, callous
disregard for human life." The Supreme Court noted in Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 364, that the
"contention that the addition of the word 'especially' somehow guides the jury's discretion, even
if the term 'heinous' does not, is untenable." Cartwright's reasoning appears to apply here. Creech
v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873 at 883-84 (9th Cir. 1991)(footnote omitted).
In discussing the constitutionality of the utter disregard factor the Supreme Court

recognized that "the question is close." Creech, 507 U.S. at 475. The Supreme Court upheld the
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utter disregard factor by assuming that the Idaho Supreme Court in Osborn limited its application
to "the subclass of defendants who kill without feeling or sympathy," as opposed to those who
"kill with anger, jealousy, revenge, or a variety of other emotions" or "take pleasure in killing."
Creech, 507 U.S. at 476. To reach this conclusion, the Court explained its analysis of the
Osborn gloss on the utter disregard factor by writing:

Webster's Dictionary defines "pitiless" to mean devoid of, or unmoved by, mercy
or compassion. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1726 (1986). The
lead entry for "cold-blooded" gives coordinate definitions. One, "marked by
absence of warm feelings: without consideration, compunction, or clemency," id.,
at 442, mirrors the definition of "pitiless." The other defines "cold-blooded" to
mean "matter of fact, emotionless." Ibid. It is true that "cold-blooded" is
sometimes also used to describe "premeditation," Black's Law Dictionary 260
(6th ed. 1990) -- a mental state that may coincide with, but is distinct from, a lack
of feeling or compassion. But premeditation is clearly not the sense in which the
Idaho Supreme Court used' the word "cold-blooded" in Osborn. Other terms in the
limiting construction -- "callous" and "pitiless" -- indicate that the court used the
word "cold-blooded" in its first sense. "Premeditation," moreover, is specifically
addressed else-where in the Idaho homicide statutes, Idaho Code § 18-4003(a)
(1987) (amended version at Supp. 1992); had the Osborn court meant
premeditation, it likely would have used the statutory language. In ordinary usage,
then, the phrase "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" refers to a killer who kills without
feeling or sympathy.
Creech, 507 U.S. at 471-72.

Petitioner notes that of the two alternatives, "feeling or sympathy," only the former can
be said to narrow the field of murderers to whom the phrase "without feeling or sympathy" can
be applied. Who committing first degree murder can be said to be acting with sympathy for his
victim? Therefore, according the United States Supreme Court, the utter disregard factor fulfills
its Eighth Amendment limiting function by focusing on those who kill with an absence of
feeling, ruling out those who "kill with anger, jealousy, revenge, or a variety of other emotions"
or "take pleasure in killing." Creech, 507 U.S. at 476.
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One problem with this analysis of the Supreme Court is that, in struggling to uphold the
utter disregard factor, the Court adopted its own limiting construction of the aggravator; a
construction which the Idaho Supreme Court never adopted before or after Creech v. Arave,
supra. What is enlightening about the majority opinion is that a majority of the U.S. Supreme

Court found that without this additional definition and limitation, the language of the utter
disregard aggravator, even as refined by the Idaho Supreme Court's limiting construction, was
too vague to pass constitutional muster. Id. Based upon this analysis, the constitutionality of the
"utter disregard" aggravator factor is suspect and the U.S. Supreme Court may reconsider its
decision.
Another reason why the U.S. Supreme Court may reconsider the constitutionality of the
aggravator is the opinion in State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 (1998). In Wood, the
Idaho Supreme Court approved finding the utter disregard aggravator based on the defendant's
sexual molestation of the victim prior to killing her and subsequently the sexual abuse of her
body seven days after her death. Id. at 103-4, 967 P.2d at 717-8. Thus, in finding the (g)(6)
aggravator to exist, the district court considered Wood's conduct seven days subsequent to the
murder.
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that this aggravator must be limited to the "acts or
circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for
human life, i.e., the cold-blooded pitiless slayer." Osborn, 102 Idaho at 419, 631 P.2d at 201.
The issue is whether or not conduct committed seven days after the crime constitutes
circumstances surrounding the crime.

The Court held that the district court was correct in

considering post-mortem conduct in the detennination of the appropriate sentence. Wood, 132
Idaho at 104, 967 P.2d at 718. The Court noted that several states agree with the interpretation,
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including Georgia and Nevada. See Conklin v. State, 254 Ga. 558, 331 S.E.2d 532, 539 (Ga.
1985) (holding that the offense of murder does not necessarily terminate at the instant of death);

Cavanaugh v. State, 102 Nev. 478, 729 P.2d 481, 486 (Nev. 1986) (holding that post-mortem
mutilation of body parts shows depravity of mind). However, some jurisdictions disagree with
this analysis, holding that it is inappropriate to consider actions after the death of the victim
because they are irrelevant in determining aggravating circumstances. See Jackson v. State, 451
So.2d 458, 463 (Fla.1984) ("Actions after the death of the victim are irrelevant in determining
[the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel] aggravating circumstance. "); State v. Ortiz, 131 Ariz.
195, 639 P.2d 1020, 1035 (1981) (Holding that to make out cruelty under the statute the evidence
must show that the victim was made to suffer during the commission of the murder; cruelty
cannot consist of abuse of the victim's body after his death.); and State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1
(Mo. 1984) (holding that there was sufficient evidence supporting the aggravating circumstance
because the victim was physically and psychologically tortured before death).
For a death sentence to be free from arbitrariness and capriciousness, "[t]he State must
channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and
detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of
death." Creech, 507 U.S. at 471. The uncertainty in the meaning of this aggravator results in the
specific arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty that the Constitution does not
allow. Based on Wood and challenges to similar aggravators pending around the country, failure
to preserve the issue by a specific challenge was ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 5,6 and
13 of the Idaho Constitution.
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III.
CONCLUSION

Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court refrain from ruling on any motion to
dismiss Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner has not received the Reporter's
transcript, thus has not had the chance review it and formulate his claims, nor has Petitioner had
the opportunity to conduct a full and adequate investigation outside the record. Petitioner has
acted with diligence in preparing the initial petition and will undeniably seek this Court's leave
to amend his Petition pursuant to

I.e.

§ 19-4906(a) and ICR 15 from time to time as

development of his case in post-conviction progresses.
DATED this 13 th day April, 2005.

KIMB
Y J.
ONS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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DISCOVERY as indicated below:

ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
POBOX 51
BOISE ID83707

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

GUADALUPE AYALA
Administrative Assistant

RESPONSE TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, STATE'S
MOTION TO DISMISS, AND STATE'S OBJECTION TO CIVIL DISCOVERY
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
LS.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, IS.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, IS.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT0500155
MOTION FOR PETITIONER
ACCESS TO GRAND JURY
TRANSCRIPTS
(CAPITAL CASE)

0 R\G\t~ AL

COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his counsel at the

State Appellate Public Defender, and moves this Court for an Order granting Petitioner full
access to the grand jury transcripts from the underlying capital case number H0300518, Grand
Jury Case No. 03-35.
The grand jury transcripts are part of the record in this case. (R., p. 693 (Certificate of
Exhibits).) Counsel in this case has a copy of the grand jury transcripts. See IC.A.R. 32 ("in
any criminal or post-conviction case where a documentary exhibit, including a presentence
report, is transmitted to the Supreme Court for use in an appellate proceeding, the district court
shall serve a copy of the documentary exhibit on the attorney general and on appellate counsel
for the defendant, subject to the confidentiality provisions of IC.A.R. 32.").

Thus, the

transcripts are available to Petitioner's counsel.
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However, in reviewing the record thus far received, counsel noted restrictions imposed by
the trial court on Mr. Hall's access to the grand jury transcripts. (R., pp. 24-26, 55-57, 68-71.)
The trial court specifically decided that Mr. Hall could read the transcripts at the courthouse and
could not take copies to read at the jail. (R., pp. 68-71.) The Orders apparently applied until the
conclusion of the case. (R., pp. 25, 56.)

Although it appears that the Orders are no longer in

effect, in an abundance of caution Petitioner moves this court for an Order allowing him copies
of the grand jury transcripts.
In Idaho capital cases, a Petitioner generally receives one opportunity to raIse all

challenges to his conviction and sentence in a petition for post-conviction relief.

State v.

Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665, 677 (1991). Failure to raise all issues which were
known or should have been known may constitute waiver of such claims. I.C. § 19-2719(5); see
Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 471-472, 903 P.2d 58, 60-61 (1 995)(upholding dismissal of factspecific claims raised in successive petition for post-conviction relief based on irregularities that
occurred in criminal case because such claims were known by petitioner at time of prior
petition).

Both equal protection and due process require that the state provide Petitioner an

adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 403-06
(1985)(imposing procedural impediments to effective assistance of counsel on appeal as of right
under state statute implicates both equal protection and due process); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
477, 485 (l963)(holding that where a state cannot deny transcripts to indigent criminal
defendants at post-conviction or on appeal, neither can the state's statutory scheme allow the
public defender's office to refuse to order those transcripts without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment); Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748, 751-752 (l967)(holding counsel's waiver on
appeal of petitioner's right to a full transcript violated due process). In a capital case, the Eighth
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Amendment is also implicated, and defendants facing a death sentence are entitled to heightened
procedural safeguards. See Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 539-540 (9 th Cir. 2001); citing

Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125-27 (1991).
In this case, information contained within these transcripts is relevant to Mr. Hall's
special appellate proceedings.

(See R., pp. 16-21; 186-188 (irregularities in return of

Indictments»; see also, e.g., Hoffman, 236 F.3d at 535 (reasoning that a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel requires review of the trial transcripts to determine the nature, frequency
and effect of counsel's errors). This early in the post-conviction proceedings, and without the
receipt of transcripts, it is impossible to determine whether trial counsel effectively investigated
and litigated any grand jury irregularities. It is critical that Mr. Hall review the materials already
received by this office.
The grand jury transcripts are two hundred and seventy-three (273) pages.

The

transcripts are dense, often dealing with forensic science, locations and timelines, and their
review will take considerable time. The review will also be an ongoing exercise. Once the trial
transcripts are received, Petitioner will need to compare grand jury testimony to trial testimony.
Counsel's copies of the grand jury transcripts contain no names of grand jurors.
Furthermore, every witness who testified before the grand jury either (a) testified at trial, or (b)
will be thoroughly investigated during post-conviction. By contrast, the clerk's record itselfalready available to Petitioner-does contain grand jury names, so disclosure of the grand jury
transcripts does not in any way disclose additional confidential information to Petitioner.
Pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, the corresponding provisions of the Idaho Constitution, and matters of record,
Petitioner respectfully asks this Court for access to the grand jury transcripts.
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DATED this 7th day September, 2005.
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PAULAM. SWENSEN
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

. hI

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this I·~ay of September, 2005, served a true and
correct copy of the forgoing MOTION FOR PETITIONER ACCESS TO GRAND JURY
TRANSCRIPTS as indicated below:

ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
POBOX51
BOISE ID 83707

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
• Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery

+

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State ofIdaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, I.S.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT0500155

NOTICE OF HEARING

(CAPITAL CASE)

----------------------------~)
COMES NOW, Erick Virgil Hall, Petitioner, provides notice that a hearing will be held
regarding the Motion For Petitioner Access To Grand Jury Transcripts.

Due to the Court's

calendar, the hearing will be held before the Honorable Thomas F. Neville at 200 W. Front St.,
Boise, Idaho on the 3rd day of October, 2005, at 1:30 p.m. (MDT).
DATED this

i

h

day of September, 2005.

OR\G'{~AL
PAULAM. SWENSEN,
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders

NOTICE OF HEARING

Page 1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this i h day of September, 2005, served a true and
correct copy ofthe attached NOTICE OF HEARING by the method indicated below:
ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
POBOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

NOTICE OF HEARING

"I

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

~ Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery
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Session: Neville100305
Session Date: 2005/10/03
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: Hirmer, Jeanne

Division: DC
Session Time: 08:32

Courtroom: CR507

Clerk(s) :
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s):
Smethers, David
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s) :

Case ID: 0023
Case Number: SPOT0500407
Plaintiff: IDAHO, STATE OF
Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Defendant: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Public Defender:

20'05/10/03
13:52:14 - Operator
Recording:
13:52:14 - New case
HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
13:52:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Petitioner not present for the record.
13:52:53 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court met in chambers off the record regarding Mr. Hall's Mo
tion for access
13:53:08 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
to G/J transcript. Court understands there is a stipulation
regarding the
13:53:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
transcript.
13:53:51 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne advised the Court that one witness had said where
she was employed
13:54:20 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
and that portion to be redacted.
13:54:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court
13:54:43 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER

OOOG9

se;s~o~~

Nevillel00305

Mr. Bourne stated petitioner will have entire trial transcri
pt anyway, and
13:54:58 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
same witnesses testified at grand jury that testified at tri
al
13:55:12 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court had provided access to defendant on a number of oc
assions for
13:56:05 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
review of documents.
I.C.R. states Court shall allow access
but that the
13:56:33 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court can place restrictions on them.
Court knows that Mr.
Ackley has
13:57:12 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
probably told his clients that on many ocassions and will re
quest that Mr.
13:57:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Ackley provide an order with those restrictions.
Court un
derstands Mr.
13:57:56 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Ackley will be filing a motion regarding scheduling.
13:58:25 - Operator
Stop recording:
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State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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CASE NO. SPOT0500155

STIPULATION FOR RELEASE OF
JURY QUESTIONNAIRES AND
FOR ADDITIONS TO THE
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
(Capital Case)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State
Appellate Public Defender, and the Respondent, by and through its representative, Roger
Bourne, and respectfully request this Court to enter the proposed orders based on the following:

1.

Petitioner has contacted the Respondent regarding the release of the completed jury
questionnaires in the underlying criminal case, Case No. H0300518, submitting that
the questionnaires are relevant to claims raised in his initial petition for postconviction relief See e.g., Claim D ("Deprivation of effective assistance of counsel
during the jury selection process"). STIPULATION: The parties stipulate that this
Court should order the clerk or the jury commissioner to permit the Petitioner to
inspect and copy the completed jury questionnaires submitted by all prospective
jurors in the underlying criminal case.

STIPULATION FOR RELEASE OF JURY QUESTIONNAIRES AND FOR
ADDITIONS TO THE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

1

2.

Petitioner has contacted the Respondent regarding the preparation of additional
transcripts based on recorded but untranscribed portions of the underlying criminal
proceedings, submitting that preparation of the transcripts are required by law, and
relevant to claims raised in his initial petition for post-conviction relief. See e.g.,
I.A.R. 25(d), I.A.R. 25(1); Claim D ("Deprivation of effective assistance of counsel
during the jury selection process"); and Claim E.2 ("Trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to adequately challenge the introduction of statements
made by petitioner to law enforcement"). STIPULATION: The parties stipulate that
the court reporter should transcribe the following:
a. The recorded, but untranscribed, exercise of peremptory challenges by both
parties during the jury selection process (Tr., p. 3376, Ls. 12-13 ("Peremptory
challenges exercised by counsel."»;
b. The recorded, but untranscribed, playing of the audio-visual recording of the
Petitioner's statements to law enforcement (Tr., p. 4185, L. 22 ("Video partially
played for the jury.); p. 4205, L. 22 ("Tape played for the jury."); p. 4208, Ls. 2223 ("Tape fast forwarded and tape played to its conclusion." ».
DATED this 28 th day October, 2005.

ROGER BOURNE
Deputy, Ada County Prosecutor

STIPULATION FOR RELEASE OF JURy QUESTIONNAIRES AND FOR
ADDITIONS TO THE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this~\ day of October, 2005, served a true and
correct copy of the forgoing STIPULATION FOR RELEASE OF JURY QUESTIONNAIRES
AND FOR ADDITIONS TO THE REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT as indicated below:

ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
POBOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

- - Statehouse Mail

X

U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

L

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

~\.OL\~ruju:~ ~r
GUADALUPE AYALA
Administrative Assistant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIStf(J.UCT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFAi~A
FIL~t.

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

Petitioner,
v.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.
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)
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)
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Case No. SPOTOS00155 By: J. D~lX..0~
ORDER ALLOWING
PETITIONER ACCESS TO
AND POSSESSION OF
GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS
SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS

OEPUTY

------------------------------)
Motion having been made, hearing having been held on October 3,2005, and the Court

otherwise being fully infonned,

It is hereby ordered that Petitioner's counsel may provide a copy of the grand jury
transcripts, Grand Jury Case No. 03-35, to Petitioner. Petitioner's counsel shall redact said
transcripts to eliminate the reference to the current employer of grand jury witness Deidre
Palmquist, said reference being at page 150, line 19, of the April 22, 2003, transcript of the
above grand jury proceedings. The court further orders that Petitioner shall not make copies of
the grand jury transcripts or otherwise cotmnunicate the content of the grand jury transcripts with
any person other than counsel and counsel's agents.

It is so ordered.
Dated this

I·~

tt,

(1~~4y
day ornot t i?,2005.

Eo.

THOMAS __ NEVILLE
District Judge

1

ORDER GRANTlNG PETITIONER ACCESS TO AND POSSESSION
OF GRAND JURy TRANSCRIPTS SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
/
N~
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _'_::l_ day of Getober, 2005, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTlNG PETITIONER ACCESS TO AND
POSSESSION OF GRAND JURy TRANSCRIPTS SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS by
method indicated below to:
MARK ACKLEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE ID 83703 .

_ _ U.S. Mail
_
Statehouse Mail rn
--.b. Facsimile - <:t. fY\()J
_ _ Hand Delivery

ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT. SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

__ u.s. Mail
-.-_ Statehouse Mail
"~ Facsimile ~ ~~
_ _' Hand Delivery

ORDER GRANTlNG PETITIONER ACCESS TO AND 'POSSESSION
OF GRAND JURY TRANSCRIPTS SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH

JUDIcIA1A,rVmRICT'L}.~A.-I-f.:...::()~V__=_

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ~~
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v,

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent

)
)

J,~ NAVARRO,~

CASE NO,
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)

----------------------------~)

152005

V

A

DEPun*"

1

ORDER FOR PREPARATION
OF ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS

(Capital Case)

Stipulation having been made and the Court otherwise being sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petitioner's request for the preparation of

additional transcripts is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court reporter shall transcribe the following:

a. The recorded but untranscribed portion of the jury selection process pertaining to
the parties' exercise of their peremptory challenges (Tr., p. 3376, Ls. 12-13
("Peremptory challenges exercised by counsel."));
b. The recorded but untranscribed portion of the trial where the audio-visual
recording of the Petitioner's statements to law enforcement was played for the
jury (Tr., p. 4185, L. 22 ("Video partially played for the jury.); p. 4205, L. 22
("Tape played for the jury,"); p. 4208, Ls. 22-23 ("Tape fast forwarded and tape
played to its conclusion." )).
Dated this

fS '~day of J~'-~dl..c.,,\

,2005.

THOMAS F. NEVILLE
District Judge

ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF ADDITIONAL TRANSCRIPTS
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•
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of pJ~ ,2005, I served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF ADDITIONAL
TRANSCRIPTS by method indicated below to:

MARK ACKLEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE
BOISE ID 83703

- - u.S. Mail

ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

U.S. Mail
_ _ Statehouse ~ail
t::L Facsimile - ~
_ _ Hand Delivery

_ _ Statehouse 11.ail ()
"- Facsimile - ~
_ _ Hand Delivery
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MOLL Y J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State ofIdaho
I.S.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, I.S.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT0500155

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY

(CAPITAL CASE)

--------------------------~)
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State
Appellate Public Defender (hereinafter "SAPD"), and moves this Honorable Court pursuant to
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Sections
5,6,7, and 8 of the Idaho Constitution, I.e. § 19-4901 et seq., § 19-2719, and I.e.R. 57(b) to
order discovery. In support of this motion, the Petitioner relies on his Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Discovery and moves the Court for an order granting discovery as specified below.
Before identifying Petitioner's specific requests for discovery, Petitioner requests the
Court's consideration of the following prefatory note regarding the appendices contained herein

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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and their respective attachments. The attachments are voluminous but necessary. The purpose
of the attachments is three-fold: first, to demonstrate to the Court the measures taken to preclude
requests for matters previously disclosed; second, to assist the State in identifying legible and
complete copies of documents requested; and third, to create a record for appellate and postconviction purposes identifying illegible, redacted, or otherwise incomplete documents bearing
upon trial counsels' ability to prepare an adequate defense.
SPECIFIC DISCOVERY REQUESTED
I.

Witnesses, Prospective Witnesses, and Other Persons of Interest.
A.

Lisa Manora Lewis. According to police reports, Ms. Lewis told Detective Dave
Smith and Scott Birch of the Attorney General's Office that she and Peggy Jean
Colbert Hill spoke to Ms. Henneman regarding directions back to the DoubleTree
Inn. Purportedly, Petitioner and Patrick Bernard Hoffert then arrived, at which

point Petitioner spoke briefly to Ms. Henneman. For unknown reasons, the State
opted not to call Ms. Lewis to testify. Petitioner requests the following:
1.

Prosecuting attorney documents. l

2.

All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement, including
Scott Birch, either made by or attributed to Ms. Lewis, regardless of
medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms.
Lewis, including those made by Scott Birch.

3.

All statements and summaries of statements to, and reports or notes by,
SRO Mike Barker.

1 "Prosecuting attorney documents" refers to memoranda, notes, or recordings prepared by the
prosecutors and their investigators that contain statements or summaries of statements based on
their interviews, or their presence during interviews, with any person during the course of their
investigation and preparation for the underlying criminal case regardless of whether such
individual ever testified at trial.

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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B.

Peggy Jean Colbert Hill.

Ms. Hill confirmed Ms. Lewis' story when

interviewed by Detective Dave Smith and Scott Birch. Additionally, Ms. Hill
noticed Ms. Henneman's yellow sapphire ring and recalled that Petitioner left
with Ms. Henneman. The State did not call her to testify. Petitioner requests the
following:

C.

1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement, including
to Scott Birch, either made by or attributed to Ms. Hill, regardless of
medium, and reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Hill,
including those made by Scott Birch.

3.

All statements and summaries of statements to, and reports or notes by,
SRO Mike Barker.

Patrick Bernard Hoffert. Mr. Hoffert was with Ms. Lewis and Ms. Hill at the
time they saw Petitioner near the Greenbelt, and met Lynn Henneman.

Mr.

Hoffert is a person of interest in the Henneman homicide. He committed suicide
the night after the homicide. Petitioner requests the following:
1.

All reports and investigative notes regarding the death of Patrick Bernard
Hoffert, including but not limited to:
a. Law enforcement reports and notes related to Mr. Hoffert's suicide at
408 E. 51 st St. #6, Garden City, Idaho, on September 25,2000.
b. Law enforcement reports and notes related to Garden City PD Incident
No. 01-2000-03006, whether generated by Garden City or other law
enforcement agencies.

2.

Copies of all audio and video-taped interviews conducted in connection
with Mr. Hoffert's death, including but not limited to the interviews of
Verdell Jean Stinn/Rugger and Deirdre Muncy.

3.

Any writings attributed to Mr. Hoffert on the day of his suicide, including
but not limited to property collected by Garden City Police Department
(hereinafter "GCPD") from the suicide investigation, including "notebook
wi notes from Hoffert," property no. 12448.

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
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D.

4.

Results of any forensic testing conducted upon the 1989 black Toyota,
VIN JT4RN13P4K0005180, property no. 12455.

5.

Coroner/ pathology notes and reports regarding the death of Mr. Hoffert.

6.

Any DNA or other forensic profile developed on Mr. Hoffel1.

7.

Detective Allen's supplemental report on the suicide scene.

Chris Hall. Mr. Hall was a person of interest in the Lynn Henneman homicide
investigation. Petitioner requests the following discovery:

E.

1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either
made by or attributed to Mr. Hall, regardless of medium, and all reports
and notes made by law enforcement about Mr. Hall.

Christian Johnson. Mr. Johnson testified for the State at trial. (Tr., pp. 37603813.) He was initially a suspect in the Henneman homicide. (Tr., p. 3776.) Mr.
Johnson may have been represented by the Ada County Public Defender's office
during or prior to his testimony, and had charges pending against him at the time
of trial. (Tr., p. 3776.) Petitioner requests the following:
1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

Any and all incentives to testify against Erick Hall explicitly or implicitly
offered to, or requested by, this witness. 2

3.

All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either
made by or attributed to Mr. Johnson, regardless of medium, and all
reports and notes made by law enforcement about Mr. Johnson.

Incentives to testify include, but are not limited to, agreements, expectations or promises of
leniency, favorable prison or jail treatment, and accommodations or improved conditions of
confinement. Further, all discovery requests related to plea negotiations and/or incentives to
testify include any type of documents or audio or video recordings that contain any reference to
any form of interaction with any witness or prospective witness and/or his/her attorney regarding
plea negotiations and/or favorable treatment regardless of the outcome of any proceeding and
regardless of whether favorable negotiations or treatment were in fact provided.
2
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F.

4.

A complete NCIC criminal record check, including juvenile criminal
records.

5.

Documentation or summaries of all off-record and/or ex parte
conversations regarding Mr. Johnson's criminal history or ongoing
criminal proceedings. (Tr., p. 3676, Ls. 12-17.)

6.

Documents or summaries of plea negotiations related to the case for which
Mr. Johnson made an appearance on or about 10/13/04. (Tr., p. 3676.)

7.

Any search warrant from any search and seizure of Mr. Johnson. (Tr., p.
3783).

8.

All reports and notes from Idaho Department of Corrections and Idaho
Department of Probation and Parole including, but not limited to:
a.

Copies of any self-initiated requests for parole and/or probation
from September 2000 to present.

b.

Documentation of parole or probation hearings and results, from
September 2000 to present.

c.

Copies of any parole and/or probation plans from September 2000
to present.

d.

Reports or notes or other documentation made by Mr. Johnson's
parole or probation officer from September 2000 to present.

e.

Documentation from any probationary search and seizure from Mr.
Johnson's residence or personal effects stored at any other
location.

Miriam Colon. Ms. Colon testified for the State at trial. (Tr., pp. 3564-3602.)

1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either
made by or attributed to Ms. Colon, regardless of medium, and all reports
and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Colon.

3.

A complete NCIC criminal record check, including juvenile criminal
records.
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G.

Norma Jean Oliver. Ms. Oliver testified against Petitioner at his sentencing,
claiming that Petitioner had previously forcibly raped her. (Tr. pp. 4756-4783.)
Her testimony related to alleged events culminating in Petitioner's guilty plea to
statutory rape in State v. Hall, Ada County Case No. M9108836/HCRI8591.
Records sought by but not utilized by trial counsel, indicate significant and
material inconsistencies between Ms. Oliver's sentencing testimony and
information she previously provided to law enforcement and medical personnel
near the time of the purported forcible rape. Based on her erratic behavior and
sentencing testimony, there is reason to doubt whether she was competent to
testify. 3 Accordingly, Petitioner requests the following discovery regarding this
witness:
1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either
made by or attributed to Ms. Oliver, regardless of medium, and all reports
and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Oliver.

3.

Any incentives to testify against Erick Hall explicitly or implicitly offered
to, or requested by, Ms. Oliver.

4.

Transcript of hearing to release 1992 Presentence Investigation Report
held on 10/28/03.

5.

A complete NCIC criminal record check, including juvenile criminal
records.

3 (Tr., pp. 4755-4756 (noting Ms. Oliver was "too distraught to even talk to" defense counsel); p.
4777, Ls. 2-7, p. 4783, Ls. 17-18 (noting that she had been on medication but was not at the time
of testifying, even though she admitted having a chemical imbalance); pp. 4756-4782 (indicating
she could not recall several aspects of the alleged forcible rape); p. 4780 (noting that she was on
SSI because she has a chemical imbalance and is unable to keep a job); pp. 4952-4954
(indicating that forcible rape charges had been reduced to statutory rape because she was
"vulnerable," "fragile," and "unable to effectively go on with the case in front of a jury" or
withstand cross-examination based in part on the recommendation of her treatment providers).)
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6.

All documentation and recordings relating to Ms. Oliver's arrest as a
runaway on or about 12/04/91, including any statements made to the
arresting officers, jailor juvenile authorities, and any dispatch or other
recordings, including the entire juvenile criminal file stemming from that
arrest. 4

7.

Information regarding Ms. Oliver's mental health, competency, or
veracity, regardless of whether documentation exists, known by the
prosecution in the underlying criminal case.

8.

Information regarding the investigation of the reported rape of Ms. Oliver,
and subsequent charging, arrest, plea negotiations and plea entry Petitioner
in State v. Hall, Case No. M9108836:
a. A complete transcript of the proceedings including a transcript of the
grand jury proceedings.
b. A "contact sheet" of all photos taken of Ms. Oliver after the alleged
rape.
c. Color copies of all photos taken of Ms. Oliver after the alleged rape
and not submitted as an exhibit in Petitioner's current case.
d. The name of the person with whom Ms. Oliver stayed at the Sands
Motel on or about 12/04/91, after the alleged rape and prior to her
arrest as a runaway, and any documentation of communication with
that person.
e. Any notes, memoranda or other documents memorializing oral
communications made during plea negotiations held by the Ada
County Prosecutor's office.
f.

All files created by or held by the Ada County Public Defender's
office related to State v. Hall, Case No. M9108836, including
documentation pertaining to plea negotiations.

g. All reports and notes, photographs, audio and video recordings,
including, but not limited to:
1.

Tape-recorded statement made to the Garden City Police
Department (hereinafter "GCPD") by Erick Hall on or
about 12/04/91.

According to reports, Mr. Hall reported Ms. Oliver to authorities as a runaway. It was only
after her subsequent arrest and detention, did Ms. Oliver allege that Erick had raped her.

4
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11.

Tape-recorded statement made to GCPD by Norma Jean
Oliver on or about 12/04/91.

h. Admission from the Ada County Prosecutor that state discovery page
numbers 120-138 were disclosed in discovery to defense counsel, as
stated in the State's "Informal Discovery Letter" dated 01116/04,
confirmation that the prosecutor's office hand-writes discovery page
numbers on the lower right comer of each page turned over in
discovery, and copies of said discovery pages with such discovery
page numbers clearly visible.
1.

All reports, notes and other documents made by Dr. Lawrence
Vickman, S1. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, regarding the
examination and treatment of Ms. Norma Jean Oliver in or around
December 1991.

J.

Results of DNA or other forensic testing conducted on vaginal and
anal swabs and articles of clothing belonging to Ms. Oliver.

k. Information regarding Ms. Oliver'S mental health, competency, or

veracity, regardless of whether documentation exists, known by the
prosecution in the underlying criminal case as well as Case No.
M9108836.
1.

All mental health, psychological and/or psychiatric records, including
all reports, notes and other documents, held or created by
Intermountain Hospital, Dr. Lamar Heyrend, counselor Margaret
Farmer, and Bonnie Pitman for Ms. Oliver.

m. Social Security Income records, including all application materials, of
Norma Jean Oliver. (Tr. p., 4780.)
H.

Detective Daniel Hess.

Detective Hess's testimony bolstered Ms. Oliver's

testimony. (Tr., pp. 4784-4813.) Petitioner requests the following discovery:
1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

All records, reports or other documents obtained by Det. Hess or other law
enforcement in the course of investigation and prosecution of the 1991
Norma Jean Oliver rape case, with specific information as to when the
documents were obtained and by whom.
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I.

Jay Rosenthal. Mr. Rosenthal was the deputy prosecuting attorney for Ada
County in the aforementioned Norma Jean Oliver rape case.

Mr. Rosenthal

testified that he amended the charges from forcible rape to statutory rape because
Ms. Oliver "simply was unable to effectively go on with the case in front of a
jury." (Tr., pp. 4952-4953.) Petitioner requests the following discovery:

J.

1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

Explanation as to why the charge of forcible anal intercourse was
dismissed even though the grand jury indicted on this charge. Mr.
Rosenthal testified as to why the forcible vaginal rape charge was pled
down to statutory rape, but he did not testify, nor was he asked, why the
indictment was amended to delete the forcible anal rape charge.

3.

All records, reports or other documents obtained by the prosecuting
attorney or his agents in the course of investigation and prosecution of the
1991 Norma Jean Oliver rape case, with specific information as to when
the documents were obtained and by whom.

April Sebastian.

Ms. Sebastian testified against Petitioner at his sentencing

while represented by Petitioner's trial counsel on an upcoming "rider" hearing,
Ada County Case No. H0400228. (Tr., pp. 4868-70; pp. 4875-96.) Ms. Sebastian
also had another active case, Ada County Case No. H0400335, at the time of her
testimony. Petitioner requests the following discovery:
1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

Any incentives to testify against Erick Hall explicitly or implicitly offered
to, or requested by, this witness.

3.

Copy

of the

Presentence

Investigation

Report

for

Case

No.

H04003351M0401584.

4.

Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report, including "Addendum to
Presentence Investigation Report" and any document purporting to make
"rider" recommendations in Case No. H0400228.
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K.

5.

All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either
made by or attributed to April Sebastian, regardless of medium, and all
reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Sebastian, from
March 1, 2003 to present.

6.

A complete NCIC criminal record check, including juvenile criminal
records.

7.

All reports and notes from Idaho Department of Corrections and Idaho
Department of Probation and Parole including, but not limited to:
a.

Copies of any self-initiated requests for parole and/or probation for
case number, from March 2003 to present.

b.

Documentation of parole or probation hearings and results, from
March 2003 to present.

c.

Copies of any parole and/or probation plans, from March 2003 to
present.

d.

Reports or notes or other documentation made by Ms. Sebastian's
parole or probation officer, from March 2003 to present.

Michelle Deen. Ms. Deen testified against Petitioner at his sentencing. (Tr.,
pp.4813-39.) Petitioner recently discovered that Ms. Deen was convicted of at
least two felonies, only one of which was elicited at trial. In addition, Petitoner
has discovered that Amil Myshin represented Ms. Deen during the entry of a
guilty plea on 12/03/03 in Ada County Case No. H0301398. Petitioner requests
the following discovery:
1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

Documentation of initial contact between Michelle Deen and the
prosecuting attorney's office.

3.

Any and all incentives to testify against Erick Hall explicitly or implicitly
offered to, or requested by, this witness.

4.

All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either
made by or attributed to Ms. Deen, regardless of medium, and all reports
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and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Deen, from March 2003 to
present.
5.

A complete NCIC criminal record check, including juvenile criminal
records.

6.

All police reports, notes and recordings regarding theft, breaking and
entering, burglary or similar crimes stemming from incidents reported by
Erick Hall and/or Janet Hoch against Michelle Deen and/or Tommy
Workman and to which law enforcement responded in or around July
2001.

7.

Documents related to Ada County Case No. H0200584:
a.

8.

9.

L.

Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report, including any
probation revocation report, reports or recommendations from the
Jurisdictional Review Committee or any other addenda;

Documents related to Ada County Case No. H0301398:
a.

Copy of the Presentence Investigation Report, including any
probation revocation report, reports or recommendations from the
Jurisdictional Review Committee or any other addenda;

b.

Copy of the psychological evaluation ordered by the district court
in June 2004 in Case No. H0301398, a mere four months before
Ms. Deen testified at Petitioner's sentencing.

All reports and notes from the Idaho Department of Corrections and Idaho
Department of Probation and Parole including, but not limited to:
a.

Copies of any self-initiated requests for parole and/or probation for
case number, from March 2003 to present.

b.

Documentation of parole or probation hearings and results, from
March 2003 to present.

c.

Copies of any parole and/or probation plans, from March 2003 to
present.

d.

Reports or notes or other documentation made by Ms. Deen's
parole or probation officer, from March 2003 to present.

Evelyn Dunaway. Ms. Dunaway testified against Petitioner at his sentencing.
(Tr., pp. 4857-68.) Petitioner requests the following discovery:
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M.

1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

Any incentives to testify against Erick Hall explicitly or implicitly offered
to or requested by this witness.

3.

All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either
made by or attributed to Ms. Dunaway, regardless of medium, and all
reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Dunaway, from
March 2003 to present.

4.

A complete NCIC criminal record check, including juvenile criminal
records.

5.

All police reports, notes, recordings and witness statements regarding a
domestic dispute or incident between Evelyn Dunaway and Erick Hall to
which law enforcement responded in or around March 2002. (Tr., pp.
4858 L.24 - p. 4864, L.ll.)

6.

All reports and notes from Idaho Department of Corrections and Idaho
Department of Probation and Parole including, but not limited to:
a.

Copies of any self-initiated requests for parole and/or probation for
case number, from March 2003 to present.

b.

Documentation of parole or probation hearings and results, from
March 2003 to present.

c.

Copies of any parole and/or probation plans, from March 2003 to
present.

d.

Reports or notes or other documentation made by Ms. Dunaway's
parole or probation officer, from March 2003 to present.

Rebecca McCusker. Ms. McCusker testified against Petitioner at his sentencing.
(Tr., pp. 4857-68.) Petitioner requests the following discovery:
1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

Any and all incentives to testify against Erick Hall explicitly or implicitly
offered to or requested by this witness.

3.

All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either
made by or attributed to Ms. McCusker, regardless of medium, and all
reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. McCusker.
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N.

4.

A complete NCIC criminal record check, induding juvenile criminal
records.

5.

All records, notes and documents created by or in the possession of Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare regarding Rebecca McCusker,
including, but not limited to allegations of child neglect or abandonment.

Dr. Glenn Groben and the Ada County Coroner's Office.
1.

All bench notes from the Lynn Henneman autopsy, sexual assault kit and
any other procedures performed or observed by Dr. Groben or any other
Ada County Coroner personnel.

2.

Any peer review, formal or informal, whether internal or external to the
Ada County Coroner's Office, as well as any documentation related
thereto, ofthe autopsy performed on Ms. Henneman (Tr., p. 4097, Ls. 1922.), or confirmation that no peer review was conducted.

3.

Any notes, reports, or dictations of findings made by Dr. Groben in the
following locations:
a. At or near the body recovery scene; and
b. At or near the alleged crime scene near the Main St. Bridge.

4.

Ada County Coroner's Office procedures for body removal and
preservation. (Tr., p. 4095, Ls. 2-21.)

5.

Copies of the full body x-rays taken ofLynn Henneman, and full
disclosure of where, when and by whom the x-rays were taken.

6.

Any toxicology test results from Idaho labs; and if none exist, then an
explanation why testing was conducted by a Texas laboratory, and a
complete copy ofthe Texas report. (Petitioner currently is in possession
of a one-page toxicology report from the Texas lab.)

7.

A list of all cases, regardless of jurisdiction, in which Dr. Groben
conducted autopsies wherein broad ligature strangulation, drowning, or
blunt force trauma was the cause, suspected cause, or explicitly excluded
cause of death, including specific identification of those "other cases
exactly like this" referenced by Dr. Groben in his trial testimony. 5

5 (Tr., p. 4056, Ls. 6-16 ("Q. Okay. Well, for what you're saying, if I'm understanding what
you're saying then, that you feel the body was outside of the water for the first 12 hours? A.
Well, at least it wasn't buoyant at all, and it certainly gets buoyant pretty quick. Doesn't take
much water because that body had to be flat against the surface with all its weight and you can't
do that in the water. I've had other cases exactly like this where I have seen the same thing,
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8.

A list of all cases in which Dr. Groben testified wherein broad ligature
strangulation, drowning, or blunt force trauma was the cause, suspected
cause, or explicitly excluded cause of death.

9.

Reports and notes from all autopsies referenced in preceding request no. 7.

10.

Any complaints filed against Dr. Groben and/or the Ada County Coroner
with any agency or professional association regarding hislits professional
performance, qualifications or veracity.

11.

Scanned, accessible, high-resolution files of all photos of Ms. Henneman's
body, including reenactment photographs. Petitioner currently is in
possession of photographs on compact disk some of which will not open
including CSI and BCPD photos.

12.

Microscopic slides and reports, notes, or other documentation of "residual
intact red blood cells" for the seven identified scalp injuries, and specific
identification ofthe number of sections taken from each individual
laceration and the results at each identified section.

13.

Sex crimes kit protocol.

14.

Any notes, reports, or results oftests in the Henneman case regarding the
following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
£
g.
h.

Reconstruction of ligatures
Depth of the scalp wounds
Fingernail clippings
Pubic hair combings
Head hair
Blood sample (tube)
The amount of force to break the humerous
Any subcutaneous examination ofthe left and right wrists and left
and right ankles as well as any other possible ligature sites
(Petitioner is in possession of Dr. Groben's report at page 3 which

and it just can't happen in the water."); p. 3989, L. 11 - p. 3990, L. 2 (Q .... Did you conduct an
examination of the skin underneath the ligature? Did you dissect that to perform medical tests to
determine whether or not there was any hemorrhage present? A. Yes. Q. And did you locate
any hemorrhage? A. No, I did not. Q. And is that a significant finding? A. Not with ligatures
such as this. I've had many cases of broad --... It's a broad ligature, and I have seen this many
times in hangings and also other -- with self-strangulation. And because 'it's so broad, the
pressure is disbursed over a wide area.").) (emphasis added)
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describes a subcutaneous examination of Ms. Henneman's right
wrist and left ann only).

O.

15.

List of videos that Dr. Groben watched that, according to his testimony,
demonstrated the length of time it takes a choking victim to be rendered
unconscious. (Tr., p. 4036, 17 - p. 4037, L. 3.)

16.

Forensic pathology procedural manual currently in effect as well as in
effect in October 2000 for the Ada County Coroner's Office. (Tr., p.
4042, Ls. 9-11.)

17.

All materials presented, including PowerPoint slides, used for the
presentation given by Dr. Groben on the Henneman homicide at the
northwest pathologist meeting held in September or October 2004.

18.

All notes, reports and recordings made by or at the direction ofthe
Coroner's Office or its agents regarding the death of Amanda Stroud.

19.

All notes, reports and recordings made by or at the direction of the
Coroner's Office or its agents regarding the death of Kay Lynn Jackson.

20.

Documentation of all correspondence between Dr. Groben or Erwin
Sonnenberg or their agents and other non-lay or expert witnesses or
potential witnesses or their agents.

21.

Dr. Groben's curriculum vita.

22.

Dr. Groben's billing records or invoices for the instant case.

23.

Any applications by the Ada County Coroner's office for accreditation
with the National Association of Medical Examiners ("NAME"), or any
other accrediting association, and any responses thereto.

Dr. Michael Estess. Dr. Estess interviewed Petitioner prior to trial. (R., p. 230;
Tr., p. 2857.) The prosecutor and/or his agents interviewed Dr. Estess and listed
him as a prospective State witness.
Petitioner's experts at sentencing.

Dr. Estess evaluated the testimony of
After consultation with Dr. Estess, the

prosecutor chose not to call him, choosing instead to undermine Petitioner's
experts through closing argument. Petitioner requests the following discovery:
1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.
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P.

2.

Dr. Estess's files.

3.

Any reports or summaries of oral communications made by Dr. Estess to
the State in the instant case.

4.

Documentation of all correspondence between Dr. Estess or his agents and
other non-lay or expert witnesses or potential witnesses or their agents.

5.

Dr. Estess' curriculum vita.

6.

Dr. Estess' billing records or invoices for the instant case.

Dr. Robert Engle.

The prosecutor listed Dr. Engle as a prospective State

witness, although he did not testify. (R., p. 597, Tr., p. 2857.) Petitioner requests
the following discovery:

Q.

1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

Dr. Engle's files.

3.

Any reports or summaries of oral communications made by Dr. Estess to
the State in the instant case.

4.

Documentation of all correspondence between Dr. Engle or his agents and
other non-lay or expert witnesses or potential witnesses or their agents.

5.

Dr. Engle's billing records or invoices for the instant case.

Other Non-Lay or Expert Witnesses.
1.

All correspondence between non-lay or expert witnesses or their agents,
including those witnesses listed in this section and/or the following
persons:
a.
b.
c.
d.

R.

Kathryn Colombo
Rachel Cutler
Shawna Hilliard
Jennifer Taylor

Jean McCracken.

Ms. McCracken

IS

Erick's mother.

The prosecutor's

investigator interviewed her. Petitioner requests the following discovery:
1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.
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S.

Amanda Stroud. Amanda Stroud was presumably critical in law enforcement's
investigation and apparently conveyed hearsay statements attributed to Petitioner.
Petitioner requests the following discovery:

T.

1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

All statements and summaries of statements prepared by law enforcement
that were either made by or attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of
medium, and all reports and notes made by law enforcement about Ms.
Stroud. (Petitioner currently is in possession of an undated, unsigned
report of interview of Amanda Stroud beginning with "She stated that she
had been drunk ... ;" a letter from Amanda Stroud to Gregory Higgins
dated 8/03; and the report of Det. Richard Allen dated 5/15/03, see
Appendix B.)

3.

All audio or video recordings, wntmgs, or other mediums of
communications made by Ms. Stroud and obtained by the prosecutor or
law enforcement (Petitioner currently is in possession of the transcript of
the 03/10/03 interview by Detectives Morgan and Smith, transcriber
unknown, but does not have possession of the corresponding audio or
video recording.)

4.

All law enforcement and prosecution investigative reports, notes, and files
regarding the Amanda Stroud homicide investigation.

Kathy Stroud.

Kathy Stroud reported her suspicions that Erick Hall was

involved in the Cheryl Hanlon homicide to law enforcement based on hearsay
information apparently conveyed by her daughter.

Petitioner requests the

following discovery:
1.

Prosecuting attorney documents.

2.

All statements and summaries of statements to law enforcement either
made by or attributed to Ms. Stroud, regardless of medium, and all reports
and notes made by law enforcement about Ms. Stroud. (Petitioner
currently is in possession of one incomplete, undated report of Det. Dave
Smith, BCPD, see Appendix B.)
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II.

Prosecuting Attorney's Office
A.

Miscellaneous documentation. Petitioner requests infonnation regarding the

following matters regardless of medium, including but not limited to notes,
reports, memorandum, photographs, emails, and audio and/or video recordings
(unless otherwise specified):

B.

1.

Color copies of any illustrative exhibits utilized during the State's opening
statement.

2.

A copy of the motion requesting an order impaneling the grand jury, and a
copy of the order as required under ICR 6.1(b) and I.e. § 19-1307.

3.

A copy of any committee minutes on the drafting of the death penalty jury
instructions. (Tr., p. 4675, L. 25 - p. 4676, L. 4 (noting that both defense
counsel and the prosecutor served on the death penalty instructions
commi ttee).)

4.

Color copies of all PowerPoint slides and other documents shown to the
jury, including, but not limited to the "scale" diagram roughly drawn and
referenced in Mr. Hall's petition for post-conviction relief.

5.

Access to the original video and/or audio tapes made during police
custodial interrogation of Petitioner on 4/1/03 for the purpose of
professional enhancement, and first part of interrogation (held in "Room
A") on 3/13/03.

6.

Disclosure and access to any other audio and/or video recordings
involving Petitioner while in police custody and not previously disclosed
during the underlying criminal proceedings. (Petitioner currently is in
possession of videos of police interrogations conducted on 3/13/03,
3/29/03, and 4/1/03. But see above request III.A.5.)

7.

All documented communications, or summaries of communications, by
the prosecutor's office with the media, including but not limited to press
releases.

Discovery Materials.

1.

Documentation denoted by asterisk (*) as identified in comments section
of attached Appendix B.
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2.

C.

Electronic Mail.
1.

III.

State's 1st, 3rd , 6th , 8th , 10th, 12th and 15 th Addenda to Discovery Responses,
and continnation that the State's 16th Addenda to Discovery Response was
the last discovery response sent to defense counsel.

Copies of all e-mails between the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's
office and the Ada County Public Defender's office regarding the
Henneman case, the Hanlon case, or Erick Hall.

Law Enforcement Agencies
A.

Field notes and logbooks. Because police reports do not contain all infonnation
contained in original field notes and logbooks, Petitioner requests all field notes
and logbooks generated by any law enforcement officer in the course of the
investigation of the Henneman and Hanlon homicides. 6

B.

Correspondence. All correspondence or summaries of correspondence between
law enforcement and other state and federal agencies regarding the Henneman
homicide investigation.

C.

Specific reports.
1.

Reports prepared by "task force" members excluding those reports listed
in Appendix B. The "task force" consisted of the following law
enforcement personnel:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

Special Agent Scott Mace, FBI
Det. Dave Smith, BCPD
Det. Lance Anderson, BCPD
Lt. Jim Maxon, BCPD
Officer Dan Barber, BCPD
Officer Mike Riley, BCPD
Officer Tom Schuler, BCPD
Officer Keven O'Rourke, BCPD
1.
Det. Greg Morgan, BCPD
J. Det. Wade Spain, BCPD
k. Sgt. Mike Lusk, ISP (Boise)

6

This request is duplicative of only those prior requests specifically identified in section II of
.

~s~tioo.
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1.

m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
r.
s.
t.
u.
v.
2.

Other reports prepared by law enforcement personnel, whether or not
officially "task force" members, (but excluding those reports listed in
Appendix B):
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
r

3.

Officer Sherri Cameron, BCPD
Officer Darla Curtis, GCPD
Ofr Shawna Hilliard, BCPD
Officer Thomas Holst, BCPD
Officer Gary Wiggins, BCPD
Officer M. Furniss, GCPD

Other reports pertaining to search efforts including, but not limited to the
following (but excluding those reports listed in Appendix B):
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

4.

Sgt. Stewart Robinson, ISP (Twin Falls)
Det. Vicki Gooch, ISP (Boise)
Sgt. Dave Kynock, ISP (Boise)
Det. Joe Miller, Meridian Police
Det. Mike Taddicken, ACSD
Det. Jamie Barker, ACSD
Special Agent Scott Birch, Idaho Attorney General's Office
Det. Rick Allen, GCPD
Sgt. John Taylor, GCPD
Det. Cory Stambaugh, GCPD
Det. Steve Bartlett, GCPD

St. Alphonsus' Lifeflight searches
Access Air searches
Idaho Mountain Search and Rescue searches
Boise Fire Department dive team search
Ada County Paramedics four-wheeler search
Blood hound searches with Officer Tony Plott and Belle
Aerial search conducted by Mike Urizar and Lt. Walby
Boise River searches by Detectives Bartless and Babbitt

Other reports pertaining to recovery efforts including, but not limited to
those prepared by the following individuals (but excluding those reports
listed in Appendix B):
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Captain Tony Lloyd, Boise Fire Department
Fireman Ton Galindo, Boise Fire Department
Fireman Doug Cooper, Boise Fire Department
Fireman Scott Hall, Boise Fire Department
Officer S. Cameron, Boise City Police Department
Det. Sergeant John Taylor, Garden City Police Department
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D.

FBI I-drives. Copies of all reports, communications or files contained on any 1-

Drive of any FBI field office involved in the Henneman or Hanlon investigation,
including, but not limited to the Salt Lake City and Boise field offices.
E.

Task force lead assignments. The task force received and investigated 527 leads

that Petitioner believes were recorded on "lead sheets." Trial counsel files only
contain twelve "lead sheets."
F.

Miscellaneous reports and other documentation.

1.

Police reports regarding all unsolved rapes, attempted rapes, murders and
attempted murders that took place in Ada County from January 1995 to
date.

2.

Police reports regarding any and all attempted abductions taking place in
or around the Greenbelt, from January 1995 to date, including, but not
limited to the following unsolved homicides:
a.

Any and all law enforcement reports and notes regarding the
murder of Kay Lynn Jackson.

3.

Police reports regarding any and all attempted robberies involving beating
on or around the head and taking place in Ada County from January 1995
to date. (Tr., p. 4887, Ls. 1-4 (April Sebastian testified that Petitioner told
her that he sometimes hit unsuspecting persons over the head and stole
their money).)

4.

Any and all FBI reports containing "profiling" of the perpetrator in the
Lynn Henneman and Cheryl Hanlon murders.

5.

Any and all reports or documentation regarding the special light sources
used, and where, when and by whom used.

6.

Police reports regarding Petitioner's escape history.

7.

Copy of all police reports and notes regarding Ada County Case No.
M0303573, the Failing to Register as a Sex Offender case filed against
Petitioner.

8.

The name of the officer(s) who searched the Main Street Bridge area.
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9.

All documented communications, or summaries of communications, by
law enforcement with the media, including but not limited to press
releases.

10.

Any reports identifying transients' involvement in small fires reported at
East Jr. High.

11.

Documentation regarding the search for bloodstains located at or near the
Chart House parking lot and near the Main Street Bridge.

12.

Records for Lynn Henneman's cellular telephone use from October 1,
2000 until service was terminated.

13.

Any results from informal or formal testing conducted for time and
distance to walk relevant areas of the Greenbelt, whether such testing was
conducted by law enforcement personnel or others.

14.

Any and all reports, notes and statements related to searches conducted
along the Boise River between the DoubleTree Motel and the Capital
Street Bridge, including searches of the Main Street bridge area on
October 9, 2000. (Petitioner currently is in possession of report of Det.
Cory Stambaugh, dated 5118/01, see Appendix B).

15.

Any and all reports, notes and statements related to searches conducted by
the FBI Salt Lake City-based "Evidence Recovery Team" along the Boise
River near the Main St. bridge area on or about 10/10100, including
documents relating to use of alternative light sources.

Documentation regarding DNA evidence.
1.

Legible, readable, and unredacted miscellaneous documentation and other
requested information identified in Appendix A and attached thereto.

2.

All documentation relating to entry of Petitioner's DNA profile into the
Idaho CODIS database, or any local or state database. (Tr., p. 3428.)

3.

All documentation relating to entry of Petitioner's DNA profile into the
national NDIS database, or any national database.

4.

Copies of any reports and summaries of communications or conversations
between Cellmark, Idaho State Police Forensics Laboratory, police
agencies and/or the Ada County prosecutor's office regarding the
existence and/or DNA profile for another perpetrator in the Henneman
and/or Hanlon homicide cases.
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5.

Results of all comparisons made of Erick Virgil Hall's DNA profile
against any local, state, or national DNA database, including the Idaho
CODIS and national NDIS databases.

6.

All DNA profile infonnation developed or other forensic testing
conducted in connection with the murder of Kay Lynn Jackson and
infonnation related to DNA or other forensic exclusions in that case.

7.

All DNA profile infonnation developed or other forensic testing
conducted in connection with the death of Amanda Stroud and infonnation
related to DNA or other forensic exclusions in that case.

G.

All Documentation and Information Regarding Reward Money Offered For
Assistance In The Henneman and Hanlon Homicide Investigations Including
Claims Made On Such Reward.

H.

Documentation Regarding Sex Offender Registration.
1.

v.

involving

Miscellaneous Documents and Reports.
A.

VI.

Documentation from the Idaho sex offender registry
registration, or attempts at registration, by Erick Hall.

Miscellaneous
1.

Legible copy of all receipts from the Table Rock Brewhouse associated
with food and alcohol ordered and purchased by Lynn Henneman on
09124/00.

2.

Transcripts of all grand jury proceedings held in connection with State v.
Erick Virgil Hall, Ada County No. H0300614 (Hanlon).

3.

Register of Actions for State v. Erick Virgil Hall, Ada County Case Nos.
H03006141M0302868 (Hanlon).

4.

Copies of all exhibits presented to Grand Jury No. 03-35 (Lynn
Henneman).

5.

Copies of any and all written questions by jury to the court, any bailiff, or
other court personnel. (Tr., p. 5516.)

IMSI, Ada County Jail, Garden City Jail and Other Prison and Jail Records
A.

Inmate Classification Manuals. Any and all manuals, infonnal or fonnal policies,
memoranda

or
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reclassification, custody status and risk assessment for Idaho Department of
Corrections that were in use in March, 2004. (See Tr., pp. 4903-4951 (testimony
of Dennis Dean, Inmate Records Placement Manager, IDOC).)
B.

Safety Practices Manual.

Any and all manuals, informal or formal policies,

memoranda or guidelines regarding safety practices for female correctional
officers or other female employees or volunteers and inmates classified as or
believed to be sexually violent toward women.
VII.

Depositions and Related Documentation Requiring Subpoenas
A.

All members of the defense team and their agents. Petitioner moves to depose
Amil Myshin (lead counsel), D.C. Carr (second chair counsel), Glenn Elam
(investigator), Rosanne Dapsauski (mitigation specialist), and Rolf Kehne Gury
selection consultant). Petitioner further moves for subpoenas duces tecum, as
specified below.

Due to trial counsels' respective schedules, the standard of

performance in post-conviction cases, and trial counsels' preference, Petitioner
requests that this Court issue subpoenas for the attendance of each team member
for the purpose of independent depositions.
Petitioner further moves for a subpoenas decus tecum for each of the
above depositions, to include the following:

B.

1.

Documentation identifying the cases each trial team member worked on
from April 1, 2003 through Januaryl8, 2005. (Tr., p. 215, L. 24 - p. 216,
L.2 (noting lead counsel's heavy workload including a manslaughter trial
scheduled for April 2004.)

2.

All e-mail correspondence between trial team members and the
prosecutor's office. (Tr., p. 249, Ls. 8-14.)

Dr. Michael Estess
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VIII. Documents Requiring Subpoenas
A.

IX.

Miscellaneous
1.

All files created by or held by the Ada County Public Defender's office
related to State v. Erick Virgil Hall, Case No. M0302158/H0300423
(failure to register).

2.

An identification of the names of all cases that each trial counsel handled
while representing Petitioner including the case names and dates that any
of the cases went to trial, including an identification of cases involving
serious felony offenses of arson, homicide (all degrees), rape, sodomy,
kidnapping, burglary and robbery.

3.

All Washington DSHS Division of Child Support records pertaining to
Frank McCracken and Jean McCrackenlHall in Case No. 70253. Court
Order to specify that need for records outweighs need for privacy.

Preservation of Physical Evidence.

Petitioner requests that all physical evidence

collected in the underlying criminal investigation be preserved in order to avoid the
destruction of potentially exculpatory materials.

See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S.

51 (1988)(bad faith destruction of potentially useful evidence may violate due process).
X.

Access to Hanlon Court Documents. SAPD counsel was informed by court personnel
that permission from both the Hanlon defense team and the prosecutor's office was
necessary to gain access to the Hanlon court file/record. However, trial counsel on the
Hanlon case subsequently informed SAPD that they knew nothing of this. SAPD access
is necessary because the Hanlon case played an extremely important role in the pretrial
and trial proceedings in the Henneman case. Regardless of whether evidence from the
Hanlon case was ever admitted, the threat of its admission clearly influenced trial
counsels' preparations and the outcome of the proceedings.
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DATED this 5th day January, 2006.

Lead Counsel, Capital itigation Unit

PAULA M. SWENSEN
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
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APPENDIX A
The following is a list of illegible, redacted, unreadable, or otherwise incomplete
documentation and imaging relating to DNA testing within the possession of the SAPD, obtained
through review of trial counsels' files.
1.

Photo documentation dated 1112/00, SAPD #8286.

2.

ISP Lab Notes dated 10/2000, SAPD #9714.

3.

ISP Lab Notes dated 10/2000, SAPD #9715.

4.

ISP Lab Notes dated 1012000, SAPD #9711.

5.

Handwritten notes dated 10/2000 through 412003, SAPD #8280.

6.

Identity of "KAG" who initialed handwritten notes dated 1012000 through
4/2003, SAPD #8280.

7.

ISP State Lab DNA Report by Ann Bradley dated 11103/00, SAPD #8585.

8.

ISP State Lab DNA Report by Ann Bradley dated 11103/00, SAPD #8587.

9.

Report or notes written by Ann Bradley, dated 11113/00, Petitioner
currently is in possession of one page only, SAPD #8594.

10.

Missing page 29 of Ann Bradley' s reported dated 12/18/00, SAPD #8645.

11.

Organic Extraction Worksheet dated 10/18/00, SAPD #8580.

12.

Polaroid photograph of Chilex Hair Extraction dated 11128/00, SAPD
#8359.

13.

Identity of witness to Chelex Extraction of DNA dated 1119/00, SAPD
#8302.

14.

PCR Printed Results dated 11111100, SAPD #8320.

15.

DQA1 Typing Image, SAPD #8614.

16.

Identity of analyst who initialed ISP DQA1 2nd Reader Form, dated
10/23/00.

17.

DQA1 Typing Image dated 12/12100, SAPD #8634.
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18.

DQA1 Typing Images dated 12/20100, SAPD #8655.

19.

DQA1 Typing Image dated 12/29100, SAPD #8681.

20.

DQA1 Typing Image dated 1110101, SAPD #8706.

21.

DQA1 Typing Image dated 2/9101, SAPD #8729.

22.

DQA1 Typing Image dated 3/23/01, SAPD #8755.

23.

DQA1 Typing Image dated 5/10101, SAPD #8803.

24.

DQAl 2nd Reader Form dated 12/20/00, SAPD #8660.

~25.

Identity of "PM" who initialed 2nd Reader Form," dated 12/01/00, SAPD
#8619.

26.

Identities of "PM" and "C" who initialed DQAl 2nd Reader Form dated
12120100, SAPD #8660.

27.

Identity of analyst on "DQA1 2nd Reader Form," dated 12120100, SAPD
#8662.

28.

Product Gel Sheet dated 3/25/03, SAPD #8262.

29.

Product Gel Sheet dated 1117100, SAPD #8290.

30.

Product Gel Sheet dated 11110/00, SAPD #8306.

31.

Product Gel Sheet dated 11110100, SAPD #8318.

32.

Product Gel Sheet dated 11116/00, SAPD #8343.

33.

Product Gel Sheet dated 12/2/00, SAPD #8368.

34.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 11/30100, SAPD #8610.

35.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 11130100, SAPD #8611.

36.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 11130100, SAPD #8612.

37.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 12/12/00, SAPD #8630.

38.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 12/12/00, SAPD #8632.
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39.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 12/20100, SAPD #8651.

40.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 12/20100, SAPD #8653.

41.

PCR Product Gel Image and date of image, SAPD #8677.

42.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 12/29100, SAPD #8679.

43.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 1/10101, SAPD #8702.

44.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 1/10/01, SAPD #8704.

45.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 2/9101, SAPD #8725.

46.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 2/9101, SAPD #8727.

47.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 3123/01, SAPD #8753

48.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 4/23/01, SAPD #8774.

49.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 4/23/01, SAPD #8776.

50.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 4/23/01, SAPD #8778.

51.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 5110/01. See Appendix C, SAPD #8799.

52.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 511 0101, SAPD #8801.

53.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 6/8/01, SAPD #8821.

54.

PCR Product Gel Image dated 6/8/01, SAPD #8823.

55.

Polymarker Typing Image, SAPD #8617.

56.

Polymarker Typing Image dated 12120100, SAPD #8657.

57.

Polymarker Typing Image dated 12/29100, SAPD #8683.

58.

Polymarker Typing Image dated 12/29100, SAPD #8685.

59.

Polymarker Typing Image dated 1/10/01, SAPD #8708.

60.

Polymarker Typing Image dated 2/9101, SAPD #8731.

61.

Polymarker Typing Image dated 3/23/01, SAPD #8757.

MOTION FOR DISCOVERY

29

001.06

62.

Quantiblot bnage dated 12/11100, SAPD #8625.

63.

Quantiblot bnage dated 11129/00, SAPD #8605.

64.

Quantiblot bnage dated 12/19100, SAPD #8647.

65.

Quantiblot bnage dated 12/28/00, SAPD #8673.

66.

Quantiblot bnage dated 119/01, SAPD #8698.

67.

Quantiblot bnage dated 2/7/01, SAPD #8720(b).

68.

Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 03/24/03 (possibly called a
"membrane"), SAPD #8259.

69.

Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 11/03/00, SAPD #8287.

70.

Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 11109/00, SAPD #8303.

71.

Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 11113/00, SAPD #8340.

72.

Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 11129/00, SAPD #8361.

73.

Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 11/30100, SAPD #8363.

74.

Identity of"JF" who initialed "DNA Standards" on LTI Slot Blot Loading
Sheet dated 11130/00, SAPD #8364.

75.

Slot Blot Loading Sheet results dated 12/01100, SAPD #8365.

76.

Identity of "EJR" who initialed Slot Blot Loading Sheet test dated
3124/03, SAPD #8260.

77.

Identity of "MAT" who initialed "Ladder & Sample Tray Witness" run
information, SAPD #8263.

78.

Identities of "m" and "MNK" who initialed "Administrative Review
Complete" and "Report Mailed & Invoiced" on Forensic Case Review
Checklist, dated 312003, SAPD #8267.

79.

Identity of "POY" who initialed "Administrative Review Complete" on
Forensic Case Review Checklist dated 1212000, SAPD #8268.

80.

Identity of "KAB" who initialed shipping label from Cellmark to ISP,
dated 2/2001, SAPD #8276.
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81.

Identity of witness (es) to "Section of DNA from Mixed Stains PCR,"
dated 1112/00, SAPD #8285.

82.

Identity of "CK" who initialed "Sample Order & Dilution" of
Amplification dated 11106/00, SAPD #8289.

83.

Identity of "JAH" who initialed "Sample Order & Dilution Witness" of
Amplification dated 1119/00, SAPD #8305.

84.

Identity of "WM" who initialed "Sample Order & Dilution Witness" of
Amplification dated 11/10/00, SAPD #8316.

85.

Identity of all witnesses, including identity of witness with initials "SB" or
possibly "RB," to Microcon 100 Filtration Concentration, SAPD #8339.

86.

Identities of "LLG" and "JU" who initialed "Ladder & Dilution Control
Witness" and "Allelic Ladder Check" on Run Infonnation dated 11116/00,
SAPD#8344.

87.

Identity of "K?D" who initialed "Sample Prep" of AmpFISTR Profiler
Plus/COfiler 310 Sample Prep Sheet, SAPD #8345.

88.

Identity of "XX" who initialed "Ladder Witness" on Run Infonnation
dated 12/2/00, SAPD #8369.

89.

Identity of individuals not disclosed on document regarding 3 sets of
swabs, from John Brumbaugh (GCPD) to Jenny Treinen (ISP), dated
10/31100, SAPD #8555.

90.

Identity of donor of oral mouth swabs contained in unidentified evidence
envelope, from Darla Curtis (GCPD) to Jenny Treinen (ISP), dated
1112/00, SAPD #8556.

91.

Identity of reviewer initials on "Blind Internal Quality Control Sample"
(Bloodstain), dated 11128/00, SAPD #8621.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

f

day of January, 2006, a true and correct copy ofthe
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
foregoing document, MOTION FOR DISCOVERY, was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:

-X- U.S. Mail

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
POBOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

- - Statehouse Mail
- - Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S
OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

- - U.S. Mail
- - Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
-L Hand Delivery
E-Mail
--

THOMAS F. NEVILLE
DISTRICT JUDGE
200W.FRONT
BOISE, ID 83702

- - U.S. Mail
- - Statehouse

Mail
Facsimile
-Hand Delivery
E-Mail
--

---'X-

Administrative Assistant

MJA/br
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State BarNo. 2127
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. SPOT0500155
STATE'S OBJECTION TO THE
MOTION FOR DISCOVERY

------------------------------)
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of
Ada, representing the State of Idaho, in the above entitled matter, and puts before the Court the
State's Objection to the Petitioner's Motion for Discovery which was filed on about January 5,
2006. The State will more thoroughly address the issues in a later memorandum, but objects on
the basis that the approximate 350 discovery requests in the Petitioner's Motion are a precluded
"fishing expedition" as described in Aeschliman vs. State, 132 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 1999). The
State requests that the Court exercise it's discretion and not order discovery until the Petitioner

STATE'S OBJECTION TO THE MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL), Page 1
nn ... ... J

shows that each item of discovery is necessary to protect the petitioner's substantial rights.
Aechliman, supra; State v. LePage 138 Idaho 803 (Ct. App. 2003).

-/I!

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 11~day of January 2006.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

;0

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .--LL day of January 2006, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing State's Objection to Motion for Discovery was served to Mark J.

Ackley and Paula M. Swensen, Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders, 3647
Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 in the manner noted below:

Gr13y depositing copies of the

same in the United States mail, postage prepaid,

first class.
o By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for

pickup at the Office ofthe Ada County Prosecutor.
o By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s)~t t e facsimile number:

STATE'S OBJECTION TO THE MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL), Page 2
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
LS.B. # 4843
NO,_

MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO, SPOT0500155
MOTION TO RECONSIDER
ORAL ORDERS RE: EX PARTE
PROCEDURES FOR EXPERT
ACCESS AND RESTRICTIONS
ON JUROR CONTACT
(CAPITAL CASE)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his
attorneys, the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, and moves this Honorable Court
to reconsider oral Orders made during the telephonic hearing held on January 6, 2006,
wherein the Court denied Petitioner's oral motion for the Court to adopt ex parte
procedures for facilitating expert access to Petitioner and wherein the Court placed
restrictions on counsels' abilities to contact jurors in the underlying capital trial.
This motion is made pursuant to I.C. § 19-2719, I.C. §§ 19-4901, et seq., I.C.R.
57, and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, corresponding sections of the Idaho Constitution, all matters of record in the

MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORAL ORDERS RE: EX PARTE PROCEDURES
FOR EXPERT ACCESS AND RESTRICTIONS ON JUROR CONTACT
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underlying criminal case, and the Memorandum m Support with accompanymg
attachments filed herewith .
.1);'d
) 0-

Dated this 1_-(._

day of January, 2006.

'-1'j2A L )7'/ <t (l(/L.(]Iz (

j

PAULA M. SWENSEN
Deputy, State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this "2/L day of January, 2006, served a
true and correct copy of the forgoing MOTION TO RECONSIDER ORAL ORDERS
RE: EX PARTE PROCEDURES FOR EXPERT ACCESS AND RESTRICTIONS
ON JUROR CONTACT as indicated below:
ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
PO BOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
~ Hand Delivery
/

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

BRANI5I REED

\~
Administrative Assistant
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
LS.B. # 4843

NO.

A.M.

-;;;1

q :Si ~'l~t. ~____
JAN 24 2006

MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT0500155
MOTION FOR THE COURT
TO ADOPT PETITIONER'S
PROPOSED SCHEDULING
ORDER
(CAPITAL CASE)

oI

COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his
counsel at the State Appellate Public Defender, and moves this Court adopt Petitioner's
proposed scheduling order for the remainder of these post-conviction proceedings.
Petitioner's motion is based on I.e. §§ 19-2719, 19-4901, et seq., the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the corresponding
sections of the Idaho Constitution.
The following scheduling proposal is based on a series of triggering events to
ensure the timely and meaningful resolution of these capital post-conviction proceedings.
To ensure meaningful post-conviction proceedings, a scheduling order must provide postconviction counsel the opportunity to satisfy their ethical and legal obligations to
investigate and raise all claims that are arguably meritorious under the standards
MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ADOPT
PETITIONER'S PROPOSED SCHEDULING ORDER
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applicable to high quality capital defense representation.

ABA Guidelines For The

Appointment And Performance Of Defense Counsel In Death Penalty Cases (2003)
(hereinafter "ABA Guidelines"), Guidelines 1O.IS.I.C ("[p Jost-conviction counsel should
seek to litigate all issues, whether or not previously presented, that are arguably
meritorious under the standards applicable to high quality capital defense representation,
including challenges to any overly restrictive procedure rules" and "make every
professionally appropriate effort to present issues in a manner that will preserve them for
subsequent review"), 10.1S.l.E.4 ("[p Jost-conviction counsel should . . . continue an
aggressive investigation of all aspects of the case"); see also State v. Beam, 121 Idaho
862, 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992)(recognizing that without meaningful post-conviction
proceedings a capital petitioner might be denied due process of law under the federal and
state constitutions).
Because of the extensive nature of counsels' investigation, including discovery
requests and depositions, Petitioner proposes that utilizing time lines as "triggering
events" will be more efficient than specifying calendar dates, precluding the need for any
unnecessary litigation. Petitioner proposes the following triggering events for deadlines:
1.

DISCOVERY
a. A timeline for the State to respond to any court-ordered discovery and
for Petitioner to review and assess such responses. The amount of
time necessary for the State to respond to discovery depends in large
part upon the degree to which this Court grants Petitioner's discovery
requests. Petitioner's Motion for Discovery is currently pending; a
hearing date on the motion has yet to be scheduled. The discovery

MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ADOPT
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motion is a necessary part of counsels' independent and thorough
investigation required by performance standards for capital postconviction counsel for the purpose of identifying and raising all
arguably meritorious claims in a final amended petition for postconviction relief. ABA Guidelines IO.15.l.C, IO.15.l.EA. Petitioner
should be given a reasonable time to review the discovery and assess
necessary investigative follow-up prior to filing an amended petition.
2.

TRANSCRIPTS

a. The date Petitioner receIves the transcript of the exerCIse of
peremptory challenges. Preparation of the transcript has been ordered,
but a transcript has not yet been completed by the court reporter or
received by Petitioner. Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir.
2001)(recognizing that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
require review of the entire trial transcript)
b. The date Petitioner receives the transcript of the interrogation tapes as
played to the jury. Preparation of the transcript has been ordered, but a
transcript has not yet been completed or received by Petitioner. See
Hoffman v. Arave, supra.

3.

DEPOSITIONS

a. A time line for the completion of depositions.

After receipt of the

transcripts and all court-ordered discovery, whichever occurs latest,
and a reasonable time period in which to review those materials,
Petitioner proposes that the Court should adopt a time-line for the
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taking of depositions.

The transcripts of the depositions will be

attached to an amended petition for post-conviction relief. I.C. § 194903.

4.

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

a. Petitioner requests a reasonable time following receipt of the
deposition transcripts for the filing of his amended petition. I. C. § 194906(a).

5.

DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS AND RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

a. Upon the filing of an amended petition, the Court should enter a
scheduling order for the filing of dispositive motions.

I.C. § 19-

4906(c).

b. The scheduling order should include a reasonable time to respond to
any dispositive motion filed.
In conclusion, an efficient, meaningful, and realistic timeline for the final

resolution of these capital post-conviction proceedings flows from the aforementioned
series of triggering events that are part and parcel to all post-conviction proceedings and
required by the standards governing counsels' performance.

Accordingly, Petitioner

respectfully moves this Court to enter a scheduling order taking into consideration these
events.
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Dated this ~ day of January, 2006.

Deputy, State Appellate Public Defender
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PAULA M. SWENSEN
Deputy, State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
. ,-/.l
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this 2~ day of January, 2006, served a true
and correct copy of the forgoing MOTION FOR THE COURT TO ADOPT
PETITIONER'S SCHEDULING ORDER as indicated below:

ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702
ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
POBOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

I

.

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

-i-- U.S.
Statehouse Mail
Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

Mitigation Specialist
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Neville012406

Session: Neville012406
Session Date: 2006/01/24
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: French, Janet

Division: DC
Session Time: 09:18

Courtroom: CR503

Clerk (s) :
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s) :
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0002
Case Number: SPOT0500155D
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK
Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
CO-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Public Defender:

2006/01/24
13:50:57 - Operator
Recording:
13:50:57 - New case
, STATE OF IDAHO
13:51:18 - Operator
'Stop recording:
13:51:29 - Operator
Recording:
13:51:29 - Record
, STATE OF IDAHO
13:51:30 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court called the case.
13:52:01 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA
Here on behalf of petitioner as well
13:53:20 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.

001.2f
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The Court stated that at last meeting, the Court and counsel
met in chambers,
13:54:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Mr. Ackley by telephone.
Court and counsel discussed the ju
ry questionnaire.
13:56:40 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley stated that he has made multiple revisions to the
previous order
13:57:32 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
emiled to the Court.
13:57:47 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne stated new order provided is acceptable to the St
ate
13:58:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court views off the record
13:58:12 - Operator
Stop recording:
14:00:58 - Operator
Recording:
14:00:58 - Record
., STATE OF IDAHO
14:01:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court responded
14:03:29 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley responded regarding reconsidering, want unredacte
d form
14:10:42 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will set this matter for hearing on February 2, 20
06 @ 9:00 a.m.
14:11:17 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne stated motion has 336 requests for Discovery with
several
14:11:44 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
sub-parts that could take it into the 1000's
14:17:16 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court stated may need to start the hearing regarding dis
covery on the
14:17:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F .
.aftenoon.
14:17:44 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne stated counsel were discussing discovery before c
oming in today.
14:18:04 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Ackley trying to prepare a list of what might be agreed
to. Will need
14:18:49 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
more time to address that motion
14:19:08 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK

00122
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Mr. Ackley stated everything requested is needed.
14:21:28 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court could hold a telephonic hearing on Friday, Februar
y 3 @ 4:30 p.m.
14:21:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
and advise whether the civil trial had gone down and may be
able to hear the
14:22:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
motions the week of February 7th.
14:23:20 - Operator
Stop recording:
14:23:42 - Operator
Recording:
14:23:42 - Record
, STATE OF IDAHO
14:23:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will look at February 8th, to set the hearing
14:24:26 - Operator
Stop recording:

001.23
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Session: Neville020306
Session: Neville020306
Session Date: 2006/02/03
Judge: Neville/ Thomas F.
Reporter: French/ Janet

Division: DC
Session Time: 08:45

Courtroom: CR501

Clerk(s) :
Ellis/ Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s)
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s)

Case ID: 0013
Case Number: SPOT0500155D
Plaintiff:
Plaintiff Attorney: Swenson/ Paula
Defendant: Idaho/ State of
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: Bourne/ Roger
Public Defender:

2006/02/03
17:09:41 - Operator
Recording:
17:09:41 - New case
Idaho/ State of
17:10:36 - Judge: Neville/ Thomas F.
Court here for further proceedings. Court inquired if form
of order agreed
17:11:23 - Judge: Neville/ Thomas F.
on access to jury questionnaire.
17:11:54 - Plaintiff Attorney: Swenson/ Paula
Ms. Swenson stated that the Court was going to here a Motion
to Reconsider.
17:19:03 - Judge: Neville/ Thomas F.
Court sets over to February 8/ 2006 @ 1:15 p.m.
17:19:21 - Operator

S""op ~&~..."$

.J!Y.5~§.QgjLl:.5!!2.!1l.!!!YJj~!,!!&._at 01 :39 PM

J. DAVID NAVARRO, CLERK OF THE COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

CASE NO. SP-OT-05-00155D

ERICK VIRGIL HALL, PLAINTIFF
Plaintiff( s)
VS

NOTICE OF HEARING

STATE OF IDAHO, DEFENDANT
Defendant(s)

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for:

Motion Wednesday, February 15, 2006 at 02:00 PM
Judge:
Thomas Neville
Courtroom:

I certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on Wednesday, February 08, 2006.

Petitioner:

MARK ACKLEY
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
VIlA EMAIL
Mailed_ _

State's Counsel:

Hand Delivered

Faxed

--

"--

ROGER BOURNE
vYlA EMAIL

Mailed__

Hand Delivered_ _

Dated: Wednesday, February 08, 2006

Faxed _ _

J. DAVID NAVARRO
Clerk of the Court
.

By:

'\

./

\:DI..r\......\ U 1 R.J.:-.

Deputy s;erk
NOTICE OF HEARING-Motion to Reconsider
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Session: NevilleOl1506
Session: NevilleOl1506
Session Date: 2006/02/15
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: French,' Janet

Division: DC
Session Time: 08:40

Courtroom: CR501

Clerk(s) :
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Owen, Patrick
Public Defender(s) :
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0018
Case Number: SPOT0500155D
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
CO-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Public Defender:

2006/02/15
14:31:17 - Operator
Recording:
14:31:17 - New case
, STATE OF IDAHO
14:31:54 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA
here on behalf of the petitioner as well
14:32:08 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court here on Petitioner's Motion to Reconsider oral ord
ers
14:32:32 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court has not entered written orders on this matter, thi
s matter resulted
14:33:47 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
from telephone conference.

001.26
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14:34:33 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court not aware of written motions, but had questions po
sed by Mr.
14:34:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Ackley.
14:38:04 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley responded regarding January 6, date
14:42:28 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne responded,regarding exparte contact, believe shou
ld not do that
14:47:02 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson argued motion, stated got a copy of visiting req
uirements for
14:49:05 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA
Court appointed experts, would like this as part of the reco
rd, conts argumen
14:53:26 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA
to allow exparte motions for expert access
14:53:38 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne responded
14:56:07 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson responded
14:57:22 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court tentatively inclined to deny a uniform procedure f
or ex parte for
14:59:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
experts in every case.
Court would like to review on a case
by case
15:00:09 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
situation.
15:01:44 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA
Court is asking to see each one on a case by case situtation
15:02:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will consider each motion on its own merits.
Court go
es to the second
15:02:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
piece, Motion for access to prior jurors
15:03:08 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson makes argument
15:06:27 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Would have to have a basis for mis-conduct by the jury
15:06:41 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA
Would need to interview to find out if there was possible mi
s-conduct
15:07:52 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne responded
15:11:14 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court responded, regarding prior experiences with privat

001~
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e investigators
15:13:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
who went too far
15:14:36 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson responded
15:16:41 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court not going to deny access to jury, but must have pr
ior permission
15:17:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
from the Court and not ex parte, would need notice to the St
ate
15:19:36 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley cont'd to Motion to Reconsider jury questionnaire
s standby
15:20:27 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
request for unredacted questionnaires, but believe could red
act addresses
15:22:15 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Could redact those portions before showing to Mr. Hall
15:22:32 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne responded
15:23:49 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Look at group of jurors in two groups, those that were all q
uestioned and
15:24:09 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
those released by stip and then those that sat on jury panel
and the three
15:24:22 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
alternates
15:26:35 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley responded, would review questionnaires, stated Ab
dullah was given
15:29:21 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
unredacted questionnaires
15:30:35 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Each juror looked at defendant and stated they did not know
defendant,
15:31:28 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
likewise defendant could have stated whether he knew any of
the jurors.
15:31:52 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court indicated that was true.
15:32:45 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley stated not hiding identity is in the transcript.
He would be able
15:33:40 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
to cross reference their number on questionnaire.
15:36:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.

nn1?~
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Court believes counsel can do their job with the transcript
and
15:36:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
questionnaires side by side as redacted.
Court will consid
er motions to
15:36:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
approach the jury on a case by case
15:37:23 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Response
15:41:40 - Operator
Stop recording:
15:45:04 - Operator
Recording:
15:45:04 - Record
, STATE OF IDAHO
15:45:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court can set the hearing Thursday, March 2 @ 1:30 p.m.
Would request
15:45:29 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
counsel try to narrow the scope of the hearing.
Request Mr.
Ackley prepare
15:45:53 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
forms of orders based on today's motions and provide to Stat
e copy to view
15:46:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
for form
15:46:24 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley stated Discovery motion is quite lenghty and divi
ded betwwen Ms.
15:46:48 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Swenson and Mr. Ackley.
15:46:58 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
no objection
15:47:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Will be in recess
15:47:10 - Operator
Stop recording:
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Session: Neville030206
Session: Neville030206
Session Date: 2006/03/02
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: French, Janet

Division: DC
Session Time: 13:24

Courtroom: CR501

Clerk(s) :
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s) :
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0001
Case Number: SPOT0500155D
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Public Defender:

2006/03/02
13:51:40 - Operator
Recording:
13:51:40 - New case
, STATE OF IDAHO
13:52:00 - Other: SWENSON, PAULA
here on behalf of petitioner Erick Hall as well.
13:52:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court has had provided a couple of orders provided, inquired
if Mr. Bourne
13:52:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
had any objection to form of the order
13:53:29 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne stated he has viewed one order but not the other.
13:54:08 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court also in receipt of State's objection, inquires of agre

n01!lO
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ement reached
- Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
between counsel in continuing this matter to another day
13:54:37 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley stated have 40 categories that will be requesting
discovery on,
13:55:06 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
only two of those would the State not object too.
Mr. Ackle
y requested to
13:55:23 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
amend the petition and then come back on further hearing.
13:56:43 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne concurred, State of Law is that motion for Discov
ery has to be
13:57:01 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
connected to the Petition. State's view is there is no appa
rent connection
13:57:18 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
between the petition now filed and the request for discovery
Assumed there
13:57:44 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
would be an amended petition at some point.
Don't know th
at there would be
13:59:22 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
further amendments after that.
13:59:30 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court inquires how long to file amended petition.
14:00:19 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley indicated if this was a petition just for purpose
s of Discovery or
14:01:03 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
if this is final petition for summary disposition.
Believe
can have done in
14:01:32 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
4-6 weeks if for purpose of discovery.
14:03:08 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne responded.
Would like a serious petition to liti
gate.
.
14:04:55 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley stated not prepared to file a final petition yet,
purpose of
14:05:36 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
conversation yet was to get discovery done. Would take 4-6
weeks to file
14:07:19 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
amended petition aimed at discovery.
14:07:52 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court has discretion allow amended pleadings.
Partial a

~3:54:22

Page 2

Session: Neville030206
greement to
'14:08:17 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
vacate hearing today on discovery to get a more focused hear
ing. Court will
14:09:56 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
request that amended petition by April 17th. The Court will
not rule on
14:10:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
whether this is the first amended or last amended.
Court wi
11 reserve
14:10:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
judgment, as far as response from the State
14:12:31 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne requested mid may
14:12:42 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will order be completed by May 19th.
14:14:42 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Need to know if the Court is going to allow another amended
petition.
14:15:29 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court can't rule in advance in abcense of pleadings before t
he Court
14:16:33 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Request further clarification
14:16:44 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court can't rule in the blind, not knowing whether or not co
unsel discover
14:17:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
anything further
14:17:27 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
14:17:34 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Need to have this narrowed down at some point. Court loathe
to rule in the
14:18:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
dark.
14:21:42 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley stated need some assurance from the State.
14:22:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Amended complaint is bound to be beneficial for judicial eco
nomy.
14:23:28 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne had agreed to set this over to get amended petit
ion
14:24:33 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Mr. Ackley responded. Would like to proceed on some of the
discovery issues
14:26:58 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
today. Got a wholesale objection from the State
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,

14:27:20 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court does not have ability to hear today.
Court will set f
urther deadline
14:27:50 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
for possible amendment to the Motion for Discovery by June 9
tho
The Court
14:29:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
will set this hearing for June 23 @ 9:00 a.m. for hearing on
the motion re:
14:29:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Discovery. Request State advise the Court if any objection
to the forms of
14:30:30 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
the order
14:30:48 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court has been making emails part of the court record.
14:31:00 - Plaintiff Attorney: ACKLEY, MARK
Comfortable with that.
14:31:17 - Operator
Stop recording:
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
LS.B. # 4843
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MAR 16 2006

MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT0500155
EX PARTE MOTION

FOR EXPERT ACCESS
TO PETITIONER

(CAPITAL CASE)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his
attorneys at the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender and moves this Honorable
Court to order the Department of Correction (DOC) and the Idaho State Maximum
Security Institution (lMSI) to grant Dr. James Merikangas, M.D., of Bethesda, Maryland,
a contact visit with Petitioner in a quiet and confidential setting suitable for interview,
testing, and evaluation.
Further, although the Court denied Petitioner's motion to generally use ex parte
procedures, but because the Court permitted counsel to apply on a case-by-case basis,
Petitioner moves that this Order be granted ex parte. One of Dr. Merikangas' specialties,

EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO PETITIONER
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neurology, is not of the type utilized in the underlying trial proceedings and Petitioner
continues to object to premature disclosure of post-conviction strategy and work-product.
This request is necessary to develop Petitioner's Claim B.1 in an upcoming amended
petition.
Petitioner prays that such access be granted to Dr. Merikangas on the

4th

day of

April, 2006, from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., and that said Order allow the medical equipment
necessary to the examination, as specified in Attachment A.
This motion is made pursuant to I.e. §§ 19-4001, et seq., and 19-870 and the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and it
is based upon all matters of record.
Dated this

I~y of March, 2006.
Respectfully submitted;

~"'11l4'4l~/~
~

.

,/

MARKJ.
EY / I
Lead, Capital Litigat&x1nit

~u1~

jU}{1C<ltIL

PAULA M. SWENSEN
Deputy, Capital Litigation Unit

EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO PETITIONER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this Ik'thday of March, 2006, served a true
and correct copy of the forgoing EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO
PETITIONER as indicated below:

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
POBOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

Statehouse Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

--::r-

"
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"
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BARBARA D. THOMAS
Administrative Assistant

EX PARTE MOTION FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO PETITIONER
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Medical Equipment Used by Dr. James R. Merikan,
Metal Equipment
Otoscope
Opathmoscope
Stethoscope
Revolving pinwheel
Reflex hammer
Metal calipers
2 tuning fo~ks
Metal stopwatch
Blood pressure cuff
Tape measure
Other Equipment
Plastic bottle of cloves
Plastic bottle of vanila

Pens
Pencils
Pad of paper
Plastic strip with stripes
Wooden tongue depressor
Cotton swabs
Peice of leather
Piece of cloth
Latex gloves
All enclosed in a leather physician·s bag

EXHIBIT"
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GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 2127
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. SPOT0500155
STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE
TO PRECLUDE DEPOSITIONS
WITHOUT COURT ORDER

COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of
Ada, State of Idaho, and moves this Court for its order precluding the State Appellate Public
Defender from conducting "one party depositions" of the Petitioner's trial team members or of
other material witnesses. The State just became aware that the Petitioner was attempting to
conduct a "one party deposition" upon reading an email from the State Appellate Public
Defender to the State and the Court's clerk, dated March 22, 2006, concerning the need for a
hearing on the issuance of subpoenas for the depositions. Since these so called depositions are
STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE DEPOSITIONS WITHOUT COURT
ORDER (HALL), Page 1

apparently scheduled without notice to the State, the State cannot be there to protect the witness
or other State interests. The person being deposed is not fully examined nor prepared for the
hearing so the Court does not get a full and accurate picture of the information relevant to
whatever issue the deposition is for. Further, the State observes that no permission has been
given by the Court for depositions as required by Idaho Criminal Rule S7(b). To the State's
knowledge, no order allowing depositions has been granted by this Court. For those reasons, the
State objects to depositions and moves this Court to require that no deposition be taken until
further order of the Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this

Z 7day of March 2006.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

Rog;;Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
delivered to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho
83703 through the United States Mail, this Z']ctay of March 2006.

STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE DEPOSITIONS WITHOUT COURT
ORDER (HALL), Page 2

2006

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 2127
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Id. 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
)
)
vs.
)
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
_ _ _R_e_s..Lp_on_d......;e_n_t._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ )

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,

TO:

Case No. SPOT0500155
NOTICE OF HEARING

ERICK VIRGIL HALL, and STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC

DEFENDER, his Attorney of Record, you will please take notice that on the 23rd day of
June 2006, at the hour of 9:00 of said day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Roger Bourne will move this Honorable Court" on the
State's Motion in Limine to Preclude Depositions Without Court Order in the aboveentitled action.

'"J77 (f
DATED this ~ day of March 2006.
GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By:
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Roger Boume
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Notice of Hearing to State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake Harbor Lane,
Boise, Idaho 83703 by depositing the same in the InterofficeMail.postageprepaid.this

1'7

day of March 2006.
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State ofIdaho
LS.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT0500155

MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF
SUBPOENAS FOR DEPOSITIONS
AND SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
(CAPITAL CASE)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his counsel at the State
Appellate Public Defender,and pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution, Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 ofthe Idaho Constitution, I.e. § 19-4901
et seq., § 19-2719, and I.C.R. 57(b), and moves this Court to issue subpoenas for the depositions
of Amil Myshin, D.C. Carr, Glenn Elam, and Rosanne Dapsauski, as well as subpoenas duces
tecum for the production of documents.
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RELEVANT BACKGROUND
On January 5, 2006, Petitioner filed his Motion For Discovery and his Memorandum Of
Law In Support Of Motion For Discovery, (herein "Memorandum"). Within these pleadings,
Petitioner requested, and sought to justify, court-ordered depositions of Amil Myshin (lead
counsel), D.C. Carr (co-counsel), Glenn Elam (Ada County Public Defender investigator), and
Rosanne Dapsauski (trial team agent/mitigation specialist), among others.

Motion For

Discovery, p. 24; Memorandum, pp. 17-18. On or about January 19, 2006, the State filed a
blanket objection to all requests for discovery. On or about February 28,2006, the State filed a
memorandum in support of its objection. Neither of the State's pleadings addressed Petitioner's
specific requests for court-ordered depositions. A hearing on the pleadings was set for March 2,
2006.
Prior to the hearing, Petitioner, through counsel, reached an agreement with the State to
continue the hearing so that Petitioner could file an amendment to his petition. The purpose of
the amendment was to connect his discovery requests to specific claims not raised in his initial
petition. The agreement was premised on Petitioner's assertion that the amended petition would
not be considered a final petition. As Petitioner's counsel stated, in part, via an email message to
Court staff, and "carbon copied" to the State:
I spoke to Roger earlier this afternoon and we both agreed that tomorrow's
hearing would be best served by scheduling a deadline for the filing of an
amended petition and rescheduling the discovery hearing. The deadline would
not constitute the conclusion of these post-conviction proceedings but rather a
deadline to raise claims identified to date and appears a necessary step prior to a
meaningful discovery hearing.
Exhibit A.
At the hearing held March 2, 2006, the Court inquired how much time Petitioner would
require for filing an amended petition. Petitioner's counsel indicated that the amount of time
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depended on whether the amended petition would be considered a final petition subject to
potential summary dismissal, or, as envisioned by counsel, a means of ensuring a productive
discovery hearing, with leave for subsequent amendment. If the deadline were set for the latter
purpose, then counsel suggested four to six weeks. However, if the deadline were set for the
filing of a final petition, then counsel could not give a specific date but did state that Petitioner
would require much more time. After some discussion, the Court declined to indicate whether
further amendments would be permitted, imposed a deadline of April 17, 2006, for the filing of
an amended petition, imposed a deadline of June 9, 2006, for the filing of any amended
discovery motion, and continued the discovery hearing to June 23, 2006. 1 Petitioner thereafter
sought to pursue his discovery requests as previously scheduled. The Court refused, indicating
that it had already placed two civil cases on its docket. Petitioner then asked to at least have his
request for depositions heard. The Court refused Petitioner's request. 2
Petitioner has recently sought recorded sworn statements from trial team members,
without resorting to a court order. For various reasons, the trial team members have refused to
cooperate. The lack of adequate cooperation will be detailed in forthcoming affidavits from
members of Petitioner's current post-conviction team.

I.

Depositions Of The Trial Team Members, And The Production Of Documents
Within Their Possession, Are Necessary For Meaningful Post-Conviction
Proceedings.

By scheduling the discovery hearing for June 23, 2006, the Court implicitly determined that
Petitioner would be permitted to amend his petition with evidentiary support or claims as
warranted by any court-ordered discovery. Nevertheless, out of the abundance of caution due
capital cases, Petitioner's counsel believes the most diligent approach is to pursue depositions
without waiting nearly three months to be heard.
I

This rendition of facts is made in good faith and to the best of counsels' recollection without
resort to court minutes and without access to a transcript of the hearing.

2
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Petitioner has a state and federal due process right to meaningful post-conviction review
that guarantees him a full and fair opportunity to develop claims of trial error. See Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 401(1985)("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its action has

significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the dictates of the
Constitution--and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause."); State v. Beam, 121
Idaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992)(recognizing that the absence of meaningful capital
post-conviction proceedings may violate due process); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798,
992 P.2d 789, 793 (Ct. App. 1999)("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a
meaningful opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process");
see also Roberts v. State, 840 So.2d 962, 971 (Fl. 2002) (recognizing that while post-conviction

proceedings are designated civil, they "involve interests and considerations that are more closely
aligned with those traditionally and fundamentally protected in criminal proceedings" and thus
must comport with due process)(citations omitted).
A. Depositions
Petitioner has raised several grounds for relief, including claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel, in his initial petition for post-conviction relief. Through depositions Petitioner seeks
to provide evidentiary support for claims raised as well as support for claims not yet raised, but
identified through his independent investigation. In addition, Petitioner requires depositions as
an investigative tool because members of Petitioner's trial team have not provided adequate
consultation.
Petitioner generally bears the burden of proving his grounds for reliefby a preponderance
of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c). The Supreme Court set out the elements for claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, Petitioner
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must show that counsel's perfonnance was deficient. Second, Petitioner must show that the
deficient perfonnance prejudiced the defense. To prove deficient perfonnance Petitioner "must
show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at
688. Petitioner must "reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct" for an
objective evaluation from counsel's perspective at the relevant time. Id. at 689. Petitioner "must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be
considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. To rebut this presumption Petitioner must probe counsels'
decision-making process through depositions.
Petitioner requires depositions for four reasons: (1) to fully develop claims raised in
Petitioner's initial petition; (2) to determine whether counsels' challenged decisions were the
result of sound trial strategy;3 (3) to fully develop claims not yet raised but identified through
investigation conducted after filing Petitioner's initial petition; and (4) to identify additional
claims for post-conviction relief whether such claims involve the ineffective assistance of
counselor judicial, juror, or prosecutorial misconduct. 4 See Coleman v. Zant, 708 F.2d 541,548
(11 th Cir. 1983) (relying in part on the denial of depositions at the state post-conviction level in
finding that the federal habeas petitioner had been denied a full and fair opportunity to develop
facts to support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Davis v. State, 624 So.2d 282, 28384 (Fla. 1993) (holding that the petitioner raising an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
3 If trial counsel asserts, or the Court presumes, challenged decisions were strategic, then
Petitioner must inquire into the decision-making process to detennine whether such decisions
were unreasonable because made with inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. See Campbell v. State, 130 Idaho 546, 548,
944 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct. App. 1997).
Depositions would not be so critical for each of these reasons but for trial counsels' failure to
honor their ethical obligation to make themselves accessible for adequate and voluntary
consultation with Petitioner's current counsel. See infra, ABA Guidelines for the Appointment
and Perfonnance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, (herein "ABA Guidelines"),
Guideline 10.13 and Commentary.
4
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should have been permitted to take the deposition of his trial counsel); see generally Harris v.

Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969) ("[W]here specific allegations before the court show reason to
believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is
confined illegally and is therefore entitled to relief, it is the duty of the court to provide the
necessary facilities and procedures for an adequate inquiry."); Teague v. Scott, 60 F.3d 1167,
1172 (5th Cir.1995) ("Denial of an opportunity for discovery is an abuse of discretion when the
discovery is necessary to fully develop the facts of a claim."); Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693,
700 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that "a court's denial of discovery is an abuse of discretion if
discovery is indispensable to a fair, rounded, development of the material facts")(internal
quotation marks omitted); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 1997)(same).
Petitioner cannot rely on the procurement of affidavits, or other investigative methods, as
a substitute for court-ordered depositions for three reasons. First, Petitioner has not received
adequate and voluntary cooperation from trial counsel in these post-conviction proceedings
despite trial counsels' ethical obligations to facilitate Petitioner's representation. As set forth in
the ABA Guidelines,
In accordance with professional norms, all persons who are or have been
members of the defense team have a continuing duty to safeguard the interests of
the client and should cooperate fully with successor counsel. This duty includes,
but is not limited to:

A.
maintaining the records of the case in a manner that will inform successor
counsel of all significant developments relevant to the litigation;
B.
providing the client's files, as well as information regarding all aspects of
the representation, to successor counsel;

C.
sharing potential further areas of legal and factual research with successor
counsel; and
D.
cooperating with such professionally appropriate legal strategies as may
be chosen by successor counsel.
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ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.l3 ("The Duty To Facilitate The Work Of Successor Counsel")
(rev. ed.2003), reprinted in 31 Hofstra L.Rev. 913, 956-57 (2003).5

The lack of adequate

cooperation will be detailed in forthcoming affidavits from members of Petitioner's current postconviction team6 , but has included, at a minimum, the failure to disclose all files and notes in a
timely fashion, the failure to communicate with post-conviction counsel, and the failure to
cooperate in post-conviction counsels' legal strategy to pursue one-party depositions, i.e., oral
affidavits, as an alternative to court-ordered depositions. 7 Petitioner's counsel is therefore forced
to pursue more aggressive measures to compel cooperation.

Indeed, according to the

Commentary to ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.13, consulting with trial counsel is an "absolutely
critical" part of post-conviction counsels' independent and thorough investigation.
The duties contained in this Guideline are of enormous practical significance
to the vindication of the client's legal rights. "[T]he strategic thinking of the
lawyer, and learning this strategic thinking[,] is absolutely critical to the thorough
presentation of a post-conviction claim. It should be routinely and openly
presented to the post-conviction counsel." To do otherwise is professionally
unethical. 2

fn2 See id. ("[G]iven the peculiar aspects of the role of counsel whose former
client brings a post-conviction action, [it] violates counsel's ethical obligations"

5 The ABA Guidelines in their entirety can be
http://www.probono.netldeathpenalty/index.cfm.

accessed

Via

the

internet

at

See I.R.C.P. 56(f) ("Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion [for
summary judgment] that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a
continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had
or may make such other order as is just."); see also I.C. § 19-4906(c), specifically referencing
depositions one method for supporting a petitioner's claims prior to an evidentiary hearing.
6

7 The State has filed an objection to any court-ordered one-party depositions. This motion is
based on the assumption that any court-ordered deposition would provide both parties the
opportunity to examine the deponents.

MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS FOR DEPOSITIONS AND
SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

7

001.48

to fail to cooperate with successor counsel in "the disclosure to the postconviction counsel of files and notes from the representation, the volunteering of
absences in the record and the volunteering of counsel's strategic thinking in the
case."); Meegan B. Nelson, Note, When Clients Become "Ex-Clients": The Duties
Owed After Discharge, 26 J. LEGAL PROF. 233, 241 (2002) ("Essentially, a failure
to cooperate with the client's new attorney can constitute the same violations as a
failure to cooperate with the actual client under Model Rule 1.16."); see generally
State Bar of Ariz Comm. on the Rules of Prof! Conduct, Formal Op. 98-07
(1998) (discussing ethical obligations surrounding file retention and surrender to
clients and successor counsel); Returning Client Files After Termination, HAWAII
BAR J., Sept. 1998, at 16 (finding an ethical obligation to release to the client "all
file materials which, if not released ... would prejUdice the rights ofthe client").
ABA Guideline 10.13, Commentary.
Second, court-ordered depositions, unlike affidavits, are the only pre-evidentiary hearing
mechanism for fully and fairly developing Petitioner's claims. See e.g., Russell v. Acme-Evans

Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that it is proper under most circumstances to
disregard an affidavit when the affidavit contradicts the witness's prior deposition testimony);

Kiser v. Caudill, 599 S.E.2d 826, 830-34 (W.Va. 2004) (holding that the failure to consider an
affidavit that contradicted earlier deposition testimony was not an abuse of discretion). Indeed,
the logistics involved in finalizing an affidavit from trial counsel are onerous and timeconsuming, and a near impossibility in light of trial counsels' resistance to voluntary
cooperation. 8
Third, court-ordered depositions, unlike affidavits or other discovery methods, are the
only mechanism, short of testimony at an evidentiary hearing that provides both parties, as well
as trial team members, a full opportunity "to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's

Petitioner's lead counsel has experience with attempting to obtain an affidavit from trial
counsel, Amil Myshin, in other cases as well. For example, the logistical difficulties involved in
the revision and finalizing process of an affidavit in the capital post-conviction case of Darrell E.
Payne v. State of Idaho, Ada County case no. SPOT0200630D, led to the submission of an
unsigned affidavit.
8
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challenged conduct." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 9 Thus, an affidavit from trial counsel, while
useful, does not present a format conducive for full presentation of all the circumstances
surrounding their decision-making.

As noted by the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York,
[D]epositions are preferable if a searching interrogation of the other party
is desired. At a deposition the examining party has great flexibility and can frame
the questions on the basis of answers to previous questions. Moreover, the party
being examined does not have the opportunity to study the questions in advance
and to consult with counsel before answering, as is the case if interrogatories are
used. Attempts at evasion, which might be stymied by a persistent oral
examination, cannot easily be countered by interrogatories. The flexibility and the
potency of oral depositions is in large part lacking in written interrogatories.

Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)(citation omitted); see also
Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390,394 (2d Cir.1997).
Petitioner is not aware of any Idaho capital post-conviction case where a request for the
deposition of a trial team member was denied by a district court. For instance, Petitioner's lead
counsel deposed both trial counsel and defense team investigators in the capital post-conviction
cases of Jimmie V. Thomas v. State ofIdaho, Jerome County case no. SPOT99-112 and Dale C.
Shackelford v. State of Idaho, Latah County case no. CV2001-0004272. 1O

In addition,

Petitioner's lead counsel is aware that post-conviction depositions of both trial counsel were

This is not to say that one-party depositions, i.e., sworn recorded statements, written affidavits,
or other documentation do not provide competent evidentiary support for a petition for postconviction relief. Idaho Code § 19-4903 specifically provides that, "Affidavits, records, or other
evidence supporting its allegations shall be attached to the application or the application shall
recite why they are not attached."
9

Depositions were not requested by Petitioner's lead counsel in Michael A. lauhola v. State of
Idaho, Ada County case no. SPOTOlO0492D; however, in that case, the district court indicated
early on that an evidentiary hearing would be granted over any motion for summary dismissal.
Trial counsel were both questioned at the evidentiary hearing. Lead counsel did not request
depositions of trial counsel in Darrell E. Payne v. State of Idaho, Ada County case no.
SPOT0200630D, see supra n4.
10
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taken in Timothy A. Dunlap v. State of Idaho, case no. SP-94-863. See a/so, Rhoades v. State,
135 Idaho 299, 302, 17 P.3d 243, 246 (2000)(noting post-conviction depositions taken of trial
counsel). Petitioner asserts that the denial of depositions in these post-conviction proceedings,
under these circumstances, would violate Petitioner's state and federal rights to equal protection
of the law, his due process right to meaningful post-conviction review, and would constitute an
arbitrary denial of the procedural safeguards necessary to protect Petitioner's substantial rights,
as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment. See e.g., Lankford v.

Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125-27 (1991)(relying on due process in weighing the "special importance
of fair procedure" in capital cases); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)(relying on
the Eighth Amendment for affording "heightened reliability" in capital cases).

B. Production Of Documents
For the same legal grounds discussed above, and incorporated herein by reference,
Petitioner requests subpoenas duces tecum for the production of documents previously requested
in his Motion For Discovery, p. 24. Specifically, Petitioner requests documentation identifying
the cases each trial team member worked on from April 1, 2003, through January 18,2005. (Tr.,
p. 215, L. 24 - p. 216, L. 2 (noting Amil Myshin's heavy workload including a manslaughter
trial scheduled for April 2004), as well as all e-mail correspondence between trial team members
and the prosecutor's office.

(Tr., p. 249, Ls. 8-14.)

In addition, Petitioner requests the

production of all email correspondence between the trial team and the Court or Court personnel,
as well as all files and notes in the trial team's possession not previously disclosed to postconviction counsel. See supra, ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.13 and its Commentary. The
basis for this request with be further justified in forthcoming affidavits from members of
Petitioner's current post-conviction team.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to issue subpoenas for the

aforementioned trial team members' attendance for their depositions at a date and location to be
determined at the hearing on this motion. Petitioner also respectfully requests this Court to issue
subpoenas duces tecum for the production of documents, limited to Petitioner's review, and prior
to the date scheduled for depositions.
DATED this 31 st day March, 2006.

,)
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PAULA M. SWENSEN
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

st

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 3~ day of March, 2006, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document, MOTION FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENAS FOR DEPOSITIONS
AND SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, was mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:

V'

/

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
POBOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

U.S. Mail
- - Statehouse Mail
- - Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

- - U.S. Mail
- - Statehouse Mail

--r- Facsimile.

_v_ Hand DelIvery

- - E-Mail
THOMAS F. NEVILLE
DISTRICT JUDGE
200W.FRONT
BOISE ID 83702

- - U.S. Mail
- - Statehouse Mail

-T
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

- - E-Mail

t{L\l)Cl11L

lhxalv.M.

<

BARBARA THOMAS
Administrative Assistant

MJAlbt
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Mark Ackley
From:

Mark Ackley

Sent:

Wednesday, March 01, 20064:52 PM

To:

'Janet Ellis'

Cc:

'Roger Bourne'; Paula Swensen

Subject: RE: Tomorrow's hearing
Janet,
I spoke to Roger earlier this afternoon and we both agreed that tomorrow's hearing would be best served by
scheduling a deadline for the filing of an amended petition and rescheduling the discovery hearing. The deadline
would not constitute the conclusion of these post-conviction proceedings but rather a deadline to raise claims
identified to date and appears a necessary step prior to a meaningful discovery hearing.
I assume you must be in a hearing as I have not been able to reach and have not heard back from Roger who
was going to contact you immediately. If the Court would like to hear from us tonight, then I will be available at
947-9259 (my office line) between 5 and 6 pm.
If you could please leave me an email on the status of tomorrow's hearing, even if there is no present change in
status, it would be much appreciated. The status will affect our preparation this evening. Thanks a lot.
Mark
-----Original Message----From: Mark Ackley
Sent: Wednesday, March 01, 2006 1:36 PM
To: 'Roger Bourne'
Cc: Paula Swensen; 'Janet Ellis'
Subject: Tomorrow's hearing
Roger,
I just dropped you a voice-mail message regarding tomorrow's hearing. Specifically, I would like
to continue the hearing, if possible, to a date in the near future. If we cannot get a date in the
near future, then we are prepared to go forward tomorrow. The reason for the request of the
continuance is to provide us an opportunity to reply to your Objection (received at the end of the
day yesterday) as well as to provide a written outline to you and the Court identifying the
relevance of our specific requests to claims in our petition. In light of your Objection, I anticipate
such an outline could really expedite matters.
Further, and not mentioned in the voice-mail message, our investigator just received a full
banker's box of new materials (and identified another) from the Ada County Public Defender's
office despite the fact that we had requested all such materials previously ... on multiple
occasions. It may likely be that our review of the materials in these two boxes leads to revisions
to our discovery motion.
These are the dates we would be available if you and the Court are amenable to rescheduling.
March 14-17 or March 21-24. April is wide open.
I can be reached directly in my office at 947-9259. At 2:30, I will be moving to our conference
room and can be reached through our general office line at 334-2712. Thanks·,
- Mark
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MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, ISB # 6722
ERIK R. LEHTINEN, ISB # 6247
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.

)
)
)
)
)

)
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)

CASE NO.
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AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
(Capital Case)

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys at
the State Appellate Public Defender, and petitions this Honorable Court for postconviction relief from the conviction and sentences imposed by this Court in the Fourth
Judicial District, in State v. Hall, Ada County case no. H0300518, on January 18,2005.
This Court has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to

I.e.

§ 19-2719; §§ 19-4901, et

seq.; LC.R., Rules 35 and 57; and Article I, Sections 1 and 5 of the Constitution of the

State of Idaho. Petitioner relies on Article I, §§ 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 17, and 18 of the
Constitution of the State of Idaho, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as International Hunlan Rights
Law in support of this Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (herein "Amended
Petition").
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I.
1.

BACKGROUND (I.C.R. 57(a)(1) through (a)(6»
Petitioner is in the custody of the State of Idaho Department of Correction,
detained at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution near Boise, Idaho.

2.

Judgment and sentence were pronounced by the Honorable Thomas F. Neville,
District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in Ada County,
Boise, Idaho.

3.

Petitioner stands convicted in Ada County case no. H0300518 of the crimes of:
Count I, Murder in the First Degree
Count II, Rape
Count III, Kidnapping in the First Degree

4.

The Court imposed sentences as follows on the 18 th day of January, 2005:
Count I, for Murder:

Death

Count II, for Rape:

Life in Prison without possibility of parole

Count III, for Kidnapping:

Life in Prison without possibility of parole

The sentences for Counts II and III are to run consecutively.
5.

Petitioner pled not guilty and a jury returned verdicts of guilty to the crimes
charged.

6.

Other than post-trial motions and a Notice Of Appeal, which cannot be litigated
under Idaho law until these post-conviction matters are concluded, this is
Petitioner's first attempt in any court to obtain relief from the convictions and
sentences herein challenged.
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II.

ILLEGAL RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY
Petitioner is a person restrained of his liberty in that he is a prisoner of the State of

Idaho, under the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, held on death row at
the Idaho Maximum Security Institution. This restraint is pursuant to the following
conviction and sentence imposed on January 18, 2005, by this Court presiding in the
Fourth Judicial District, in State v. Hall, Ada County case no. H0300518: Murder in the
First Degree, Kidnapping in the First Degree, and Rape. This restraint is illegal in that the
convictions and sentences were obtained in violation of the constitutions of the United
States and of the State of Idaho and in violation of court rules, statutes and other law as
set forth below.

III.

LACK OF SPECIFICITY - NEED TO AMEND
This Amended Petition is filed according to the time constraints imposed by this

Court. Due to these time constraints, it is impossible for Petitioner to file a petition that
complies with I.C. §§ 19-4901, et seq;!, § 19-2719; and I.C.R. 57, because of the
following factors, among others:
1.

The Court appointed Petitioner's present counsel to represent him in postconviction proceedings on February 17,2005;

2.

Counsel for Petitioner had no participation in the criminal case leading to the
conviction and sentences herein challenged;

3.

The underlying sentence of death represents the first death sentence imposed
since inception of a new and untested death penalty scheme, and thus
contains many complicated issues of first impression in the State of Idaho;
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4.

A copy of the Reporter's Transcript was not received until on or about
September 26,2005; and

5.

Present counsel has not had a meaningful opportunity to conduct an
independent investigation due to the following factors:
•

Petitioner's current counsel have not yet reviewed all transcripts
received. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a
thorough review of the trial transcript and the entire record to
determine the nature, frequency and effect of counsel's errors,
Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 535 (9th Cir. 2001). In this
case, the trial transcript, grand jury transcripts, and transcripts of
interrogations total over six thousand (6000) pages. The Clerk's
Record numbers over five hundred (500) pages, not including the
Presentence Investigation Report. A thorough review of the
transcript has been sacrificed to accommodate the investigation
and litigation of other matters that would not have otherwise been
necessary but for the State's failure to voluntarily comply with
their discovery obligations and due to court-imposed time
constraints and other restrictions placed on Petitioner's ability to
adequately reinvestigate his case.

•

Petitioner's current counsel are still aWaItmg all requested
transcripts including a complete Reporter's Transcript of the
underlying criminal proceedings, and a copy of the Grand Jury
transcript from State v. Hall, Ada County Case No.
M9108836JHCR18591.!

•

Petitioner's trial teaIll has refused to adequately cooperate with
Petitioner. This lack of cooperation has included their failure to
disclose all their files and notes, and their failure to return email
and voicemail messages or otherwise adequately consult with
Petitioner. See Motion for Issuance of Subpoenas Duces Tecum
and Subpoenas for Depositions incorporated herein by reference. 2

! A copy of this transcript was requested in Petitioner's Motion For Discovery filed
January 5, 2006, and currently scheduled for a hearing on June 23, 2006.
2 The single most troubling aspect of Petitioner's reinvestigation of this case has been the
trial teaIll's unwillingness to cooperate. Petitioner's current counsel simply cannot meet
their obligations without the cooperation of trial counsel. ABA Guideline 10.7.B.1.
provides that post-conviction counsel "have an obligation to conduct a full eXaIllination
of the defense provided to the client at all prior phases of the case. This obligation
includes at minimum interviewing prior counsel and members of the defense teaIll and
examining the files of prior counsel."
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•

Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing on his Motion For Discovery
in which he requested materials including Brady material. See
Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. See Moore v. Kemp,
809 F.2d 702, 730 (11th Cir. 1987) (defendant who was not given
Brady materials in state post-conviction proceedings did not get
"full and fair" hearing in the state courts). The hearing is
currently scheduled for June 23, 2006.

•

Petitioner is still awaiting receipt of the completed jury
questionnaires. The questionnaires were the parties' "bible"
during voir dire. (Tr., p. 5445, Ls. 1-3.)

•

The poor condition of the transcript received precludes
meaningful post-conviction review. There can be no doubt that
the State must provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of
prior proceedings when that transcript is needed for an effective
defense or appeal. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). In this
case, the transcript quality is so poor that it amounts to a violation
of both equal protection and due process to proceed upon this
record. In a capital case, the Eighth Amendment is also violated.
Petitioner will submit, at a later date, a report of transcription
errors.

•

Petitioner has, to this point, been restricted from contacting jurors
due to limitations set by this Court not otherwise required by
Idaho law. Petitioner intends to file another motion with the Court
to show that unrestricted jury contact is necessary for meaningful
post-conviction proceedings.

•

The Court's time constraints and the uncertainty whether the
Court will permit further amendment have forced Petitioner to
sacrifice what was a methodical and thorough reinvestigation of
the underlying case. To avoid procedural default, Petitioner must
raise claims that he might not otherwise have raised after a
complete investigation.

Competent post-conviction representation reqrnres a reinvestigation of the
underlying criminal case for all potentially meritorious guilt and sentencing-phase claims
inside and outside the record. See 2003 American Bar Association Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Trial counsel in Death Penalty Cases (herein "ABA
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Guidelines"), Guideline 10.15.1 ("Duties Of Post-Conviction Counsel")(Exhibit 1.) The
Commentary to Guideline 10.15.1 provides in part:
Two parallel tracks of post-conviction investigation are required. One
involves reinvestigating the capital case; the other focuses on the client.
Reinvestigating the case means examining the facts underlying the
conviction and sentence, as well as such items as trial counsel's
performance, judicial bias or prosecutorial misconduct. Reinvestigating
the client means assembling a more-thorough biography of the client than
was known at the time of trial, not only to discover mitigation that was not
presented previously, but also to identify mental-health claims which
potentially reach beyond sentencing issues to fundamental questions of
competency and mental-state defenses.
Petitioner's reinvestigation must be both diligent and exhaustive, aimed at
including all possible grounds for relief since the failure to raise all possible claims may
result in a procedural bar. See I.e. § 19-2719 (3), (5); Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469,
903 P.2d 58 (1995); State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). Further, the
reinvestigation can neither rely solely on the assistance and investigation of trial counsel,
nor upon the discovery provided by the State or its agents during the underlying criminal
proceedings. See e.g., Hoffman, supra (recognizing the inability or difficulty of trial
counsel's objective examination of their own performance); le.R. 44.2 (requiring the
appointment of at least one attorney other than trial counsel for the purpose of
representing the defendant in post-conviction proceedings). At this point, while Petitioner
has been diligent, due to the reasons noted above, his reinvestigation has not been
exhaustive. 3 Accordingly, Petitioner will seek this Court's leave to file a final amendment

3 A 1998 survey of the time and expenses required in Florida capital post-conviction
cases concluded that:

[T]he most experienced and qualified lawyers at Florida's post-conviction
defender office, the Office of Capital Collateral Representation[,] have
estimated that, on average, over 3,300 lawyer hours are required to take a
post-conviction death penalty case from the denial of certiorari by the
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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to his petition pursuant to I.e. § 19-4906(a) and ICR 15, after a reasonable opportunity to
review any court-ordered discovery following the hearing currently scheduled June 23,
2006.
For reasons stated more fully herein, Petitioner requests that these post-conviction
proceedings be SUSPENDED until resolution of the State's prosecution against him for
the capital murder of Cheryl Hanlon. However, because the Court has not had an
opportunity to consider a formal motion to suspend these proceedings, and based on the
Court's deadline, in support of this Amended Petition, Petitioner is able to show the
Court as follows:

IV.

GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
Petitioner asserts that the convictions and sentences entered against Petitioner

were obtained in violation of laws of the United States and of Idaho, including the
Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and
Article I, §§ 1,5,6, 7, 8 13, 17, and 18, of the Constitution of the State of Idaho,
provisions of the Idaho Code and the Idaho Criminal Rules as well as international law.
Within this Amended Petition, Petitioner has raised numerous grounds for relief
based on various types of claims including, but not limited to, claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel (Strickland claims) as well as Brady violations. 4 Petitioner alleges

United States Supreme Court following direct appeal to the denial of
certiorari [from state post-conviction proceedings.]
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 6.1 (citing "The Spangenberg Group,
Amended Time & Expense Analysis Of Post-Conviction Capital Cases In Florida 16
(1998).")
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963). To prove a Strickland violation, Petitioner must show (1) deficient

4
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that he is entitled to relief on each independent claim. Further, Petitioner alleges that
even if the claims do not meet the governing level of prejudice on their own, that when
jointly considered, the accumulation of error creates the degree of prejudice entitling
Petitioner to relief Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992).

A. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
TRIAL COUNSELS' FAILURE TO ACT WITH DILIGENCE IN
ENSURING THAT ALL THEIR CLAIMS WERE FULLY INSULATED
FROM ANY FUTURE CLAIMS BY THE GOVERNMENT THAT THE
CLAIMS WERE NOT SUFFICIENTLY PRESERVED.
Trial counsel must be diligent in protecting a defendant's constitutional claims
from future attacks by the government that the claims were not properly preserved
appellate and federal habeas corpus proceedings.

See ABA Guidelines, Guideline

10.8.A.3.c. As stated in part in the Commentary,
One of the most fundamental duties of an attorney defending a capital case
at trial is the preservation of any and all conceivable errors for each stage
of appellate and post-conviction review. Failure to preserve an issue may
result in the client being executed even though reversible error occurred at
trial. For this reason, trial counsel in a death penalty case must be
especially aware not only of strategies for winning at trial, but also of the
heightened
need to fully preserve all potential issues for later review.
,
Commentary, ABA Guidelines, Guideline 10.8 (footnotes and quotations omitted).
1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Fully Insulate "Motion To Allow Defense To Provide Copy Of Grand
Jury Transcript To Defendant" From Future Attacks By The
Government That The Claim Was Not Sufficiently Preserved.

perfonnance and (2) prejudice. Prejudice is established by showing that but for counsels'
deficient perfonnance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability that undennines confidence in
the outcome of the trial or sentencing. To prove a Brady violation, Petitioner must show
that the State failed to disclose (1) material and (2) exculpatory evidence. Materiality has
been defined to mean a "reasonable probability of a different result." Where not
otherwise stated herein, Petitioner asserts that he has established all requisites for his
Strickland and Brady claims.
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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Trial counsel moved to be allowed to provide grand jury transGripts to Petitioner.
(R., pp. 51-52.) The motion was partially denied. The Court specifically limited copies

of grand jury transcripts to counsel and counsel's staff and experts.

The Court

specifically ordered that trial counsel was not permitted to provide copies to the
defendant. (R., pp. 24-26, pp. 55-57.) The Court did allow trial counsel to review the
transcripts with the client, but this was never adequate to allow Petitioner to read the
transcript in its entirety or adequately review the transcripts for inaccuracies or
discrepancies.
While trial counsel did state that the "Defendant has State and Federal
Constitutional Rights to confront the witnesses against him and to a fair trial," (R., p. 51),
they did not state the specific constitutional provisions upon which they were relying.
Counsel should have rested their motion on the following Constitutional grounds: the
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
which in addition to the rights noted by counsel, including the defendant's right to due
process, the right to counsel, the right to assist counsel in his defense, and the right to
present a defense. Because this is a capital case, counsel should always raise their client's
Eighth Amendment rights.
2. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Fully Insulate Their "Motion To Declare Idaho's Capital Sentencing
Scheme Unconstitutional" From Future Attacks By The Government
That The Claim Was Not Sufficiently Preserved.
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to fully protect
their challenges to the constitutionality of the new death penalty statute claims from
procedural default attacks from the government. While trial counsel did cite numerous
United States Supreme cases, because of the near certainty that the government will
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assert some sort of procedural bar on nearly every claim in state appellate and federal
habeas corpus proceedings, trial counsel should have specified specific constitutional
provisions violated if for no other reason than to foolproof the claim against any
challenges.
For instance, trial counsel complained that there are no definitions or explanations
of weighing, sufficiently compelling, unjust, mitigating circumstances, and that the
statute fails to explain the weighing process or define aggravating circumstances. (R., pp.
204 - 205.) It is a fair reading of the motion that trial counsel challenged these statutory
provisions based on the case law set forth elsewhere in the motion. To absolutely ensure
subsequent consideration of the claims on their merits, trial counsel should have rested
their motion on the following constitutional grounds:

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 5

3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their Motion To
Establish Procedure During Voir Dire.
Trial counsel did not cite to one state or federal constitutional provision as
authority for their motion. (R., pp. 201-208.) Counsel should have rested their motion on
the following Constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.

5 Petitioner does not concede that the claims in this particular motion are not properly
preserved for future review, but makes this claim on the basis that counsel had a duty to
full-proof their claims against any conceivable procedural attack. In light of the wealth of
case law in which condemned inmates have lost valid claims under severe default rules,
Petitioner is struck by the short-sighted and even flippant approach trial counsel took to
their motion practice, at times captioning motions, "Yet Another Motion To .. :" and often
not citing to a single constitutional provision in support. (R., pp. 142-44.)
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4. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their "Motion in
Limine" To Preclude IRE 404(b) Evidence.
Trial counsel made one motion in limine. (R., pp. 372-374.) In this motion,
counsel moved to exclude I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that the State gave notice it intended to
introduce, namely, the 1991 rape case involving Norma Jean Oliver, the 1994 case
involving Petitioner's escape, the pending Hanlon murder case, and the statements of
Amanda Stroud. Trial counsel did not cite a single amendment, provision, or clause of
the United States or Idaho Constitutions, although they did mention the inability to crossexamination and confront particular witnesses.
Counsel should have rested their motion on the following constitutional grounds:
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
In particular, trial counsel should have argued that the Petitioner's rights under the

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment would be violated by admission of this evidence.

5. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their "Motion to
Exclude."
Trial counsel moved to exclude the testimony of the "various women [defendant]
has lived with who knew him in 2001, 2002, and 2003," and which that State intended to
call to testify to establish the propensity aggravator. (R., p. 405.) Trial counsel did not
cite a single amendment, provision, or clause of the United States or Idaho Constitutions,
although they did mention the inability to cross-examination and confront particular
witnesses.
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Counsel should have rested their motion on the following constitutional grounds:
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
In particular, trial counsel should have argued that the Petitioner's rights under the

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment would be violated by admission of this evidence.

6. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their "Ex Parte
Motion to Appoint Jury Selection Consultant."
Trial counsel moved ex parte to hire a jury selection consultant, Attorney Rolf
Kehne. (R., pp. 464-465.) The ex parte motion stated in relevant part:
... AMIL N. MYSHIN and D.C. CARR, handling attorneys, hereby moves
this honorable Court, ex parte, to appoint and to approve payment of Rolf
Kehne as a jury selection consultant to help select the jury in the aboveentitled case. Mr. Kehne has been helping trial counsel adjust to the new
jury-sentencing law and trial counsel wishes to have his help during jury
selection.
(R., p. 464.) The Court granted the motion, but when it became apparent that the
jury consultant was assisting counsel in making legal arguments and potentially
briefing constitutional issues, the jury consultant was dismissed .
. .. THE COURT: I want to talk about a couple of things here. I have great
respect for Mr. Kehne's professional competence. But it's -- as I
understood the brief discussion Mr. Myshin and I had off the record in
chambers when he brought me the ex party (sic) motion early yesterday
afternoon, he was to act as a consultant to help him, Mr. Myshin and Mr.
Carr, ask appropriate questions. I'm now getting a cite Whitt (sic) v.
Waynewright (sic) that I've not heard before, that I've never had a chance
to look at. Sixth Amendment has been referred to in ways that are unclear
without a chance to reflect on it, and a brief that's promised after the
weekend.
I had -- if it's okay with you, Mr. Myshin, I'll make a brief statement of a
very brief conversation we had -- you and I had in chambers a moment
ago. My understanding is that the Defense team did not intend to file a
brief. When we left here Friday night there was some indication that you
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were crediting that. Second, that I understood that Mr. -- you're not going
to be employing Mr. Kehne from this point forward as a jury consultant if
I understood you correctly.
MR. MYSHIN: Yes, sir.
(Tr., p. 2061, Ls. 9 p. 2062, L. 14; p. 2067, Ls. 10-21) (sic added)6
At no time did counsel state the constitutional bases for their requests. (R., pp.
464-465.) Counsel should have rested their motion, and objected to Mr. Kehne's
dismissal, on the following Constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In particular, cOlllsel needed
to argue that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires effective assistance at all
critical stages, and that the jury selection process is a critical stage of the proceedings in a
capital case.

7. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their "Motion To
StrikelDismiss Aggravating Circumstances."
Trial counsel did not cite to one state or federal constitutional section or
amendment as authority for their motion. (R., pp. 186-89.) Trial counsel argued that the
prosecutor failed to provide adequate legal definitions for the Grand Jury to perform its
constitutional function. Without jury instructions with proper limiting construction
regarding the aggravating circumstances, the grand jury could not intelligently decide
whether a crime (here the aggravators) had been committed. People v. Calbud, 402
N.E.2d 1140 (N.Y. 1980); State v. Superior Court, 580 P.2d 747 (Ariz. App. 1978). The
failure to provide the limiting instructions violated Petitioner's state constitutional rights,

6 After Mr. Kehne was dismissed from the case, the case of Wainwright v. Witt, by any
spelling, was never mentioned again.
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Article I, Section 8, as well as his federal constitutional rights under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments (Due Process Clause) to the United States Constitution.
In addition trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
obtain a ruling on their motion to dismiss the propensity aggravator. On March 15,2004,
trial counsel filed a Motion To StrikelDismiss Aggravating Circumstances. (R., pp. 18689.) Among the grounds for their motion, trial counsel asserted that the Grand Jury
improperly considered evidence from a subsequent murder as support for the propensity
aggravator, I.C. 19-2515(9)(h). (R., pp. 187-88.)
Trial counsel requested that, "[the propensity] aggravating circumstance be
stricken or dismissed." (R., p. 188.) In its Memorandum Decision And Order, the Court
changed trial counsel's request for relief to a request for an evidentiary ruling on a
motion in limine. As the Court stated, "[t]he second issue is whether the Indictment for
the alleged murder in a case subsequent in time to this case can be used to support the
statutory aggravator of "propensity" in this case." (R., p. 378) (footnote omitted). The
Court rendered the following advisory opinion:
So just as a heads up, I will strike the aggravating circumstance of
propensity if the State does not offer evidence of conduct in the
commission of the murder at hand, because I believe that the subsequent
conduct resulting in the Indictment in the Hanlon case, the 624 case
should not and cannot be used to support the aggravating circumstance of
propensity in this case, the 518 case. To me prior,conduct has to be
conduct that occurred prior in time to this alleged crime. So with that
exception I'm denying the Defendant's Motion to Strike Aggravating
Factors. The rest of the factors under Idaho Code Section 19-2515(9)
specifically E through and including F and G will stand. H will stand if it
can be proven somehow with conduct in the commission of the murder at
hand and not by reference to the Hanlon murder.
(Tr., p. 597, L. 23 - p. 598, L. 14); (R., p. 380, Ls. 18-21) ("Unless the State does make
such an offer of evidence relating to conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, it
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will not be able to support the aggravating circumstance of "propensity".) Trial counsel
received from the Court the necessary factual findings they required for a successful
motion; however, trial counsel failed to pursue a ruling on their actual claim as presented.
Trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner because a ruling on the
motion would have led to dismissal of the propensity aggravating circumstance.

8. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In Support Of Their Objection To
Dennis Dean's Testimony Regarding Risk Assessment.
Dennis Dean is an employee of the Idaho Department of Corrections. He testified
for the State regarding Petitioner's possible custody status if convicted on the murder
charge and sentenced. Trial counsel objected to Mr. Deen's testimony as to risk
assessment, and argued that the defense was precluded from questioning Mr. Deen
without risk of "opening the door" to evidence of the Hanlon murder, and that there
would be a denial of confrontation. (Tr., p. 4924, 1.18 - p. 4936, 1. 7.) At no time did
counsel state the federal constitutional bases for the objection. Counsel should have
rested the objection on the Constitutional grounds:

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

B. DEPRIVATION OF EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL DUE TO
COUNSELS' FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY LITIGATE ERRORS
OCCURRING DURING THE GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS.
Counsel should consider whether any procedures have been instituted for
selection of juries in capital cases that present particular legal bases for challenge. Such
challenges include potential challenges to irregularities in grand jury proceedings. See
ABA Guidelines, Guideline lO.10.2.A.

1. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Move To Dismiss The Amended Indictment On The Grounds That It
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Charged An Additional Or Different Offense Than Initially Presented To
The Grand Jury.

As noted above, trial counsel filed motions captioned, "Motion To Declare
Idaho's Capital Sentencing Scheme Unconstitutional," (R., pp. 201-08), and "Motion To
StrikelDismiss Aggravating Circumstances." Both motions, rested, to varying degrees, on
the premise that Idaho's aggravating circumstances are elements, or at least functional
equivalents to elements, of the aggravated crime of capital murder and therefore must be
charged by way of Grand Jury Indictment or Information. Trial counsel should have
moved to dismiss the amended indictment, referred to as "Indictment Part II," on the
additional grounds that it charged an additional or different offense than initially

presented to the Grand Jury in violation of Petitioner's rights under Idaho statute and
criminal rules, and constituted a violation of Article I, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution
and the Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process Clause) of the United States Constitution.
Had trial counsel raised the issue then there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been different, as the indictment would have been dismissed.
Since the release of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (herein "Ring"), and its
progeny, it is uncontestable that aggravating circumstances are elements, or at least the
functional equivalents of elements, of a separate and greater crime than that of murder of
the first degree. Stated differently, the elements of the core crime of murder of the first
degree are contained entirely in IC § 18-4003, while the elements, or their functional
equivalents, of the aggravated crime of capital murder are set forth in IC § 18-4003 plus
at least one aggravating circumstance contained in IC § 19-2515.
In a meandering and tortured manner, trial counsel endeavored to explain the
constitutional underpinnings of State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 90 P.3d 298 (2004).
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Assuming counsel was pressed for time, simply inserting a block quote from Lovelace in
their motions, with just a little added emphasis, would have been a good start to making a
point that counsel struggled making throughout argument. 7
If the legislature defines some core crime then provides for increasing the
punishment of that crime upon a finding of some aggravating fact[,] .,. the
core crime and the aggravating fact together constitute an aggravated
crime, just as much as grand larceny is an aggravated form of petit
larceny. The aggravating fact is an element of the aggravated crime.
Id., citing Apprendi, supra at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. at 2365 n. 19, 147
L.Ed.2d at 457 n. 19 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Sattazahn v.
Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 123 S.Ct. 732, 154 L.Ed.2d 588 (2003),
Justice Scalia reiterated the analysis from Ring holding that aggravating
circumstances that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty
"operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense.'" Id. at 111, 123 S.Ct. at 739, 154 L.Ed.2d at 599 citing Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. at 2443, 153 L.Ed.2d at 576.
Characterizing "murder" as a distinct, lesser-included offense of
"murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances," Justice Scalia
outlined the relevance of facts or elements necessary to prove an
offense to a jury, for Sixth Amendment purposes, and facts or elements
necessary to determine whether a defendant is being twice tried for the
same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy
Clause. See id. The Court, albeit not a majority, announced:
In the post-Ring world, the Double Jeopardy Clause can, and must, apply
to some capital-sentencing proceedings consistent with the text of the Fifth
Amendment. If a jury unanimously concludes that a State has failed to
meet its burden of proving the existence of one or more aggravating
circumstances, double-jeopardy protections attach to that "acquittal" on
the offense of "murder plus aggravating circumstance(s)." Thus, [Arizona
v.} Rumsey [,467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984)] was
correct to focus on whether a factfinder had made findings that constituted
an "acquittal" of the aggravating circumstances; but the reason that issue
was central is not that a capital-sentencing proceeding is "comparable to a
trial," ... but rather that "murder plus one or more aggravating
circumstances" is a separate offense from murder "simpliciter."
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 at 112, 123 S.Ct. 732 at 740, 154
L.Ed.2d 588 at 599 (plurality).

Petitioner does not assert as an independent ground for relief based on his trial counsels'
deficient writing skills, with the notable exception of their inability to federalize claims.
7
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Lovelace, at 76, 90 P.3d at 301 (emphasis added). From this premise, trial counsel should
have moved onto the statutory requirements ofLC. § 19-1420 which provides,
An indictment or infonnation may be amended by the prosecuting attorney
without leave of the court, at any time before the defendant pleads, and at
any time thereafter, in the discretion of the court, where it can be done
without prejudice to the substantial rights of the defendant. An
infonnation or indictment cannot be amended so as to charge an offense
other than that for which the defendant has been held to answer.

Idaho Criminal Rule 7 likewise requires that the indictment or infonnation
contain all "essential facts constituting the offense charged." See also State v. Windsor,
110 Idaho 410, 418 (1985). Accordingly, if an initial indictment does not contain all the
elements of the offense or does not fairly infonn the defendant of the charges against him
or does not enable him to plead an acquittal or conviction, then it is insufficient. The

State may amend an insufficient indictment; however - and here is the core of the claim
missed by trial counsel - "any amendment which charges the accused with a crime of
greater degree or a different nature than that for which the accused was bound over for
trial by the committing magistrate is barred by the Idaho Constitution [Article I, Section
8]." State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 566, 861 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Ct. App. 1993)(emphasis
in original).
Thus, the State amended the initial indictment to charge Petitioner with a greater,
or at least a different, crime for which he was bound over by the committing magistrate.
See United States v. Allen, 406 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2005)(en banc), petition for cert. filed
(Sept. 29,2005) (No. 05-6764) (holding that the submission of aggravating factors to the
grand jury for inclusion in the indictment preserves the constitutionality of Federal Death
Penalty Act prosecutions); State v. Fortin, 843 A.2d 974 (N.J. 2004) (holding that
"murder is a distinct lesser-included offense of the greater offense of capital murder" and
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that aggravating factors, as elements of capital murder, must be submitted to a grand jury
and returned in an indictment pursuant to the New Jersey Constitution.) Accordingly, the
motion should have been granted and the amended indictment dismissed as
unconstitutional under Article I, Section 8 ofthe Idaho Constitution.
In addition, the failure of the government to follow its own established procedures

dealing with amending indictments constituted a violation of his federal constitutional
right to due process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

See e.g., Fetterly v.

Paske!!, 997 F.2d 1295, 1300 (9th Cir.1993) (1980) ("[W]here a state has provided a
specific method for the determination of whether the death penalty shall be imposed, 'it is
not correct to say that the defendant's interest' in having that method adhered to 'is
merely a matter of state procedural law."') (paraphrasing Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S.
343,346 (1980).
Trial counsels' failure to move to dismiss the amended indictment on these
additional grounds, flowing logically from trial counsels' premise for other motions,
constituted deficient performance. But for trial counsels' deficient performance there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different.

2. Trial Counsel Failed To Move To Dismiss Indictment On Ground That
Grand Jury Failed To Find That Each Aggravator Outweighed
Mitigation.
The Grand Jury returned an indictment amended to include four aggravating
circumstances. However, an additional factual finding must be found to sentence
Petitioner to a sentence greater than life without the possibility of parole. Specifically, it
must be found that each aggravating circumstance outweighs the totality of the mitigating
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circumstances presented. This requirement is a direct consequence of the rationale from
the rule articulated in Ring:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Id., at 600 (citing and quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243, n.6 (1999). See
e.g., Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003) (holding that the detennination of
whether aggravation outweighs mitigation is of the type of factual finding encompassed
by Ring); Johnson v. State, 118 Nev. 787,59 P.3d 450 (2002).
Under Idaho law, the maximum punishment for a defendant convicted of murder
of the first degree and found to have committed at least one aggravating circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt is only life without the possibility of parole. This is because
"maximum punishment" is defined as "the maximum sentence" that may be imposed

"solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant." Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis in original).
Under well-established Idaho law, the rule is that a defendant cannot be sentenced
to death, even if aggravators are found, unless it is also found that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigation. See e.g., State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,
153, 774 P.2d 299, 323 (1989) ("We hold that the trial court may sentence the defendant
to death, only if the trial court finds that all the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh
the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances found and make imposition of death
unjust.") Unless this additional finding is made, the maximum punishment is life without
the possibility of parole. Therefore, to constitute a legally sufficient indictment, the
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Grand Jury must make this additional finding. Article I, Section 8, of the Idaho
Constitution, I.e. § 19-1420; ICR Rule 7 (requiring that the indictment or infonnation
contain all "essential facts constituting the offense charged"); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho
410,418 (1985).
Since it impossible to present all possible mitigating circumstances at this early
stage, the prosecutor must present any known mitigation to the Grand Jury for the
weighing process. Such an obligation is consistent with the prosecutor's current
obligations. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 539 P.2d 792 (Cal. 1975)(prosecutor's duty
to expose exculpatory evidence to grand jury); see also 1 ABA Standards For Criminal
Justice, § 3 - 3.6(b) (No prosecutor should knowingly fail to disclose to the grand jury
evidence which tends to negate guilt or mitigate the offense.) Trial counsels' failure to
move to dismiss the amended indictment on these additional grounds, flowing logically
from trial counsels' premise for other motions, constituted deficient perfonnance. But for
trial counsels' deficient perfonnance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome
would have been different.

3. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Object To The Interliniation Of "Drowning" As One Of Three Possible
Causes Of Death And By Failing To Request A Unanimity Instruction At
Trial.
The Grand Jury was not presented with evidence that drowning was a probable
cause of the victim's death, and further, made no such finding. It violated Petitioner's
rights to notice, to present a defense, to due process, and to heightened procedural
safeguards in capital cases as protected by Article I, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution,
and the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
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Constitution, for the Court to interliniate "drowning" as a cause of death absent sufficient
evidence and findings by the Grand Jury.
Once multiple, alternative causes of death were alleged by Indictment, Petitioner
asserts that the State had either dismiss the alternatives or present them all to a jury and
bear the burden of proving a particular cause of death beyond a reasonable doubt. The
jury verdicts however do not indicate which cause the jury believe led to the victim's
death. Moreover, without a unanimity instruction, it is impossible to determine whether
the jury unanimously agreed on the cause in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Because trial counsel has refused to cooperate with Petitioner's reinvestigation of
this case, and because Petitioner is still awaiting a hearing on his Motion For Discovery,
it is impossible at this time to fully state this claim, nevertheless, Petitioner asserts he has
satisfied both prongs of Strickland.
C. PETITIONER'S FIFTH, SIXTH, EIGHTH, AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED WHEN HE WAS
IMPROPERLY SHACKLED DURING THE COURSE OF HIS TRIAL.

Petitioner wore a "leg brace" during all court appearances. (Tr., p. 592.)
According to the State, the brace was worn under clothing, but would lock whenever
Petitioner stood and his leg would remain stiff, unless he pressed a button to the side of
the brace that released it. (Tr., p. 592, Ls. 7-15.)

Petitioner would have to push the

button as he walked. (Tr., p. 593, Ls. 4-6.) This was a new device that the Court had
never previously employed. (Tr., p. 592, Ls. 23-24.) The Court made no findings whether
the device was visible and no findings whether the device was necessary. Petitioner
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believes that the jurors were able to discern this devise and thus knew that Petitioner was
in fact shackled. 8
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit using physical restraints visible to
the jury absent a trial court determination that restraints are justified by a state interest
specific to the particular defendant on trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 US. 622, _, 125 S.Ct.
2007, 2009 (2005) (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986).) This basic rule
embodies notions of fundamental fairness. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2011; see also, Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501,503,505 (1976) (making a defendant appear in prison garb poses

such a threat to the "fairness of the factfinding process" that it must be justified by an
"essential state policy"). Visible shackling undermines the presumption of innocence, the
related fairness of the factfinding process, the right to counsel and secure a meaningful
defense, and the maintenance of a dignified juridical process that includes respectful
treatment of the defendant. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2013 (citing Coffin v. United States, 156
US. 432, 453 (1895))(presumption of innocence "lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law"); Holbrook, 475 US. at 569 (restraint suggests that
the justice system itself sees "a need to separate a defendant from the community at
large"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US. 335, 340-341 (1963)(Sixth Amendment
guarantees right to counsel in order to secure meaningful defense); Illinois v. Allen, 397
US. 337, 344 (1970)(shackling affronts the "dignity and decorum of judicial
proceedings").

Due to trial counsels' failure to adequately consult with Petitioner and the courtimposed restrictions on juror contact, he is unable to fully establish the factual basis for
this claim.
8
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The prohibition against shackling applies with equal force during the penalty
phase of a capital trial. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010-2014. Given the severity and finality of
a death sentence, jury accuracy in making the decision between life and death is no less
critical than the decision between guilt and innocence. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014. The
appearance of the offender during the penalty phase in shackles almost inevitably implies
to a jury, as a matter of common sense, that court authorities consider the offender a
danger to the community--often a statutory aggravator and nearly always a relevant factor
injury decisionmaking, even where the State does not specifically argue the point." Id. It
also almost inevitably affects adversely the jury's perception of the character of the
defendant.

Id.

And it thereby inevitably undermines the jury's ability to weigh

accurately all relevant considerations--considerations that are often unquantifiable and
elusive--when it determines whether a defendant deserves death. In these ways, the use of
shackles can be a "thumb [on] death's side of the scale." Id., quoting Sochor v. Florida,
504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992). Here, because propensity was an aggravating factor, the
shackles were especially prejudicial.
Absent adequate justification and findings regarding the specific circumstances of
the case, visible shackling is inherently prejudicial. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014-2016 (citing
Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568.) The effects cannot be shown from a trial transcript. Deck,

125 S.Ct. at 2015. Thus, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make
out a due process violation. Id. Rather, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the shackling error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id.,
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).)

Because of the inherent

prejudice caused by visible shackling, the trial court has an affirmative duty to make
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written findings stating that either the shackles are not visible, or findings regarding the
specific circumstances of the case that might justify visible shackling.
Absent written findings to the contrary, and because there is reason to believe that
this new device made Petitioner's custody status and physical restraint apparent to the
jurors, the use of the restraining device, absent a determination that they were "justified
by a state interest specific to [that] particular trial," violated "a basic element of the 'due
process of law' protected by" the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and violated the
presumption of innocence.

Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2012. 9 Moreover, the shackling device

impermissibly affected the jury's determination of aggravating factors and the weighing
of those factors, in violation of the Eighth Amendment as well as the constitutional
provisions set forth above.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still awaiting a hearing and ruling
on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006, as well as depositions oftrial counsel
and permission to contact the jurors.
D. THE STATE COMMITTED MULTIPLE BRADY VIOLATIONS

Suppression of evidence favorable to an accused by the prosecution violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Favorable evidence includes not only that evidence tending to exculpate the accused, but
also any evidence adversely affecting the credibility of the government's witnesses, e.g.,

The Court cannot now make the requisite factual findings based on its extra-record
recollection without making itself a witness in the instant post-conviction proceedings.
See Dyas, 317 F.3d 934, 936-937 (state court determination that jury could not have seen
the shackles was unreasonable in absence of any inquiry to establish facts concerning
what jury could see).
9
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evidence that could be used for impeachment. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150
(1972). The prosecution must actively search out material in its files and in the files of
related agencies reasonably expected to have possession of evidence favorable to an
accused. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
1. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable
Evidence Pertaining To Norma Jean Oliver

On or about December 4, 1991, law enforcement arrested Norma Jean Oliver as a
juvenile runaway. (Exhibit 2.) Following her arrest and incarceration at a juvenile
detention facility, Ms. Oliver alleged that Erick Hall forcibly raped her the prior day. She
was transferred to Intermountain Hospital, a psychiatric facility. Petitioner believes that
Ms. Oliver was arrested based on information that he provided to law enforcement,
establishing her whereabouts at the Sands Motel. Petitioner believes her false accusations
of forcible rape were either in retaliation to her arrest, cover for another person, or the
result of her mental illness. Petitioner was charged with two counts of forcible anal and
vaginal rape. (Exhibit 3.) Subsequently, the anal rape charge was dropped, and the
forcible vaginal charge was amended to statutory vaginal rape. (Exhibit 4, Exhibit 5.)
Petitioner has always maintained that he and Ms. Oliver had consensual sex. However,
Ms. Oliver, while pretending to be an adult, was only a minor. Accordingly, Petitioner
pled guilty to statutory rape in State of Idaho v. Erick Hall, Ada County Case No.
HCR18591. Petitioner spent five years in prison for his conviction, and an additional
four years for an escape conviction during that incarceration.
Approximately twelve years after the statutory rape conviction, the State located
Ms. Oliver for the purpose of prosecuting Petitioner for capital murder. The State used
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Ms. Oliver to establish aggravating circumstances based on 1991 statement to the police
that Petitioner choked and violently raped her. (Tr., p. 5454, L. 18 - p. 5457, L. 16.)
At Petitioner's sentencing, Ms. Oliver had great difficulty recalling events. Ms.
Oliver admitted that she suffered from a chemical imbalance and was not taking her
medication at the time she testified; however, she did not indicate the nature or extent of
her mental health problems. (Tr., p. 4777, Ls. 2-7; p. 4780, Ls. 6-18; p. 4783, Ls. 17-18.)
On direct examination, Ms. Oliver could not recall critical events relating to the statutory
rape including whether Petitioner and she engaged in vaginal intercourse, though she did
indicate that Petitioner penetrated her anally. (Tr. pp. 4756-4783); see also (Tr., p. 4760,
L.15 ("I only remember bits and pieces"); p. 4761, L.18 ("I can't remember"); pA762,
LsA-5 (she met Petitioner at Mountain Billiards "I think, but I'm not sure"); pA762, L.18
(she's "not quite sure" whether they sat around in the trailer at all); pA763, L.24-25 ("I
closed my eyes - I don't' know [what happened]. I can't remember"); pA764, L.12 ("I
can't remember [if she couldn't talk because Petitioner was strangling her]. I don't think
I could."); p.4764, L.14 ("I don't know [if I was scared]."); pA765, L.3 ("I can't
remember [what it was like what I woke up.]"); pA765, L.21 ("I can't remember");
pA766, L.3 ("I can't remember), L.6 ("I can't remember), L.9 ("I don't know. I'm
sorry"), L. 17 ("I'm not sure."); p. 4768, L.l ("I don't know."), L.1 0 ("I don't remember);
pA769, L.7 ("I can't remember"), L.13 (witness does "not really" remember getting up
the next morning); pA771, L.3 (witness "can't really remember" being arrested at the
Sands Motel); pA771, L.6 (witness "can't really remember" getting put into back seat of
police car at Sands Motel); pA771, L.9 (witness "doesn't know" if she wound up at the
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juvenile detention jail); p.4771, L.21 (witness "can't remember" meeting with police
officer at Intermountain Hospital because "it's a blur").)
Ultimately, through leading questions, Ms. Oliver effectively testified that
Petitioner raped her. In addition, Ms. Oliver described a number of injuries that she
sustained when allegedly forcibly raped by Petitioner. Detective Daniel Hess, who later
testified as the arresting officer in the statutory rape case, corroborated her description of
injuries. However, these injuries were not noted contemporaneously with Detective
Hess's 1991 report nor listed in the emergency room report. Neither the emergency room
report nor Detective Hess's police report were used to cross-examine either witness. 10

a. The State committed Brady violations by not disclosing
documentation or information that Ms. Oliver suffers from Bipolar
Disorder or other conditions tending to undermine her credibility as a
witness.
In the course of Petitioner's reinvestigation of the case, Norma Jean Oliver has
voluntarily disclosed that she suffers from Bipolar Disorder. As noted above, the record
indicates that Ms. Oliver was not taking any medication at the time of her testimony at
Petitioner's trial. Petitioner believes that likewise in 1991, when Ms. Oliver first made
her allegations she was off medication.
Petitioner intends to show that Bipolar disorder is a treatable illness marked by
extreme changes in mood, thought, energy and behavior. If left untreated, bipolar
disorder tends to worsen, and the person experiences full-fledged manic and depressive
episodes. Some symptoms of manic episodes include: grandiose delusions, inflated sense

Petitioner previously claimed that the prosecution and/or its agents failed to timely
disclose requested medical records of Norma Jean Oliver. This was based on an initial
one-time meeting with both Petitioner's trial counsel wherein they indicated that they had
made repeated requests for Ms. Oliver's medical records. Trial counsels' belief was
subsequently further reflected in the trial transcript.
10
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of self-importance; racing speech, racing thoughts, flight of ideas; impulsiveness, poor
judgment, distractibility; reckless behavior; and, in the most severe cases, delusions and
hallucinations. One of the usual differential diagnoses for bipolar disorder is that the
symptoms are not better accounted for by Schizoaffective Disorder and is not
superimposed on Schizophrenia, Schizophreniform Disorder, Delusional Disorder, or
Psychotic Disorder Not Otherwise Specified.
Petitioner asserts his case mirrors the facts in Freeman v. Us., 284 F.Supp.2d 217
(D. Mass. 2003), where a letter had been sent to the prosecuting attorney from a
psychiatrist for the main and uncorroborated government witness in a criminal
prosecution. The letter put the prosecutor on notice that the witness suffered from bipolar
disorder, was currently in the midst of a major depressive episode, and would likely
decompensate under rigorous questioning by attorneys, and that her medical and
psychiatric problems would be seriously intensified by her participation in a trial. This
information was not disclosed to the defense. The federal district court for the district of
Massachusetts found that the evidence was material as required to establish a Brady
claim arising from government's failure to disclose the letter.
In this case, Jay Rosenthal testified that the 1991 forcible rape charges were

reduced to statutory rape because Ms. Oliver was "vulnerable," "fragile," "terrified," and
''unable to effectively go on with the case in front of a jury" or withstand crossexamination based in part on the recommendation of her treatment providers, psychiatrist
and caseworker. (Tr., pp. 4952-4954; p. 5953, Ls.12-25.) As far as Petitioner is aware,
this information was not disclosed to the defense at the time he entered his plea bargain.
Likewise, he believes it was not disclosed prior to his capital sentencing hearing. Further,
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the State called Mr. Rosenthal prior to calling Ms. Oliver, thus keeping the defense in the
dark about the reasons for the State amending the charges to statutory rape when they
cross-examined Ms. Oliver.
Petitioner claims that the State was on notice of the full nature of Ms. Oliver's
mental health problems, both in 1991 and 2004, yet failed to disclose this information to
the defense. Evidence of Ms. Oliver's mental health problems is exculpatory evidence.
Further such evidence is material because Ms. Oliver's testimony was critical in
sentencing Petitioner to death. There exists a reasonable probability that without such
evidence the jury would not have found the propensity aggravator beyond a reasonable
doubt and would not have found that the other aggravating circumstances outweighed the
mitigation without her testimony.

b. The State committed Brady violations by not disclosing the complete
results of the sexual crimes examination and testing ("rape kit")
conducted in the Norma Jean Oliver statutory rape case.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still awaiting a hearing and ruling
on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006, motion for depositions and due to
restrictions on contacting jurors. Petitioner does however assert that the rape kit contains
eXCUlpatory evidence. Specifically, Petitioner states that the examination and testing
showed that Petitioner did not have anal sex with Ms. Oliver and that there could be
evidence indicating that Ms. Oliver had sexual intercourse after being allegedly forcibly
raped by Petitioner.

c. The State committed Brady violations by not disclosing all
photographic evidence that would have impeached the testimony of
Norma Jean Oliver and Detective Daniel Hess and tended to show
that Petitioner only committed the crime to which he pled, DODforcible statutory rape.
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The photographic evidence in this case was the only contemporaneous evidence
available at trial to corroborate the testimony of Ms. Oliver and Detective Hess regarding
the degree of injuries allegedly inflicted upon Ms. Oliver by Petitioner. It was difficult to
identify any injuries in the photographs utilized at trial, but impossible to say
conclusively that the photos did not depict the injuries as described.
Petitioner has requested through discovery the original contact sheet of
photographs taken of Ms. Oliver. Petitioner asserts that the contact sheets or other
photographs requested will demonstrate that Ms. Oliver and Detective Hess were either
confused about the nature of the injuries, or were intentionally misleading.

d. The State Committed Brady Violations By Not Disclosing Evidence
Suggesting That Norma Jean Oliver Was Incompetent To Testify.
As noted above, Ms. Oliver had tremendous difficulty recalling events to which
she was called to testify. Petitioner incorporates by reference Claim - above. Indeed,
Ms. Oliver's testimony was so disconnected from surrounding facts and circumstances
that trial counsel could not conduct a meaningful cross-examination as guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Ms. Oliver's testimony was so junlbled and
incomplete that it lacked the reliability necessary for introduction of evidence in a
capital sentencing proceeding under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and denied
him his rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Not only was
Ms. Oliver's testimony incomplete in court, Petitioner has recently learned through his
reinvestigation of the case that when Ms. Oliver was contacted by the State to testify in
the underlying criminal case, her memory of the events twelve years earlier was
completely lacking. It was only through repeated readings of police reports that Ms.
Oliver was able to even piece together what she presented to the jury.
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The State should have disclosed the full extent of Ms. Oliver's memory
problems to the defense.

Had the State done so, then trial counsel could have

successfully precluded her testimony in its entirety, or otherwise effectively crossexamined her on her near complete lack of memory prior to being contacted by the
State. Accordingly, the failure to disclose this information constituted a Brady violation
and requires reversal of Petitioner's death sentence.
Petitioner cannot fully state this Brady claim and its subparts as he is still
awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,2006. 11

e. The State Committed Brady Violations By Not Disclosing Incentives
Given To Ms. Oliver To Testify.
Petitioner has learned through his reinvestigation of the case that Ms. Oliver was
not compelled by subpoena to testify as a witness for the State. Instead, Petitioner
believes that the State flew Ms. Oliver from West Virginia and provided her meals and
lodging while in Boise. Petitioner cannot fully state this claim at this time, and reserves
the right to withdraw this claim upon completion of his investigation including receipt of
any court-ordered discovery following the hearing scheduled in June 2006.

2. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable
Evidence Pertaining To April Sebastian

It is worth noting that elsewhere in his amended petition, Petitioner also claims that: (1)
Ms. Oliver was incompetent to testify; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in
failing to fully investigate, or re-investigate, Ms. Oliver's allegations; (3) trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to move to strike, or otherwise preclude,
consideration of Ms. Oliver's testimony [based on her incompetence]; (4) trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to impeach Ms. Oliver with information in their
possession, and disclosed in discovery but never reviewed by counsel; and (5) the State
committed multiple Napue violations by failing to correct false and misleading testimony
of their witnesses.
II

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

32
{lO-fQC

April Sebastian testified against Petitioner at his sentencing. At the time of her
testimony, she was actively represented by Petitioner's trial counsel, Amil Myshin, in her
upcoming "rider" hearing in the case of State of Idaho v. April Sebastian, Ada County
case no. H0400228. (Tr., pp. 4868-70; pp. 4875-96.) At the time of her testimony, Ms.
Sebastian also had another active case, State of Idaho v. April Sebastian, Ada County
case no. H040033511M0401584. Following her testimony, Ms. Sebastian appeared for her
"rider" hearing with her counsel, Amil Myshin. The district court presiding over the case
granted her probation based on a recommendation from the State.
Petitioner has reasonable grounds to believe that the State offered Ms. Sebastian
benefits in her other cases in exchange for her testimony against Petitioner. For instance,
based on a review of court documents, Ms. Sebastian was not a good candidate for
probation, appearing to have failed on probation twice previously. The extent to which
the State offered Ms. Sebastian benefits in exchange for her testimony is still being
investigated. Further, Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still awaiting a
hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006. Nevertheless, at
this time, Petitioner asserts that the State violated Brady and such violations warrant
reversal. Petitioner reserves the right to withdraw this claim upon completion of his
investigation.
3. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable
Evidence Pertaining To Michelle Deen Regarding Her Prior Criminal
Convictions, Her Past Attempts To Broker Deals With The Police To
Avoid Prosecution, And Her Compromised Mental Health As Reflected
In By Court-Ordered Substance Abuse And Psychological Examinations.
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Ms. Deen testified against Petitioner at his sentencing.

(Tr., pp.4813-39.)

Petitioner has discovered through his reinvestigation that Ms. Deen was convicted of at
least two felonies, only one of which was elicited at trial.
The State had an obligation to disclose Ms. Deen' s full criminal record including
both felony convictions stemming from the cases of State of Idaho v. Michelle Deen, Ada
County case no. H0301398 and State ofIdaho v. Michelle Deen, case no. H0200584. The
State's apparent failure 12 to provide Ms. Deen's full criminal history to trial counsel
constitutes a Brady violation warranting reversal.
In addition, Petitioner's reinvestigation of the case has uncovered the fact that at

least in one prior incident Ms. Deen has attempted to broker deals with the State,
through its agents, to avoid prosecution or to obtain leniency. Specifically, in the course
of review Ms. Deen's files at the Ada County Courthouse, Petitioner has found a
handwritten note among other court documents stating:
2-9 - narc. arrest made by patrol. D arrested at 18.4 g meth (+). D wanted
to talk to police re: "deal." D said meth not hers & didn't want to go down
on someone elses dope. D then failed to contact cops after they spoke. 2
syringes found wi dope
(Exhibit 6.) This appears to be a note, reflecting the circumstances surrounding Ms.
Deen's arrest on February 9, 2002, for mUltiple drug-related offenses, including felony
possession of a controlled substance, State v. Deen, Ada County case no.

12 Petitioner's counsel is forced to assert an apparent Brady violation because based on
his review of trial counsels' files and the lack of evidence presented at trial, it appears
this information was not disclosed. However, Petitioner cannot assert with absolute
certainty that the State did not disclose the information for three reasons: (1) Petitioner
has not yet received all of trial counsels' files and notes; (2) the trial counsel has
improperly refused to adequately consult with Petitioner despite his many requests; and
(3) the State has objected to Petitioner's Motion For Discovery.
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to curry favor with State agents constitutes a Brady violation warranting reversal.
Finally, Petitioner has discovered in his reinvestigation of the case that that Ms.
Deen underwent court-ordered substance abuse and psychological evaluations in the case
of State v. Deen, Ada County case no. No. H03013981M0311644. The State's apparent
failure to provide Ms. Deen's full criminal history to trial counsel constitutes a Brady
violation warranting reversal.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still conducting his investigation
and is awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5,2006.

4. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable
Evidence Pertaining To Rebecca McCusker.
Petitioner reported Rebecca McCusker to the Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare for allegations of child neglect and/or abandonment. Petitioner believes that
corroborating records could establish a motivation for Ms. McCusker to retaliate against
Petitioner by exaggerating or lying in her testimony at Petitioner's sentencing. These
records are in the State's possession. Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still
investigating this claim and is awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For
Discovery, filed January 5, 2006.

5. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable
Evidence Pertaining To Evelyn Dunaway.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still investigating this claim and is
awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006.
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6. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable
Evidence Pertaining To Wendy Levy.
The State interviewed Wendy Levy in preparation for their sentencing case.
(Exhibit 7.) Ms. Levy provided evidence to the State that was exculpatory. Accordingly,
the State found nothing helpful from Ms. Levy and chose not to call her as a witness.
The evidence provided to the State included, but was not limited to, evidence
regarding Erick Hall's positive, non-violent relationships with previous girlfriends. This
evidence was exculpatory because it tended to mitigate against imposition of the death
sentence and it undercut the State's argument that Petitioner has a propensity to murder
based on a history of violent sex crimes against former girlfriends. The State had an
affirmative obligation to disclose this evidence to the defense. None of that evidence was
provided. The State's Brady violation warrants reversal of Petitioner's death sentence.
7. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable
Evidence Pertaining To A Potential Alternate Perpetrator.
The State was in possession of evidence that suggested the possibility of an
alternate perpetrator ofthe homicide. As even the State recognized, at least when outside
the presence of the jury, the DNA evidence that linked Petitioner to rape did not establish
that he also killed Ms. Henneman. The State did however argue, based on their expert's
testimony, that the DNA sample taken from Ms. Henneman was the sample of just one
perpetrator, Erick Hall. Thus, the State argued that there was only one perpetrator of
rape, and therefore one perpetrator of the murder.
During these post-conviction proceedings, Petitioner has established that the DNA
evidence actually shows that there was more than one perpetrator involved in the crime of

AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

OO¥90

rape. (Exhibit 8.) Petitioner has always maintained, and continues to maintain, that he
did not kill Ms. Henneman. Petitioner asserts that the secondary contributor to the DNA
may have been the actual killer. During the course of this reinvestigation, Petitioner has
identified one possible person as the source for the DNA evidence not yet matched. That
person, Patrick Hoffert, is deceased.
According to police reports, Lisa Lewis and Peggy Hill told Detective Dave
Smith and Scott Birch of the Attorney General's Office that they had seen and spoken
with Lynn Henneman near the Greenbelt on the night she was abducted. (Exhibit 9.)
Ms. Lewis indicated that Ms. Henneman asked for their assistance on directions to the
DoubleTree Inn. According to Ms. Lewis, Petitioner and Patrick Bernard Hoffert then
arrived, at which point Petitioner spoke briefly to Ms. Henneman. Ms. Hill reported
noticing Ms. Henneman's yellow sapphire ring and recalled that Petitioner left with Ms.
Henneman.
The State did not call either Ms. Lewis or Ms. Hill to testify despite that fact that
on the surface, their testimony would appear incriminating of Petitioner. The reason the
State did not call these witnesses is because there is more to the story. Specifically, the
morning after Ms. Henneman's abduction, Patrick Hoffert, the other individual placed
with Ms. Henneman the night before, committed suicide. (Exhibit 10.) An investigation
was conducted both by the Garden City Police Department and the coroner's office.

I

Through reinvestigation of this case, Petitioner has obtained the affidavits of Ms.
Lewis and Ms. Hill, who confirm the information in the police reports. (Exhibit 11,
Exhibit 12.) Further, Ms. Lewis indicates that Deirdre Muncy, Patrick Hoffert's former
girlfriend, told her that prior to committing suicide Patrick stated that, "he raped the
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girl.,,13 When Ms. Lewis attempted to bring this information to the attention of the
Garden City Police, she was told to mind her own business. Ms. Lewis also indicates that
several years later she positively identified the woman she met as Lynn Henneman
through a photographic array given to her by Detective Dave Smith of the Boise Police
Department. Ms. Hill was also contacted by Detective Smith, but with no follow-up. This
information does not appear in trial counsels' files and was not presented at the trial.
Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still investigating the degree of
information known but withheld by the State and further is awaiting a hearing and ruling
on his Motion For Discovery, filed January 5, 2006.
8. The Prosecution Violated Brady By Failing To Disclose Favorable
Evidence Connecting Christian Johnson To The Henneman Homicide.

Christian Johnson was the State's prime suspect in the Henneman homicide for
numerous months. Based on the amount of time he was under investigation, Petitioner
believes there are numerous documents and other information not contained in trial
counsels' files, which should have been disclosed by the State if those documents or
information inculpated Mr. Johnson. Evidence tending to identify someone else as the
perpetrator is exculpatory and material. Grube v. Blades, 2006 WL 297203 (D. Idaho
2006)(slip copy, memorandum order).
Petitioner is still investigating this claim and reserves the right to withdraw it
upon completion of his reinvestigation of the case.
E. THE STATE COMMITTED NUMEROUS NAPUE VIOLATIONS

13 Deirdre Muncy denied this assertion, but that alone, does not make the evidence
inadmissible or irrelevant at a capital sentencing proceeding, especially in light of the
other odd circumstances involving Mr. Hoffert that remain.
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The deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of evidence
known to be false violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the
government, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it
appears. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). In other words, the state cannot
create a materially false impression regarding the facts of the case or the credibility of the
witnesses. In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), the Supreme Court made
clear that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false
evidence is incompatible with "rudimentary demands of justice." This was reaffirmed in
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the

Court stated that, "[t]he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false
evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." Id., at 269; see also Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972)

Prosecutor falsehoods alone do not automatically entitle a petitioner to relief.
Relief is compelled when the false impressions are "material," which means when "there
is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of
the jury." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 394 U.S. 103 (1935). The record must suggest a
reasonable likelihood that during deliberations the jurors could have considered the false
evidence or argument.
1. The Prosecutor Elicited Materially False Testimony From Dennis Dean
Regarding Idaho Department of Corrections Inmate Classification
System, Directives For Classification And Conditions Of Confinement.

During the sentencing trial, the State created a materially false impression of how
the Idaho Department of Corrections (mOC) would determine Petitioner's custody
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status, and the conditions of confinement to which Petitioner would be subjected. At
sentencing, the State called Dennis Dean, the Inmate Records Placement Manager with
the IDOC. (Tr., p. 4904, Ls. 9-11.) Mr. Dean described the initial classification process
for offenders, and explained that classification was a "risk assessment" done to determine
how best to house an inmate. (Tr., p. 4906, L. 24 - p. 4907, L. 6.) The State elicited
testimony that the IDOC system has three prison levels of "secured" facilitiesmaximum, medium, and minimum-and other non-secured facilities such as work
centers. (Tr., p. 4905, L. 17 - p. 4906, L.

1.)14

The prosecutor deliberately and repeatedly elicited materially misleading
information from Mr. Dean suggesting that Petitioner, if sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole, could be housed at a minimum custody facility:
Q.

Okay. So if a person were, say at the medium security facility and
they were misbehaving, showing disrespect to staff or breaking
things or doing a variety of other rule violations, they could get
more points and go to maximum security?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Then, over time, if they behaved and did certain things, they could
lose points and ultimately go to minimum custody?

A.

Yes, those points - detention points would fall off after a year.

(Tr., p. 4911, Ls. 6-15) The prosecutor asked about conditions at minimum secured
facilities, and elicited that inmates at those facilities can work on "fire fighting crews []

14 This information alone is incorrect. According to IDOC, there are at least 5 levels of
custody. (Exhibit 13.) (IDOC Offender Classification). Furthermore, Mr. Dean's claims
or implications that classifications are based on purely "objective" criteria are false. ( Tr.,
p. 4907, Ls. 9-10) (Exhibit 14.) Petitioner does not at this time have access to all of the
necessary IDOC policies, nor does Petitioner have access to the "IDOC Male Offender
Custody Classification User Manual," but will request those policies and manual in an
amended discovery motion if not voluntarily disclosed by the IDOC.
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that work out of that facility," can work on "road crews," "have the opportunity to work
outside," have access to "a therapeutic community," and can attend classes." (Tr., p.
4915, Ls. 9-25) This examination was designed to deliberately mislead the jury into
believing that Petitioner would be eligible for minimum security despite first degree
murder, rape, and kidnapping convictions, using the assumption that the Petitioner would
receive a life without parole sentence. (Tr., p. 4949, L. 22- p. 4950, L. 8.)
The State did finally elicit testimony on redirect examination that Petitioner
would not be eligible for minimum custody under the current IDOC classification system.
However, the State immediately pointed out that the classification system is not state law,
but merely IDOC policy, and that "from time to time points and classifications have to
change based on prison populations and crowding and various like that." (Tr., p. 4950,
Ls. 4-7) It is improper to rely on speculative future housing policy changes to obtain a
sentence of death. Overall, the State left the jurors with the overwhelming, and incorrect,
impression that Petitioner could be eligible to live in a minimum secured facility at some
point, which is not the case. The prejudice was especially acute because the State drew
attention to the fact that Petitioner's escape in 1994 was from a minimum secured
facility. (Tr., p. 4920, Ls. 18-25.)
The State also improperly and prejudicially implied that Petitioner would
eventually be housed in "country-club-like" conditions. Mr. Dean testified that the
medium secured facility was "like a little town," "something like a college campus," with
a gymnasium, dining room, chapel, where inmates could go to work, play at the ball field,
earn wages, attend college classes, and live in a therapeutic environment. (Tr., p. 4913,
L.18 - p. 4915, L. 6.)

According to the IDOC Directive 303.02.01.001, however,
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"medium custody" offenders "shall be held within the confines of a secure perimeter,"
movement "shall be structured and monitored," and inmates "shall normally be under
continuous armed staff supervision and in restraints" whenever outside the facility. The

moc

medium security facility is surrounded by multiple layers of razor wire, attack

dogs, and armed guards. 15 The State's presentation of Petitioner's "conditions of
confinement" if sentenced to life without parole is extremely misleading, irrelevant to the
jury's sentencing determination, and highly prejudicial in that it encouraged the jury to
make its sentencing determination based on improper, irrelevant, and incorrect
information. There is a reasonable likelihood that the false and misleading testimony
could have affected the judgment of the jury.

2. The Prosecutor Deliberately Created The Materially False Impression
That Petitioner Seriously Choked Evelyn Dunaway While Engaging In
Sexual Intercourse.
The State argued at sentencing that Petitioner's history with girlfriends and other
women established his propensity to commit murder. In support of its propensity theory,
the State called Petitioner's former girlfriend, Evelyn Dunaway, to testify. The State's
questioning of Ms. Dunaway was materially misleading and unduly prejudiciaL
The State's examination of Ms. Dunaway was designed to and did leave the
impression that Petitioner seriously choked Ms. Dunaway while having sexual
intercourse with her:
Q. Okay. Would that have been in March of2002?
A. Possibly.

15 Through discovery, Petitioner intends to offer further evidence of the lack of decent
conditions, lack of programming, lack of exercise, lack of job training, and the
unlikelihood that Petitioner will ever be assigned to medium custody.
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Q. All right. Was that the end of the relationship then?
A. It was.
Q. Okay. Was there another time before that when Erick choked you with
his hands?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did that take place?
A. In our bedroom.
Q. At that same trailer?
A. Yes.
Q. Why was he mad at you that day?
A. I don't remember.

Q. Okay. How serious was the choking? Was it-A. It was serious.

Q. Tell us what happened, that you remember?
A. There was a couple times -- I don't remember.
Q. Was it bad enough to scare you?
A. Yes.

Q. I mean did he come up from behind you, or sit on you, or how did it
work?
A. He would sit on me.

Q. I just need to ask you one other area, Evelyn, that I don't care to ask
you but I need to anyway. While you were living there with him in the
trailer for those months did you have a sexual relationship with him?
A. We did.
Q. I just need to know kind of in terms of frequency. Was -- how often
was there sexual intercourse between you?
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A. Daily.
Q. Was it sometimes more than daily?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that of your -- of your instigation or his? Did he want sex -A. Sometimes both but more him.
(Tr., p. 4846, L. 1 - p. 4947, L. 16)(emphasis added).
Given that the victim, Lynn Henneman, was purportedly raped and choked to
death, the connection the State wished the jury to infer is obvious: Petitioner has a
propensity for choking women while having sex. However, Ms. Dunaway never testified
that Petitioner choked her while having sex. Rather, the prosecutor deliberately asked
questions in such a way that the jurors would naturally make the connection between
sexual intercourse and choking, despite the fact that he was inquiring about two separate
areas. (Tr., p. 4847, L. 2 (informing the witness that they were now transitioning to a
different area of questioning).) Indeed, in Petitioner's reinvestigation of the case, Ms.
Dunaway has confirmed that Petitioner never choked her while having sex. (Exhibit 15.)
There is a reasonable likelihood that the false and misleading testimony could
have affected the judgment of the jury.

3. The Prosecutor Deliberately Created The Materially False Impression
That Petitioner Choked Michelle Deen While Engaging In Forcible
Sexual Intercourse.
In further support of its propensity theory, the State called Petitioner's former
girlfriend, Michelle Deen, to testify. As with Ms. Dunaway, the State's questioning of
Ms. Deen was materially misleading and highly prejudicial to Petitioner.
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The State's examination of Ms. Deen was designed to and did leave the impression
that Petitioner choked Ms. Dunaway while having forcible sexual intercourse with her:
Q. Now, I hate to be indelicate and I -- but I told you I was going to have
to be some and so I need to ask you about your sexual relationship with
the defendant.
Who decided when and where and how and such as that in terms of
when you were going to have sexual relations?

A. Erick did.
Q. And how did he decide that, I mean, and how did he convey that to
you?

A. It just pretty much when he wanted it, it was right then and there.
Q. Did it matter if you said no?

A. It didn't matter.
Q. If you did say no, what would happen?
A. It would still happen. It would be pretty much take my clothes off and
have sex.
Q. Did he ever have to use force on you to get you-

A. He's a very strong man. I couldn't fight Erick back if I wanted to.
Q. Did there come a point when, you know, August when he put you in a
headlock over something that had come up?
A. He put me in a headlock, and I can't remember the situation why he
put me in a headlock. He had me in a headlock on the couch and he told
me that if I yelled or moved that all he had to do was to twist my neck and
he could kill me. And he told me not to tell nobody about this, about our
situation or he'd kill me.
Q. Okay. How hard did he squeeze?
A. It was very forceful. It hurt really bad. I couldn't move. I was too
scared.
Q. Did -- (brief delay.) Did it interfere with your breathing?
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A. I couldn't breathe that well after he did it. You know, during the time
he did it it was hard for me to breathe and I didn't want to move or say
anything, because I didn't want to die.
Q. Okay, now. When you -- after this all happened, did you decide to
leave?
A. Yes, I did. Erick went to bed -- we went to bed one night, he got
sound to sleep and I snuck out and left.
(Tr., p. 4820, L. 22 - p. 4822, L.16). The prosecutor thus "linked" sexual intercourse and
choking. The witness never testified that Petitioner choked her during sex, yet the
prosecutor's questioning was designed to connect sexual activity with force. Given that
the victim, Lynn Henneman, was purportedly raped and choked prior to her death, the
connection the State wished the jury to infer is obvious. There can be no doubt that the
erroneous conclusion the prosecutor calculated jurors would draw was material, given the
allegations about the manner of Ms. Henneman's death.

4. The Prosecutor Elicited Materially False Testimony From Norma Jean
Oliver.
In support of its propensity argument, the State relied heavily upon allegations

that Petitioner forcibly raped Norma Jean Oliver in 1991.

Petitioner was originally

charged with two counts of forcible anal and vaginal rape of Ms. Oliver. (Exhibit 3.)
Subsequently, the anal rape charge was dropped, and the forcible vaginal charge was
amended to statutory vaginal rape. (Exhibit 4.) Petitioner pled guilty to vaginal statutory
rape. During Ms. Oliver's testimony at the sentencing trial in the instant homicide case,
the State repeatedly elicited materially false testimony regarding the 1991 rape case.
First, the State elicited testimony it the State itself had not found credible when it
elicited testimony from Ms. Oliver suggesting that Petitioner had anally raped her in
December 1991. (Tr., p. 4767, Ls. 5-7 ("[h]e started having anal sex with me and I told
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